The Insider

Defense Secretary Robert Gates today argued against cutting the defense budget to address the massive federal deficit.

“When it comes to the deficit, the Department of Defense is not the problem,” Gates said at the annual meeting of The Wall Street Journal’s CEO Council. The specific defense cuts recently proposed by the leaders of the administration’s deficit commission amount to “math, not strategy,” Gates said.

C-SPAN has video of Gates’ remarks. In the clip, Gates appears after Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.

A top Marine Corps official today denied a report from the London Sunday Times that Marine Commandant Gen. James Amos was “really angry” over Britain's decision not to buy STOVL JSFs and sent British exchange pilots packing.

“That's absolutely, 100 percent, unequivocally false,” Lt. Gen. George Trautman, deputy commandant for aviation, told Inside the Navy today. “There is not a single grain of truth in [that]. Gen. Amos . . . he doesn't get angry, it's not his nature, and no U.K. exchange officers have been sent home or anything else.”

Last month, the British government announced in a major defense review that it would not buy STOVL F-35 and would instead purchase carrier variants.

The Marine Corps today announced it is looking to put wind turbines on 10 bases around the United States.

The service released a draft programmatic environmental assessment detailing its plans. From the document:

The proposed action is to site, design, construct, and operate small-scale wind energy projects on USMC 28 facilities at a variety of locations throughout the United States. The design of a small-scale wind energy 29 project would include the number, locations, and sizes of wind turbines for a project site. These 30 parameters would be chosen based on, for example, the capital cost of the wind turbines, the area 31 available for siting the wind turbines, a facility’s power demand, the specific requirements of the local 32 electricity distribution system, or a combination of the four. The number of turbines installed at any 33 given project site would range from a single turbine to four turbines. Thus, the PEA addresses the federal 34 action of wind turbine construction in the context of limited numbers of turbines and specified size range 35 category of turbines defined in this document: small (<0.1 megawatt [mw]), medium (0.1 to 1 mw), and 36 large (1 to 2.5 mw).

The following bases are considered priority sites for the plan:

• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Brooklyn, New York (NY) 41
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Galveston, Texas (TX) 1
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Syracuse, NY 2
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Great Lakes, Illinois (IL) 3
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Battle Creek, Michigan (MI) 4
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Riverton, Utah (UT) 5
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Omaha, Nebraska (NE) 6
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Kansas City, Missouri (MO) 7
• Marine Corps Reserve Center, Amarillo, TX 8
• Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California (CA)

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The Council on Foreign Relations just released a task force study on U.S. options for future policy in Afghanistan. The council's report comes out a month before the Obama administration is set to complete a review of the war effort in that country.

According to a council statement, the study found "that the current approach to the region is at a critical point." It concludes that "for now, the United States should assume the lead, with the goal of encouraging and enabling its Pakistani and Afghan partners to build a more secure future. Yet even the United States cannot afford to continue down this costly path unless the potential for enduring progress remains in sight. After nine years of U.S. war in the region, time and patience are understandably short." Further:

While the Task Force offers a qualified endorsement of the current U.S. effort in Afghanistan, including plans to begin a conditions-based military drawdown in July 2011, the Obama administration's upcoming December 2010 review should be "a clear-eyed assessment of whether there is sufficient overall progress to conclude that the strategy is working." If not, the report argues that “a more significant drawdown to a narrower military mission would be warranted.”

The Task Force, chaired by former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, and directed by CFR Senior Fellow Daniel S. Markey, notes that nine years into the Afghan war, the outcome of the struggles in the region are still uncertain and the stakes are high. "What happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan matters to Americans," affirms the report. It warns that "militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan pose a direct threat to the United States and its allies. They jeopardize the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear power that lives in an uneasy peace with its rival, India."

The Task Force supports the U.S. investment in a long-term partnership with Pakistan, but underscores that it is only sustainable if Pakistan takes action against all terrorist organizations based on its soil. Concrete Pakistani actions against terror groups "are the bedrock requirements for U.S. partnership and assistance over the long run." In Pakistan, "the United States aims to degrade and defeat the terrorist groups that threaten U.S. interests from its territory and to prevent turmoil that would imperil the Pakistani state and risk the security of Pakistan's nuclear program."

The Task Force notes that these goals are best achieved through partnership with a stable Pakistani state, but that "the challenge of fighting regional terrorist networks is compounded by the fact that Pakistan draws distinctions between such groups." Flood-ravaged Pakistan also faces "enormous new stresses on the state—already challenged by political, economic, and security problems—increasing disaffection among its people, and weakening its ability to fight extremists in its territory."

In Afghanistan, "the United States seeks to prevent the country from becoming a base for terrorist groups that target the United States and its allies and to diminish the potential that Afghanistan reverts to civil war, which would destabilize the region." Afghanistan faces the challenges of "pervasive corruption that breeds the insurgency; weak governance that creates a vacuum; Taliban resilience that feeds an atmosphere of intimidation; and an erratic leader whose agenda may not be the same as that of the United States."

The report's top recommendations, according to the council statement, are:

Pakistan

-"To further enhance Pakistan's stability, the United States should maintain current levels of economic and technical assistance to help military and civilian leaders reconstruct and establish control over areas hard-hit by the flood, including those contested by militant forces." The Task Force recommends "continued and expanded training, equipment, and facilities for police, paramilitaries, and the army."

-"To reinforce U.S.-Pakistan ties and contribute to Pakistan's economic stability in the aftermath of an overwhelming natural disaster, the Obama administration should prioritize—and the Congress should enact—an agreement that would grant preferential market access to Pakistani textiles."

-"As it cultivates a closer partnership with Islamabad . . . the United States still needs to seek a shift in Pakistani strategic calculations about the use of militancy as a foreign policy tool. Washington should continue to make clear to Islamabad that at a basic level, U.S. partnership and assistance depend upon action against LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba], the Afghan Taliban, especially the Haqqani network, and related international terror groups."

Afghanistan

-"In Afghanistan, core American security aims can best be achieved at a lower cost if the United States manages to shift a greater burden to Afghan partners," explains the Task Force. "The United States should encourage an initiative with three complementary elements: political reform, national reconciliation, and regional diplomacy."

-"Political reforms should aim to grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests," states the Task Force. "Rather than leaving the reconciliation process to [Afghan] President Karzai and his narrow support base, Washington should participate fully in guiding a broad-based, inclusive process, bearing in mind that a rapid breakthrough at the negotiating table is unlikely. Afghan reform and reconciliation should then be supported by a regional diplomatic accord brokered by the United States."

-"To foster Afghanistan's viability as a security partner, the United States must continue to build cost-effective Afghan security forces appropriate to the capabilities necessary to protect the population. This will require more army and police trainers, as well as an expansion of community-based stabilization forces."

-"Afghanistan needs a self-sustaining foundation for generating jobs and revenue that will reduce dependence on international assistance. To meet this need, the United States should encourage private sector investment in Afghanistan's considerable mineral and energy resources, its agricultural sector, and in the infrastructure needed to expand trans-Afghan trade."

Another recent study on the region, this one a "Year in Review" from the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, finds that leadership and training deficiencies are the main challenges for NATO trainers as the security force nears the end of its first full year helping build the Afghan National Security Force, Inside the Pentagon reports this week:

The report comes as President Obama's proposed July 2011 draw-down of U.S. forces nears, and as the newly elected Republican-controlled House of Representatives prepares to define its goals for Iraq and Afghanistan.

The report, released Nov. 9, details the force's challenges, progress and goals in its aims to help the Afghanistan National Security Force professionalize and train its own forces.

"Assisting our Afghan partners to build an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge, and the attainment of the growth objectives for the next year is not assured," the report adds.

"There will continue to be leader shortfalls in the Afghan National Army, and some corrupt and inefficient leaders remain in the Army and Police," writes NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan commander Lt. Gen. William Caldwell in the report. "Attrition also is a constant challenge that undermines professionalization, delays growth, and degrades quality. NTM-A will support our Afghan partners to continue growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force."

Highlighting our recent score of numerous Congressional Research Reports again today (we've already looked at one on open-source intelligence and another on lead systems integrators).

We've also obtained one on specialty metals. In that Oct. 5 report, CRS notes:

Effective July 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a final rule to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to implement Section 842 of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act and Sections 804 and 884 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-181. The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) contained several provisions which may impact the procurement of specialty metal. Section 803 required the Strategic Materials Protection Board to perform an assessment of the viability of domestic producers of strategic materials; Section 804 changed the requirement that DOD procure all specialty metal from domestic sources. This provision does not apply to contracts or subcontracts for the acquisition of commercially available “off-the-shelf” items (with certain exceptions), as defined in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Section 35(c); and Section 884 requires DOD to publish a notice on the Federal Business Opportunities website before making any "nonavailability" determinations that would apply to multiple contracts.

The specialty metal provision raises several questions, among them: (1) to what extent do United States national security interests and industrial base concerns justify waiver of the specialty metal provision, (2) if the United States does not produce a 100% domestic specialty metal, should DOD restrict procurement from foreign sources, and (3) what factors should drive the determination of which specialty metals should fall under the specialty metal provision? Debate over the specialty metal provision invites and renews a debate over the efficacy of domestic source restrictions and whether the rationale for every restriction represents a balanced and reasonable approach.

Before listing the possible options for Congress, the report states:

It is important to note that the specialty metal provision in the Berry Amendment had been in place since 1972. Any change in the law will likely have both upstream and downstream effects. How will the change affect prime contractors and subcontractors on the second, third, and fourth tiers, as well as U.S. domestic suppliers? It may take some time for DOD to implement the change in policy.

Consequently, CRS lists six possible options for policymakers to consider:

(1) eliminate the specialty metal provision, or eliminate the Berry Amendment;

(2) combine the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act into one statute;

(3) enforce a new specialty metal provision;

(4) limit the inclusion of non-compliant specialty metal;

(5) require more congressional oversight; and

(6) convene a blue-ribbon panel, a "Specialty Metal Commission."

Inside the Pentagon reported in June that the Congressional Steel Caucus had sent Defense Secretary Robert Gates a letter, dated May 5, urging the Pentagon to use only American steel in the production of armor for troops and vehicles and to revamp rules that permit the use of imported steel. ITP interviewed DOD industrial base chief Brett Lambert for that article. From the story:

If there are recommended changes, the Pentagon would want to examine any proposals closely to ensure it will be able to maintain the required MRAP production rate of 1,000 per month, Lambert told ITP. The vehicles are considered essential for protecting troops from improvised explosive devices, the No. 1 cause of fatalities and casualties among U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Pentagon has sent Capitol Hill a brief reply acknowledging it received the May 5 letter and noting there would be further follow up, but the department has not yet provided a substantial response, a congressional source said.

Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-IN), chairman of the Congressional Steel Caucus, Rep. Tim Murphy (R-PA), the caucus' vice chair, and 35 caucus members signed the letter, which expressed "deep concerns" about a DOD regulation that affects the procurement of steel armor plate.

"We believe that this regulation jeopardizes the safety of our troops and increases our reliance on imported steel, to the detriment of our national security and the American industrial base," the lawmakers wrote.

At a March 25 hearing on the state of the steel industry, the caucus discussed the Specialty Metals Amendment, as originally included under the Berry Amendment in 1973. The Specialty Metals Amendment aims to ensure that American steel is used to protect U.S. troops, and that American steel producers have the incentive to invest in the technology, capacity, and research and development to meet DOD needs, the letter states.

An Army spokeswoman told InsideDefense.com today that she doesn't believe the service's stalled Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy will be published until the end of the month.

“I don't think the strategy is solid but we have been working through the staffing process of the documents that support the strategy rollout (press release, talking points, etc.),” according to an e-mail from Army spokeswoman Alayne Conway. “I have asked the question about timing but still awaiting the answer. Realistically, I don't think we will see it until the last week of Nov[ember].”

As we've reported, the Army G-8 prepared the strategy for release at the end of October, but put its publication on hold after senior leaders protested.

We've got what was completed right here.

"We showed it to senior leaders. We thought we did OK. And I don't think they liked the way we presented it,”Army chief programmer Lt. Gen. Robert Lennox told reporters Oct. 26. “I don't think they liked the way we were telling the story. We're going to go back and redo it.”

The TWV strategy is expected to address the Army's future plans for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle as well as a potential humvee recapitalization program.

Industry is also awaiting the release of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle request for proposals, which was initially scheduled for publication at the end of last month. “The Army intends to release a revised RFP for a new Ground Combat Vehicle very soon,” Conway wrote. “Though the revised RFP is still in the final stages of [Defense Department] approval, the Army is confident that this detailed process will result in a successful partnership with industry based on an affordable and achievable acquisition program.”

Meanwhile, the co-chairs of the Obama administration's special deficit reduction commission have released a draft proposal calling for the termination of both the JLTV and GCV.

What to do about North Korea will likely be one of the discussion items while President Obama attends this week's G-20 summit in Seoul.

With that in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations today released a "contingency planning memorandum" titled "Military Escalation in Korea," in which the council's Center for Preventive Action (CPA) Director Paul Stares "warns that a new crisis on the Korean peninsula is a serious risk and urges the United States to work closely with Seoul to monitor warning indicators in the North," according to a council statement. Specifically:

Further provocations by North Korea as well as other military interactions on or around the Korean peninsula carry the danger of unintended escalation, writes Stares. Moreover, changes underway in North Korea could precipitate new tensions and herald a prolonged period of instability that raises the possibility of military intervention by outside powers.

Stares analyzes potentially dangerous situations that could erupt due to the atmosphere of recrimination and mistrust that exists between North and South Korea; the possibility of provocative, domestically driven, North Korean behavior; and the potential for a troubled succession process in Pyongyang. He concludes that the United States has a strong and abiding interest in taking steps to prevent another Korean war and provides the following recommendations to reduce the risk of unwanted military escalation in the region.

-The United States and South Korea should continue to maintain their heightened vigilance through enhancements to their surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities. Particular attention should be paid to likely warning indicators, such as succession instability, notable anniversaries and dates, and missile and nuclear tests.

-The United States should continue to reassure South Korea of its alliance commitments and also help it to fix certain defensive weaknesses identified in the wake of the investigation on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan on March 26, 2010, which claimed the lives of forty-six sailors.

-A concerted diplomatic effort should be made to reduce tensions on the peninsula and to contain North Korea’s pursuit of additional nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities. Encouraging Beijing to restrain Pyongyang’s provocative behavior in the interests of regional stability must continue.