BMD Carrots & Sticks

Ellen Tauscher, the Obama administration's special envoy for strategic stability and missile defense, gave a speech yesterday during a conference in Moscow. In it, she outlined what the United States was willing -- and not willing -- to do to foster missile defense cooperation with Russia:

Sharing of sensor data, working on developing common pre-planned responses, conducting a joint analysis of missile defense systems, and working together on missile defense exercises will allow Russia to see how we do missile defense. Russia has observed our intercept tests in the past and the invitation to observe a future test still stands. By cooperating with us on missile defense, you will be able to see that the European Phased Adaptive Approach is directed against regional threats. Limited regional threats from outside of Europe… not Russia.

Right now, there are six years until Phase 3 of the EPAA becomes operational in 2018. During those six years, we will be testing an Aegis BMD site in Hawaii (that sounds to me like a nice place to visit). We will be developing and testing the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors. We will also be working with our NATO Allies to ensure how to best protect NATO European populations and territory. Beginning cooperation now will give Russia a chance to see… with their own eyes… what we are doing. And it will give us time to demonstrate how our missile defense systems operate.

I realize it takes time to build confidence. During that time, if you don’t like what you have learned from your experiences working side-by-side with us, then walk away. At least this way, you will be able to make decisions based on data you have collected and observed directly rather than on assumptions and perceptions developed from afar.

As it is, Russia today is in a position of strength that should allow you to explore cooperation. Our missile defense systems are not directed against Russia’s sophisticated nuclear deterrent force. We do not seek an arms race with Russia; we seek cooperation that can help convince you that your national security and strategic stability is not threatened. While Russia talks about countermeasures as a hedge against our defensive system, we hope that instead, through cooperation and transparency, Russia will conclude such development is unnecessary. So join us now, in the missile defense tent.

One of the best ways to build that confidence would be to work with us on NATO-Russia missile defense Centers where we can share sensor data and develop coordinated pre-planned responses and reach agreement on our collective approach to the projected threat. This will give us collectively a common understanding and foundation. Furthermore, we have seen the positive benefit this cooperation could have on missile defense effectiveness at the recent NATO-Russia Council Theater Missile Defense Computer Aided Exercise.

While we undertake this missile defense cooperation, our two governments could do even more to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We already cooperate in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working together in the UN to counter Iran and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Just last month, we worked together in the UN Security Council to strongly condemn the DPRK’s missile launch and placed additional sanctions on transfers of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to and from North Korea. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that Russia, NATO and the United States are working to counter their efforts.

Tauscher also drew a line at what the United States is not willing to do:

But let me be clear. While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree to the pre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government. We are committed to deploying effective missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland and our Allies and partners around the world from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

We will not agree to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. We cannot agree to a legally binding guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria,” which would, in effect, limit our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.

We cannot accept limitations on where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States and NATO also cannot agree to Russia's proposal for "sectoral" missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of its own territory, NATO must ensure the defense of its own territory.

Tauscher and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon held a conference call with reporters the previous day in advance of the missile defense conference. In that call, Creedon said the Pentagon's cost assessment and program evaluation office would complete a cost analysis of the Obama administration's proposed missile defense effort in Europe by this summer.

"We're hoping that we will have all of this wrapped up fairly soon -- sometime this summer is the hope," Creedon said. Further, as InsideDefense.com reported:

According to language included in last week's mark-up of the House Armed Services Committee's fiscal year 2013 defense authorization bill, the CAPE office was supposed to have provided a briefing to lawmakers on its initial findings in March. "That briefing was not provided," the committee states.

During her teleconference this afternoon, however, Creedon said such an analysis isn't as simple as it looks. "Very often, when CAPE does a cost estimate, it's a cost estimate of a . . . specific program," she said. "And because the [European Phased Adaptive Approach] is not in DOD parlance a program, what CAPE is doing is looking at the cost of each of the individual programs that will be utilized to build the EPAA. So for instance, they are looking at the cost of the [Standard Missile]-3IA, they're looking at the cost of the SM-3IB, they're looking at all of the costs of all of the various increments that will be utilized not only in EPAA, but also in other phased adaptive approaches as we move towards other areas of the world.

"So as a result, it sounds like it's a simple tasking, but . . . it's actually far more complicated," Creedon continued.

That CAPE estimate will factor into a report House authorizers want the Defense and State departments to jointly submit on how the administration plans to share with NATO the costs of the proposed land-based missile defense system in Europe.