In case you missed it this summer, the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee recently submitted a report to Congress on the government's efforts to counter nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation over the past two years. The panel itself includes officials from the Defense, Energy, Homeland Security and State departments.
While the full report is classified, the committee did release an unclassified executive summary outlining its conclusions and recommendations, which include:
Undertake a broad analysis of U.S. and allied non-kinetic capabilities and technologies, which may have CWMD applications, and determine how they may be better exploited;
Develop, test, and deploy improved capabilities for standoff or remote detection of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) materials related to WMD. The improved capabilities should enable detection from a greater distance than current capability provides, and, for biological threat agents in particular, decrease the time between detection and identification of the biological agent to enable effective warning and treatment;
Develop a range of capabilities to improve U.S. abilities to conduct conventional prompt global strike;
Develop better, or improve existing, coordination mechanisms and information systems to support communities of interest (COI) awareness of ongoing security cooperation activities in foreign regional areas of responsibility;
Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, and protection against Non-traditional ((chemical)) Agents and emerging biological agents;
Create a global community of interest to matrix existing and future international partnerships to share information to more fully understand all ramifications of the present WMD challenge;
Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the future technology requirements of the nuclear weapons arsenal and stockpile, accounting for the fundamental role of deterrence and the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent;
Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for enhanced consequence management efforts, communications, awareness (i.e., common operational picture), and infrastructure to improve local responders’ capabilities to deal with mass casualties. Continued exercises and education, training more personnel, and dedicating more resources to preparedness are also needed to improve nation-wide CWMD consequence management capabilities;
Improve foreign WMD consequence management (FCM) capabilities by establishing more international cooperative agreements with allied host nation governments in coordination with DOS and accounting for variations in countries organic capabilities. Specifically, these should define roles, responsibilities, and procedures for host nation and U.S. military WMD consequence management;
Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for improved WMD forensics, to include improvements to coordination procedures among relevant national and local agencies;
Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination (e.g., information management systems, decision support systems, sensor development, and intelligence support) regarding state and non-state WMD proliferation and development activities; ((and))
Develop, test, and deploy capabilities to understand and predict the motivations, actions, and reactions of an adversary seeking to acquire and employ WMD against the United States, its interests, friends and allies, whether the adversary is a state or non-state (e.g., terrorist cell -- affiliated or non-affiliated) actor.