CRS On Irregular Warfare

By John Liang / October 25, 2012 at 3:41 PM

The Navy's irregular warfare and counterterrorism activities "pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets," a recent Congressional Research Service report finds.

"Congress's decisions regarding Navy IW and CT operations can affect Navy operations and funding requirements, and the implementation of the nation's overall IW and CT strategies," the Oct. 18 report states, adding:

One potential oversight issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were made available.

Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to the Navy for programs that support the Navy’s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a strategic reserve for the United States in countering improved Chinese maritime military forces and otherwise deterring, and, if necessary, fighting in potential conventional interstate conflicts.

Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

* To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such activities?

* Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?

Additional congressional oversight issues, according to CRS, include:

* How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on such activities?

* What are estimated costs of the Navy’s proposed Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSBs)? How will the AFSBs be used? From an acquisition policy perspective, does the AFSB program amount to a new start, and if so, what are the implications for review and oversight of the program?

* Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?

* Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?

* Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?

* Are the Navy's recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What other Navy organizational changes might be needed?

View the full CRS report.

View more of InsideDefense.com's reporting on Irregular Warfare Alert.

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