The Insider

Lockheed Martin, prime contractor for the Joint Strike Fighter, says “aircraft component reliability” continues to hamper test flights of the F-35B, the short take-off and vertical landing variant, while the other two JSF variants -- the conventional take-off and landing and aircraft carrier variants -- are tracking “ahead” of the 2010 flight test plan.

The F-35 flight test team completed 52 flight tests in October, two more than planned for the month, the company said in a Nov. 4 statement, which also notes:

The CTOL aircraft logged 22 flights against a plan of 17; STOVL jets flew 27 times against a plan of 28; and the CV jet flew three times against a plan of five.  Additionally, the STOVL jet flew supersonically, and at Mach 1.3 has flown faster than any other variant to date, and achieved 7 g’s, the highest load condition to date and maximum design g’s for the STOVL.

The conventional take-off and landing variant, the lowest risk of the three JSF types intended for the Air Force, is 66 flights ahead of the plan while the aircraft carrier variant is three flights ahead, according to the company statement.

The F-35B, meanwhile, was 41 test flights behind schedule at the end of last month.

F-35 program officials are pursuing a multi-faceted approach to improve tempo, including working to obtain higher levels of spare parts from suppliers to keep the aircraft in a flight-ready condition, while completing the analysis and corrective action planning to address the root cause of any issues.

The November goal is a total of 51 flights, according to Lockheed, with an eye toward 394 test flights through December.

The Pentagon recently established a policy governing when, how and in what capacity Defense Department employees can work from home. According to an Oct. 21 memo signed by Clifford Stanley, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness:

It is DoD policy that telework shall be:

a. Actively promoted and implemented throughout the Department of Defense in support of the DoD commitment to workforce efficiency, emergency preparedness, and quality of life. Telework is not an entitlement, but its use can serve as an effective recruitment and retention strategy; enhance DoD efforts to employ and accommodate people with disabilities; and create cost savings by decreasing the need for office space and parking facilities, and by reducing transportation costs, including costs associated with payment of transit subsidies.

b. Authorized for the maximum number of positions to the extent that mission readiness is not jeopardized.

c. Accomplished on a regular and recurring or an ad hoc basis at an approved alternate worksite.

d. Periodically exercised to ensure its effectiveness in continuing operations in the event of a crisis or national emergency (e.g., pandemic influenza).

e. Used to help create employment and return-to-work opportunities for veterans, people with disabilities, and spouses of Service members and employees being relocated.

France and the United Kingdom signed a bilateral Defense and Security Cooperation Agreement this week. Analyst Jeffrey Lewis on his ArmsControlWonk blog notes the common stockpile stewardship portion of the pact:

7. We have decided:

[snip]

b) to collaborate in the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations, through unprecedented co-operation at a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of our nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety – this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the UK;

Lewis further notes:

The new facility at Valduc is apparently going to be called EPURE and will replace France’s current hydrodynamic test facility, AIRIX, and presumably obviate the planned Core Punch facility at Aldermaston.

The agreement also includes language concerning NATO and missile defense:

22. NATO remains the fundamental guarantor of Europe’s security. We share the same objectives for the forthcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon. In particular, we are looking for major decisions on reform to ensure NATO’s efficiency and effectiveness. We also want a new Strategic Concept that: makes clear NATO’s continuing commitment to collective territorial defence and to addressing threats to Allies’ security wherever they stem from; addresses new threats to Allies’ fundamental security interests; and underlines NATO’s desire to work with a wide range of partners. In this context, we will pursue closer co-operation across the board between NATO and the EU, and a lasting partnership between NATO and Russia based on practical co-operation and reciprocity.

23. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. British and French independent strategic nuclear forces, which have a deterrent value of their own, contribute to overall deterrence and therefore to Allies’ security. These national minimum nuclear deterrents are necessary to deter threats to our vital interests. We will support a decision in Lisbon on territorial missile defence, based on the expansion of the [Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence] system, which is financially realistic, coherent with the level of the threat arising from the Middle East, and allows for a partnership with Russia. Missile defence is a complement to deterrence, not a substitute.

Inside Missile Defense reported in September that NATO officials earlier this summer had inspected the architecture of the Medium Extended Air Defense System -- being developed by the United States, Germany and Italy -- for compatibility with the alliance's ALTBMD Program. That program's goal is the "upgrade, test and integration of NATO's command and control systems and underlying communication network to enable effective information exchanges between various NATO and national missile defence systems," according to a NATO website. Further:

As part of the Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise, officials "demonstrated the initial interoperability between the MEADS architecture and the ALTBMD architecture to ensure compatibility, interoperability and alignment in moving forward there," Kee told sister publication Inside the Army Sept. 8. "This was the first step of demonstrating that initial interoperability."

The test showed that MEADS and ALTBMD can pass data and "see" the missile tracks picked up by its sensors, Kee explained. NATO officials view the ALTBMD program as a key component in the eventual creation of a missile shield for all of Europe.

While congressional Republicans and Democrats scramble to find their way following yesterday's elections, the Obama administration is taking steps to try to make government programs work better and to be more open with the American public about how the government operates.

The White House budget office today issued a memo to the heads of all government departments that encourages the sharing of data among these departments. But this approach must be done with a recognition of privacy, according to the memo:

Sharing data in external public policy, scientific, and other areas of research is of value to the public and can promote savings. In cases where high-value data contain information that is protected under federal privacy laws, agencies are encouraged, to the extent permitted by law, to develop and implement arrangements that would permit access to these data for research purposes subject to the appropriate safeguards.

For a sneak peek at how Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee may approach key issues like defense spending, missile defense, major weapons programs and building security by partnering with allies and friendly nations, look no further than the report accompanying the panel's FY-10 National Defense Authorization Bill.

Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-CA),  ranking member and now a frontrunner to take over as chairman, was one of two dozen GOP members on the committee last fall who collectively spelled out out issues they would handle differently if in control of the authorization committee.

Their perspective is spelled out in a six-page memo included in the “additional views” section of the report accompanying the FY-10 authorization bill (pages 669 to 674). That authorization bill largely endorsed major changes to DOD's modernization accounts -- including major weapon system terminations -- proposed by Defense Robert Gates in April 2009.

On topline defense spending:

We are concerned that the President’s Budget did not adequately increase defense spending. After taking into account the migration into the base budget of items previously funded in the supplemental the net effect is less than 2% real growth. As a result, the committee had limited headroom in which to address many of the programmatic cuts that accompanied Secretary Gates’ so-called ‘‘reform budget.’’ While the committee included a number of measures in the mark that redress some of the shortcomings found in the Administration’s request, including adopting an amendment which authorized much of the Army and Marine Corps Unfunded Requirements, we question some of the spending priorities of the committee.

Most notably, this committee provides for an additional $402.6 million above the President’s Budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) defense nuclear nonproliferation program which was already increased from the previous year’s request. We are concerned that this funding was provided without a formal request by the Secretary of Energy or the Administrator of NNSA and without an integrated, interagency plan for securing nuclear materials. We will carefully monitor NNSA’s execution of these funds in the coming year.

On missile defense:

We believe that such additional funding could have been used to address other priorities such as missile defense. Congress, and particularly the Armed Services Committees in both chambers, has the unmistakable obligation to ensure that the Department of Defense develops and deploys defensive capabilities that protect the American people, our forward-deployed forces, and our allies. This includes promising programs in the area of missile defense.

On the same day in which President Obama acknowledged that a nuclear-armed North Korea posed a ‘‘grave threat’’ to the world, the committee chose to sustain the Administration’s $1.2 billion cut to missile defense. In a year where Iran and North Korea have demonstrated the capability and intent to pursue long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon programs, and a track record for widespread proliferation—elements of a genuine national security threat—the committee endorsed reductions to capabilities that would provide a comprehensive missile defense system to protect the U.S. homeland, our forward-deployed troops, and allies.

The committee sustained the Administration’s 35% reduction to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program. This national missile defense system, located in Alaska and California, is designed to protect the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missiles fired either in anger or by accident. We are deeply disappointed that the committee rejected an amendment to restore funding to the program. The amendment provided a modest increase of funds to complete a partially constructed missile interceptor field in Alaska where all the equipment had already been purchased. It sought to pay for this program with funds set aside to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. After witnessing Kim Jong Il walk away from the Six-Party talks, kick out U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and vow to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state, it is unrealistic to expect that there will be any dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program within the fiscal year. We believe that those resources could have been better spent on real, near-term capabilities to protect the United States. Should progress be made in negotiations with North Korea such that dismantling their nuclear complex becomes possible, funds could be reprogrammed at that time.

It is equally troubling that the committee did not enact amendments to reverse the Administration’s decision to reduce and terminate pioneering missile defense programs like the Airborne Laser, Kinetic Energy Interceptor, Multiple Kill Vehicle, and Space Tracking and Surveillance System, or restore their funding. The Department of Defense has yet to deliver to the committee any analysis or new requirements to justify these sweeping decisions. Furthermore, we cannot reconcile the simple fact that as the missile threat is increasing --substantiated by our own intelligence agencies --funding for our missile defense capabilities is decreasing.

The committee supported increased funding for theater missile defenses, which are important capabilities in protecting our forward-deployed troops and allies from shorter-range missiles. However, with a net $1.2 billion cut, we have been forced to trade national missile defense for more theater missile defense. Setting up such a false choice between the defense of our homeland and defense of our forward-deployed troops and allies is neither smart nor sound policy. Both are necessary and both could have been adequately funded without such deep cuts.

On working with allies:

We commend the inclusion of provisions taken from the bipartisan NATO FIRST bill that was introduced earlier in the year by Representatives Turner and Marshall. A strong commitment to transatlantic security is necessary as the Administration engages in a reset policy with Russia. We regret that the committee did not adopt the Administration’s proposals relating to building the capacity of partners in order to increase coalition partner nation participation in Afghanistan. These proposals are necessary to be able to quickly implement the new Afghanistan policy. Without these authorities we miss an opportunity to reduce the burden on our deployed forces in Afghanistan.

We are pleased the committee endorsed an amendment that sought to increase support for a European missile defense system proposed to be located in the Czech Republic and Poland. As the amendment noted, ‘‘Missile defense promotes the collective security of the United States and NATO and improves linkages among member nations of NATO by defending all members of NATO against the full range of missile threats.’’ Though the committee rejected authorizing additional resources, it did support the creation of a framework to evaluate alternatives, should they be pursued by the Administration. However, we would note that based on independent analysis requested by the committee, we have seen no alternative that provides a more cost-effective and operationally available solution to protect the U.S. and Europe than the current proposal.

We appreciate the Chairman’s commitment to work with us to address an amendment that would establish binding legislation to ensure that any treaty or agreement with Russia that seeks bilateral reductions in our strategic nuclear forces does not include limitations on U.S. missile defenses, space, or advanced conventional weapons capabilities. These important conventional capabilities continue to remain vital to our military forces and the defense of the American people and our allies, and are not collateral for U.S. negotiators to trade away to persuade Russia to reduce its nuclear forces.

On the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship:

We had concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and the relief that was being provided to the cost cap in the subcommittee mark. Current law caps LCS end costs at $460 million per vessel, beginning in fiscal year 2010, with the fifth and follow-on ships. The committee has now raised the cap or delayed implementation of the cap for three years in a row. This program was proposed to Congress on the basis of affordability, but the price tag of the latest ships is approximately 250% greater than the original price estimate.

We have increased congressional oversight of this program; but, particularly in light of the passage of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 in May, the first legislative act of this committee should not be approving a unilateral increase to the end cost of this program. This is especially true since the Navy has not officially requested a change to the current legislation. Therefore, we were pleased that the committee agreed to support an amendment to strengthen section 121, regarding the LCS cost cap. The bipartisan amendment imposes additional requirements before any changes to the cost cap may go into effect. This amendment is intended to send the signal that this committee is serious about controlling costs, does not adjust cost caps lightly, and is determined that the Navy make a knowledge-based decision prior to procuring additional Flight 0 LCS vessels.

On "transparency and defense oversight":

Finally, we believe that to carry out our constitutional mandate to raise and support the armed forces, the committee expects a transparent and open relationship with the Department of Defense where the independent views of the Service Chiefs are represented to the Congress by the civilian senior leadership in a timely manner.

That is why we are disappointed that the committee did not fully adopt an amendment that would have provided a statutory framework for the Service Chiefs to provide their independent view to the Congress.

The House Republicans' policy agenda that was rolled out in September, called the "Pledge to America," states that the GOP will "fully fund missile defense" to protect the homeland and support U.S. allies. No specifics are given, but Republican members of the House Armed Services Committee were very upset when the Obama administration cut $1.2 billion from missile defense funding in the fiscal year 2010 defense budget.

As part of that move, the administration eliminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program and the Multiple Kill Vehicle program, reduced the scope of the Airborne Laser program (renaming it the Airborne Laser Testbed and shifting it from the Missile Defense Agency to the office of the director of defense research and engineering) and committed to fielding 30 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. The previous Bush administration wanted 44 interceptors.

Riding a wave of Tea Party anger over government spending, among other issues, the newly elected House GOP majority may have to explain to its base why missile defense should be given any more money if you consider the argument laid out by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. During a May 13, 2009 appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, Gates defended the administration's moves this way:

In terms of your larger point, I would say that the security of the American people and the efficacy of missile defense are not enhanced by continuing to put money into programs that, in terms of their operational concept, are fatally flawed or research programs that are essentially sinkholes for taxpayer dollars.

Gates walked the committee through each program and gave his reasons for why each should be cut. The KEI effort was, at the time of Gates' testimony, in its 14th year of development even though the program plan called for five years. Gates said KEI was "a program that wasn't going anywhere." In its justification material sent to Congress with the FY-10 budget, MDA laid out several technical problems affecting the KEI program. "Even if such technical problems could be solved without excessive cost and schedule implications, we have become concerned about the cost-effectiveness of the KEI interceptor, which is currently estimated at $75 million per unit," the agency said.

Gates said the Multiple Kill Vehicle was aimed at a stronger missile threat, such as from China or Russia, and not the threat posed by rogue states like Korea and Iran. MKV was "incompatible" with the policies of both the Obama and Bush administrations in that sense, Gates said.

The operational concept behind the ABL does not hold up, Gates pointed out. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen, testifying with Gates, told the committee he felt the ABL "has been a flawed concept for years." Gates pointed out that if the target were Iran, the concept calls for ABL to "orbit almost entirely within the borders of Iran. This is probably a little problematic."

Eight days after Gates and Mullen spoke to the committee, MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly explained why 30 ground-based interceptors provided the protection needed against a possible North Korean missile attack. O'Reilly explained that there was never any analysis done to justify the 44-interceptor limit and the threat projections done in 2002 that supported the 44 number "were off by a factor of 10 to 20 in that regard."

Through the Freedom of Information Act, Inside Missile Defense obtained a May 2010 report, marked "for official use only," that contains the following threat assessment:

While both Iran and North Korea have demonstrated technologies that are directly applicable to the development of ICBMs, neither has yet to show any evidence of developing an ICBM-class warhead.