The Insider

The Defense Department has commissioned an independent study to analyze the impacts on military radar from a proposed large wind farm in Oregon -- this after initial military concerns prompted the Federal Aviation Administration to label the project a possible hazard to air navigation, signaling possibly significant roadblocks to this and potentially other nearby projects, Defense Environment Alert reports today:

At issue is the Shepherds Flat wind farm project slated to be built by Caithness Energy in Arlington, OR. In March, the FAA issued a notice of presumed hazard regarding the project -- due to DOD concerns -- triggering a formal evaluation of the project’s potential impacts and allowing for discussions with the project’s backer to determine if mitigation of the impacts can be adopted, according to an FAA spokeswoman. The wind facility, if constructed, would be the largest such facility in Oregon, according to Caithness’ Web site.

DOD has now also launched an independent study to be led by MIT Lincoln Laboratory to assess the security threats posed by the wind farm and to identify mitigation options, an Air Force spokesman says in an e-mail response to questions.

The Pentagon’s objections have caused a stir within the Obama administration, given its interest in developing sources of alternative energy, according to an April 15 Washington Post article chronicling the debate between DOD’s security concerns and clean energy interests.

According to the FAA’s presumed hazard finding, DOD is concerned about the cumulative effects of about 1,800 turbines proposed or existing within the Air Force’s radar line-of-sight in Fossil, OR. DOD fears the cumulative impact of the wind turbines will reduce the sensitivity of the military’s radar, the FAA notice says.

“This loss of coverage over the entire volume of the radar will seriously impair the ability of the DOD to detect, monitor, and safely conduct air operations in this region, and therefore poses an unacceptable risk to DOD’s mission.” No overlapping radar exists in the area to compensate for this, it says.

“To mitigate this impact, the DOD recommends moving the proposed turbines outside of the radar line-of-sight,” it says.

The Air Force spokesman says a report from the independent study will be submitted to the administration as soon as possible but no later than 60 days after April 16. The study will include advice from experts on the impacts of renewable energy facilities on radar “and will bring technically competent, independent analysis to bear to inform our consideration of next steps for the Shepherds Flat wind farm,” the spokesman says.

Further, the Air Force says it has reached out to Caithness, the wind farm developer, and GE, the wind turbine manufacturer, to discuss ways to mitigate wind turbines’ potential risks to military radar. A request to Caithness to comment on the issue went unanswered. . . .

The FAA’s potential interference determination has triggered Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) to indicate he will place a hold on Sharon Burke’s nomination to become DOD’s operational energy director nominee, according to the Post article. Wyden’s staff did not respond by press time to questions on the issue.

In a recent posting on the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) blog, Air Force Gen. Gene Renuart, commander of both NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, makes note of recent talk in the public arena over the military’s involvement in wind energy development, and its role in determining if new developments interfere with flight safety or radar operations. He stresses the military’s full backing of alternative energy development, noting that the development of such energy and the maintaining of national defense are not mutually exclusive.” Make no mistake about it, NORAD and U.S. Northern Command are dedicated to both homeland defense and clean energy,” he writes.

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), chairwoman of the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee, is helming a hearing today on the need for more rotorcraft for U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"This hearing represents a 'good news, bad news' story," Sanchez said in her opening statement. "The good news is that the committee, the (Defense) Department, and (special Operations Command) all recognize that rotary-wing shortfalls are a critical issue for our Special Operations Forces. The bad news is that much work remains to be done, and the proposed solutions may take years to implement." Moreover, the congresswoman added:

Currently, our Special Operations Forces operate in more than 75 countries each and every day - countering terrorism, building partnership capacity in key areas, and improving security and stability for key partner nations. Often working in remote locations with limited infrastructure and reinforcements, air assets provide a vital operational link to ensure mission success for SOF.

Rotary-wing assets in particular are key enablers for our special operators, and critical for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. These helicopters and tilt-wing aircraft provide fire-support, surveillance, insertion/extraction, and other combat support functions. Most critically, they serve as a logistical backbone for SOF and other forces, moving critical supplies over rugged terrain to remote locations in minimal time.

My top priority as chairwoman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities is to provide all the necessary resources to our military in order to protect our country from terrorist threats. And this includes rotary-wing assets which are high demand, low density resources.

It is important to note that U.S. Special Operations Command cannot buy aircraft but is only authorized to pay for SOF-unique equipment for aircraft. This means that SOCOM must coordinate very closely with the Services. I look forward to discussing this process with each of the witnesses, and hearing how the Services’ larger acquisition programs align with and support SOCOM priorities.

The Army’s Integrated Battle Command System is ready to enter the design phase, after contractor Northrop Grumman announced the successful completion of an Interim Design Review for the program.

In an April 26 press release, Northrop said the three-day review, concluded on March 25, was the first in a series of events leading up to the Army's Delta-Preliminary Design Review slated for later this year.

According to the release, the IBCS program -- which uses an open-architecture and can be tailored for different missions using a battle command system for air and missile defense -- will utilize an integrated fire control network, significantly enhancing joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense operations.

The Army awarded Northrop a $577 million, five-year design and development contract in December 2009 to develop IBCS.

The Army last week released the draft purchase description for the Joint Light Tactical Family of Vehicles as a precursor to an industry day being held today (April 26) in Sterling Heights, MI.

While many of the JLTV's specifications have only been released to industry and those on a “need to know” basis, the PD does include a few nuggets of useful information.

The document describes four different JLTV categories:

a. Payload Category A (JLTV-A): The JLTV-A will serve Battlespace Awareness (BA) mission roles.

b. Payload Category B (JLTV-B): The JLTV-B will serve Force Application (FA) mission roles by providing protected, sustained and networked tactical ground mobility for mounted infantry/combat arms forces.

c. Payload Category C (JLTV-C): The JLTV-C will serve Focused Logistics (FL) mission roles by providing transport of wounded personnel, general cargo, ammunition and shelters.

d. Companion Trailers (JLTV-T): The companion trailers will provide addition payload carrying capacity commensurate with the specific Payload Category vehicles.

It also features a statement about Australia's participation in the program:

Although Australia is yet to make a formal commitment with regard to joining the US JLTV Program for the EMD Phase, the JLTV Program is seeking industry comment and feedback on a number of requirements that Australia has proposed for inclusion in the JLTV EMD PD. In particular, the Program is seeking industry comment on whether these Australian proposed requirements are design and/or cost drivers. The level of effort required to comply with these Australian proposed requirements is also sought. Industry feedback will be used by the Program in order to determine whether these Australian proposed requirements can be incorporated at no/minimal impact to the Program or if of significant impact, not incorporated at all.

And if you get way down in the weeds, you find stuff like this:

The cab of the vehicle shall be equipped with rugged, cup holders for the driver and co-driver that are capable of holding containers in the range of a standard 12 ounce aluminum soda pop can to a 24 ounce plastic soda pop bottle.

But don't worry:

The cup holders shall not interfere with combat operations.

Following its decision to submit a solo bid for the Air Force's $35 billion next-generation tanker competition, EADS North America today announced it has added recently retired Air Force Gen. Arthur Lichte to the firm's board of directors. Lichte retired on Jan. 1, following a stint as head of the service's Air Mobility Command.

"General Lichte's leadership experience in command positions at squadron, group and wing levels -- as well as commander of the Air Mobility Command -- will provide valuable perspectives as our company brings its proven, mission-ready solutions to America's warfighters," EADS North America Chairman Ralph Crosby said in a statement.

According to a bio of Lichte's service in the EADS statement:

He previously served as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director, Air Force Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., with responsibility for Air Staff organization and administration. Lichte also was the Deputy Chairman of the Air Force Council, and was the Air Force accreditation official for the Corps of Air Attachés. In addition, his experience included assignments at the Strategic Air Command, Air Mobility Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and United States Air Forces in Europe.

As a command pilot he logged more than 5,000 flying hours in various aircraft, including the C-5, C-17, C-20, C-21, C-32, C-37, C-130, EC/RC-121, KC-10, KC-135, VC-25, VC-137 and UH-1N.

Last September, Lichte said at a conference that his service faced a gap of at least 46 aerial refuelers, as Inside the Air Force reported at the time:

Right now, the Air Force flies a mix of 474 KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, according to a chart presented by Air Mobility Command chief Gen. Arthur Lichte during a Sept. 16 presentation at an Air Force Association-sponsored conference.

“We know with a requirement of 520 to 640 that we are already seeing a gap,” Lichte said. “We only have 474 tankers, so there’s already this gap that we have out there.”

At the same time, it will cost the Air Force up to $6 billion per year late in the next decade to maintain its aging fleet of KC-135 tankers, according to Lichte. The expected cost is double a previous estimate done in 2001 and first reported by Inside the Air Force in March.

“I’d rather pay good money and have new airplanes . . . flying rather than all this money for airplanes sitting on the ground in maintenance status,” Lichte said during a Sept 15 briefing with reporters. “As we delay, it’ll take longer to replace that entire KC-135 fleet.”

The previous KC-135 cost study was conducted before a major boom in tanker missions following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since then, tanker sorties have increased dramatically to support combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to refueling fighter jets that constantly patrol the skies over the United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle.

Insurgencies -- from the Vietnam War to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan -- tend to follow certain patterns, according to a new RAND Corp. study.

"The study provides a planning framework for both policymakers and strategists to help design counterinsurgency campaigns and mitigate the kind of false expectations that undermined the arc of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan," according to a RAND statement on the study. Specifically, RAND intelligence policy analyst Ben Connable says that counterinsurgency ops "will continue to play a large role in today's military strategy, so it is critical to understand how and perhaps more importantly, why, insurgencies end."

Analysts looked at 89 insurgency cases "and concluded it is possible to shape insurgency endings with sufficient forethought, strategic flexibility and sustained willpower," the statement reads, but adds a caveat that "because numerous variables help define insurgencies -- local culture, terrain, economy, type of government -- the study notes there is no one-size-fits-all template for dealing with insurgencies."

Specifically, the RAND study found:

* Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years and the government’s chances of winning increase slightly over time.
* Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat, while inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat.
* Pseudo-democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing.

The report also identifies "key indicators of tipping points -– when events take a crucial turn toward the final outcome," according to the RAND statement. "The rates at which desertions, defections and infiltrations of an insurgency occur and the willingness of civilians to report on insurgency activity to the government can be significant."

Moreover:

Insurgencies with more than two clear parties involved have longer, more violent and more complex endings, said Connable. Contrary to conventional wisdom, governments tend to outlast insurgents, mainly because they are typically stronger, better organized and more professional than non-state forces.

Governments are better off without external support, but tend to lose when support is withdrawn in the midst of a campaign. Insurgents need external support to survive, and they need sanctuary, but stand a better chance of succeeding if that sanctuary is given voluntarily.

Insurgent cadres formed around a traditional, hierarchical structure are more often successful than fragmented networks, and insurgencies rarely succeed in middle-income and urbanized countries, but fare better in rural or a mix of rural and urban terrain, according to the study.

The study also found that terrorism often backfires and the use of indiscriminate terror is often a sign of overconfidence or weakness. However, weak insurgencies can win, particularly if the government also is weak, loses the war through sheer ineptitude or if the causes of the insurgency are strong enough to carry the fight to its ending. The RAND study found weak insurgencies won in 50 percent of the decided cases.