The Insider

By Gabe Starosta
August 29, 2012 at 3:31 AM

The Defense Department is just days away from awarding a Bell-Boeing team a new contract to provide performance-based logistics and supply chain management services for the V-22 Osprey, Boeing officials said today.

Bell-Boeing, the Osprey tiltrotor's manufacturing team, is already working under a PBL arrangement that covers touch labor, spares and repair services, tech publication updates and a variety of other support activities known as Phase 1 of the V-22’s sustainment, and the companies are now in the fourth year of that five-year framework. But DOD and the companies have reached a "handshake" agreement to add supply chain and obsolescence management to that portfolio, Marty Anderson, Boeing’s V-22 sustainment director, told reporters at a company aircraft modification facility in Millville, NJ, this morning.

Those supply chain and obsolescence-management activities will be covered under a new deal known as the V-22's Phase 2 PBL, and its period of performance is set to begin this Saturday, Sept. 1. It is slated to run until December 2016, for a full duration of 51 months, and DOD and Bell-Boeing plan to extend the Phase 1 contract to cover that same time period, Anderson said. He added that the new agreement would provide demand forecasting and warehousing services, among a handful of new capabilities not covered under Phase 1.

Boeing officials declined to discuss the value of the Phase 2 contract, but its details could be revealed this week if the contract is signed by Friday as expected. Both PBL arrangements will cover logistical support for all of the V-22s in the field, regardless of operating service.

The vast majority of delivered Ospreys, 154 out of 181, are owned by the Marine Corps, and 26 are owned and operated by the Air Force, primarily its special operations forces. The remaining V-22 is used as a technology demonstrator.

For more information on the V-22’s forthcoming PBL announcement and details on Boeing’s plan to improve the quality and cost of Osprey sustainment into the future, be sure to check Friday’s issue of Inside the Air Force.

By John Liang
August 28, 2012 at 3:27 PM

The Pentagon is renewing the charter for the Missile Defense Advisory Committee, according to a notice posted on this morning's Federal Register.

The committee's purpose is to provide "independent advice and recommendations on all matters relating to missile defense, including system development, technology, program maturity and readiness of configurations for the Ballistic Missile Defense System," the announcement reads.

The panel has three permanent subcommittees: technical, geopolitical and the "Agency Strategic Operations Subcommittee," according to the notice, which also spells out their duties:

a. The Technical Subcommittee shall be comprised of no more than seven members. The primary focus of the Subcommittee is to conduct independent reviews and assessments of topics deemed critical by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics including application of technology to improve missile defense capabilities and quality and relevance of missile defense science, engineering and technology programs; and system development. The estimated number of subcommittee meeting is up to four per year.

b. The Geopolitical Subcommittee shall be comprised of no more than six members. The primary focus of the Subcommittee is to conduct independent reviews and assessments of topics deemed critical by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics including issues central to missile defense strategic priorities and policy implications of United States defense strategies; program maturity and readiness of configurations; national defense policy and acquisition. The estimated number of subcommittee meetings is up to four per year.

c. The Agency Strategic Operations Subcommittee shall be comprised of no more than six members. The primary focus of the Subcommittee is to conduct independent reviews and assessments of quick reaction and ad hoc topics deemed critical by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Director, Missile Defense Agency.

By John Liang
August 27, 2012 at 9:45 PM

Before the GOP's convention this week in Tampa, FL, to nominate Mitt Romney for president, the Republican National Committee inadvertently posted a draft platform to its website on Friday. The draft was quickly pulled offline, but not before Politico was able to obtain it and post it.

Here's what a portion of the draft platform document had to say about the Obama administration's National Security Strategy:

The current Administration's most recent National Security Strategy reflects the extreme elements in its liberal domestic coalition. It is a budget-constrained blueprint that, if fully implemented, will diminish the capabilities of our Armed Forces. The strategy significantly increases the risk of future conflict by declaring to our adversaries that we will no longer maintain the forces necessary to fight and win more than one conflict at a time. It relies on the good intentions and capabilities of international organizations to justify constraining American military readiness. Finally, the strategy subordinates our national security interests to environmental, energy and international health issues, and elevates "climate change" to the level of a "severe threat" equivalent to foreign aggression. The word "climate," in fact, appears in the current President's strategy more often than Al Qaeda, nuclear proliferation, radical Islam, or weapons of mass destruction. The phrase "global war on terror" does not appear at all, and has been purposely avoided and changed by [t]his Administration to "overseas contingency operations."

To view the October 2010 strategy, click here.

By John Liang
August 27, 2012 at 9:14 PM

The Defense Business Board recently released a study titled "Linking And Streamlining The Defense Requirements, Acquisition And Budget Processes."

According to the report's executive summary:

The overarching goal outlined in the Terms of Reference was to streamline and link the three processes that together provide the capabilities required by the warfighter on time, at a reasonable cost, and in the quantities needed to accomplish the mission.

Retired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro chaired the study. Other participants included former Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim; retired Air Force Gen. Michael Carns; retired Navy Adm. Vernon Clark; and retired Army Gen. Paul Kern.

View the report's findings and recommendations.

By John Liang
August 27, 2012 at 3:06 PM

The director of national intelligence is required to submit a biennial report to lawmakers this week on the "nuclear aspirations of non-state entities, nuclear weapons and related programs in non-nuclear-weapons states and countries not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and certain foreign persons," according to congressional statute.

That report, due Sept. 1, should include:

(1) A statement of the number of nuclear weapons possessed by such country or non-state entity.

(2) An estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons that such country or non-state entity seeks to obtain and, in the case of such non-state entity, an assessment of the extent to which such non-state entity is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon or device or radiological dispersion device.

(3) A description of the technical characteristics of any nuclear weapons possessed by such country or non-state entity.

(4) A description of nuclear weapons designs available to such country or non-state entity.

(5) A description of any sources of assistance with respect to nuclear weapons design provided to or by such country or non-state entity and, in the case of assistance provided by such country or non-state entity, a description of to whom such assistance was provided.

(6) An assessment of the annual capability of such country and non-state entity to produce new or newly designed nuclear weapons.

(7) A description of the type of fissile materials used in any nuclear weapons possessed by such country or non-state entity.

(8) A) description of the location and production capability of any fissile materials production facilities in such country or controlled by such non-state entity, the current status of any such facilities, and any plans by such country or non-state entity to develop such facilities.

(9) An identification of the source of any fissile materials used by such country or non-state entity, if such materials are not produced in facilities referred to in paragraph (8).

(10) An assessment of the intentions of such country or non-state entity to leverage civilian nuclear capabilities for a nuclear weapons program.

(11) A description of any delivery systems available to such country or non-state entity and an assessment of whether nuclear warheads have been mated, or there are plans for such warheads to be mated, to any such delivery system.

(12) An assessment of the physical security of the storage facilities for nuclear weapons in such country or controlled by such non-state entity.

(13) An assessment of whether such country is modernizing or otherwise improving the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of such country.

(14) An assessment of the industrial capability and capacity of such country or non-state entity to produce nuclear weapons.

(15) In the case of a country, an assessment of the policy of such country on the employment and use of nuclear weapons.

By John Liang
August 24, 2012 at 6:50 PM

Over the past fortnight, InsideDefense.com has reported on the House and Senate defense committees' responses to the Pentagon's fiscal year 2012 omnibus reprogramming request.

We now have the responses available online. And see below for our coverage of those responses.

House Committee Rejects $100M Reprogramming Request To Repair Miami
(Inside the Navy - 08/20/2012)

House Authorizers Want Army To Compete Future Interceptor Procurement
(Inside the Army - 08/20/2012)

House And Senate Push Back Against USAF's Reprogramming Request
(Inside the Air Force - 08/17/2012)

Congress Rejects F117 Funding Plus-Up As USAF Works To Reduce Cost
(Inside the Air Force - 08/17/2012)

House Authorizers Criticize, Approve Fuel-Shortfall Reprogramming
(Inside the Pentagon - 08/16/2012)

Lawmakers Leave Omnibus Reprogramming Request As Unfinished Business
(Inside the Army - 08/13/2012)

By John Liang
August 24, 2012 at 2:52 PM

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments this morning held a briefing on sequestration, with senior fellow Todd Harrison presenting "a comprehensive account-by-account and outlays analysis of its potential impact on" the Pentagon budget, according to the organization's website.

CSBA also released a "backgrounder" document that "discusses the overall direction of the budget request, its alignment with the new strategic guidance, and the details on how sequestration would be implemented.  It also evaluates the impact sequestration would have on different types of accounts and highlights some of the major budgetary issues facing the Department even if sequestration is avoided," the website states.

To view the CSBA backgrounder, click here.

And to be kept abreast of InsideDefense.com's coverage of Pentagon spending, check out our Defense Budget Alert email notification service.

By John Liang
August 23, 2012 at 9:20 PM

The Government Accountability Office issued a report today, weighing in on the Defense Department's decision to waive a competitive prototyping requirement for a subsystem of a classified Air Force satellite program:

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, as amended (WSARA), requires that the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition program provides for competitive prototypes before Milestone B approval -- which authorizes entry into system development -- unless the Milestone Decision Authority waives the requirement. Competitive prototyping, which involves commercial, government, or academic sources producing early prototypes of weapon systems or critical subsystems, can help Department of Defense (DOD) programs reduce technical risk, refine requirements, validate designs and cost estimates, and evaluate manufacturing processes prior to making major commitments of resources. WSARA states that the Milestone Decision Authority may waive the competitive prototyping requirement only on the basis that (1) the cost of producing competitive prototypes exceeds the expected life-cycle benefits (in constant dollars) of producing such prototypes, including the benefits of improved performance and increased technological and design maturity that may be achieved through competitive prototyping; or (2) but for such a waiver, DOD would be unable to meet critical national security objectives. WSARA also directed us to review and assess DOD's rationale for competitive prototyping waivers.

On June 18, 2012, DOD notified us that it had waived the competitive prototyping requirement for the Control and Planning Segment (CAPS), a subsystem of the Air Force's Enhanced Polar System (EPS). EPS, which consists of two payloads hosted on classified satellites, a gateway to connect user terminals to other communication systems, and a control and planning segment to control the payloads and manage communications, will provide extremely high frequency, jam-resistant, and secure satellite communications to strategic and tactical forces in the polar region. According to DOD, this is the first waiver of WSARA's competitive prototyping requirement since it was enacted in 2009.

In this report, we assess (1) DOD's rationale for waiving the competitive prototyping requirement for CAPS and the analysis used to support it and (2) the acquisition strategy for CAPS in the context of the waiver. To conduct our assessment, we compared the rationale in the waiver to the WSARA requirement to determine the extent to which the waiver is consistent with the statute. In addition, we reviewed the Air Force's business case analysis, which provides the data and assumptions on which the waiver is based, the acquisition strategy, and other relevant documentation. We also submitted written questions to DOD, Air Force, and EPS program officials to clarify information in this documentation, as necessary.

GAO found the following:

DOD's rationale for waiving WSARA's competitive prototyping requirement for CAPS covered both bases provided in the statute; however, DOD did not provide complete information about the potential benefits of competitive prototyping or support for its conclusion that prototyping would result in schedule delays. In the waiver, DOD found reasonable the Air Force's conclusion that the additional $49 million cost of producing competing prototypes exceeded the negligible expected life-cycle benefits because minimal opportunities exist to increase CAPS technological and design maturity through competitive prototyping. The Air Force's conclusions about CAPS technical and design risk are supported by its market research, but its cost-benefit analysis was incomplete because neither the waiver nor the business case analysis supporting it provided an estimated dollar value for the expected benefits. Further, the Air Force's cost estimate of competitively prototyping CAPS was based on a program office estimate, which has not been independently reviewed by DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation. DOD also did not provide support in the waiver for its conclusion that implementing competitive prototyping will delay EPS's initial operational capability and result in DOD being unable to meet critical national security objectives. Finally, the CAPS acquisition strategy anticipates the use of a cost-reimbursement contract for designing and building the system; however it may be difficult for DOD to meet the requirements for justifying the use of a cost-type contract for development, given the low design and development risk described in the waiver.

View the full GAO report.

By John Liang
August 23, 2012 at 2:32 PM

On Friday, InsideDefense.com reported on the results of an investigation into the causes of a crash of an MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft in Morocco this past April:

A fatal MV-22 Osprey crash in Morocco this past spring was due largely to pilots' mistakes, but wind was also a key factor, according to a Marine Corps investigation report, which recommends no disciplinary action against the pilots and concludes the aircraft's flight manual had inadequate guidance for the circumstances involved.

On April 11, the pilots "made a decision to turn and take off with a tail wind so that they wouldn't endanger any of the folks that were in the rest of the landing zone," Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, the Marine Corps' top aviation official, told reporters today. With the wind at his tail, the pilot began to rotate the nacelles forward from helicopter mode to airplane mode, which moved the Osprey's center of gravity forward.

"So what happens now is that the aircraft turns; the nacelles roll forward; it begins to pitch forward; the wind catches the tail here, exacerbates the motion and pitches the nose down," Schmidle said. "While all that is happening, the control stick doesn't have enough movement at this point to move . . . the horizontal stabilizer on that tail up enough to get the nose positioned to come up. So what happens then is the aircraft now is committed, and it flies into the ground." Two Marines in the rear of the aircraft were killed. The pilot and copilot were seriously injured.

A significant factor in the crash was the pilots' failure to follow the flight manual's procedures for hovering in helicopter-mode and conducting low-speed flight, the report states, citing the 180-degree hover turn that placed the aircraft directly into a tail wind. The failure to correct for a nose-down attitude during the hover-turn made the situation more severe, the report states. Investigators also found the aircraft's nacelles were moved too far forward.

"The mishap aircraft co-pilot failed to adjust stick control margin during the pedal turn, preventing him from having enough aft cyclic stick control margin to overcome the effects of a nose-down attitude and transitioning to aircraft mode with a significant tail wind," the investigating officer wrote. The commanding general of the 2nd Marine Air Wing later recommended revising that wording to say the co-pilot "failed to adjust nacelles aft during the pedal turn."

We originally only had a 27-page version of the redacted report, but have since obtained a much more detailed analysis -- more than 400 pages -- that includes many enclosures.

Click here to view the more-detailed, 20-megabyte report.

By John Liang
August 22, 2012 at 3:27 PM

Inside the Army ran a story this week about the two-year, unclassified, multinational Nimble Titan missile defense exercise that wrapped up in April.

ITA reported that Nimble Titan will likely expand to include countries in the Middle East region over the course of its next campaign:

Nimble Titan 14 "will grow in size and scope," and "eight new sovereign nations have been invited to join the campaign which begins this year," according to an Aug. 15 statement sent to Inside the Army by Army Col. Mike Derrick, Nimble Titan's director.

As for the countries that took part in the most recent exercise:

Nimble Titan 12 had participation from 15 nations, NATO headquarters, all U.S. combatant commanders and other government agencies. A total of 10 additional nations observed the event, Derrick said. Nations must attend as an observer before they can be invited to participate in subsequent campaigns, he explained. Derrick said he could not discuss which countries participated in the last set of war games.

Since that story, ITA has obtained a set of STRATCOM briefing slides dated June 7, 2011, and marked "cleared for public release" -- and the slides list the countries that participated in Nimble Titan 12. They include Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.

View those briefing slides, as well as a more recent set issued on May 31.

By Tony Bertuca
August 21, 2012 at 5:02 PM

The Army and Marine Corps are expected to award up to three $65 million contracts Friday for the next developmental phase of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, though the award date is subject to change, according to government and industry sources.

As reported by Inside the Army in June, industry teams competing for the program expect the winners to be announced on Aug. 24, though the awards were initially expected earlier this summer.

So far, six industry teams have emerged as bidders for the JLTV's 27-month engineering and manufacturing development phase: BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, Navistar Defense, Oshkosh Defense, AM General in a solo bid, and AM General partnering with General Dynamics.

Officials from several companies involved consider the JLTV a must-win proposition given that armored vehicle spending is set to decrease well below levels seen at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The JLTV is intended to be a phased replacement of the humvee, which has been deemed unsafe to operate in environments with improvised explosive devices.

The services expect to procure a total of more than 55,000 vehicles.

By John Liang
August 21, 2012 at 3:59 PM

The State Department's International Security Advisory Board recently released a study on "strategic deterrence and the path to a world of mutual assured stability." In the report (viewable here), ISAB lists 10 "key de-stabilizing factors" that need to be periodically looked at as nuclear weapon stockpiles are gradually reduced:

* inadequate intelligence, monitoring, and verification, and unacceptable delay in detection of breakout actions and early indicators of threatening action, as well as discernment of destabilizing motives, influences, and drivers, in leadership, societies and sub-national groups;

* ineffective defense against various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery mechanism threats for ourselves and our allies;

* ineffectiveness of non-nuclear, advanced conventional forces to provide all aspects of the desired deterrence, including their survivability in the face of a surprise or shocking turn of events;

* nuclear forces, albeit progressively smaller in size, but not adequately sized and maintained, and with a force structure and posture not appropriately tailored for circumstances and uncertainty;

* inability to move strategic stability discussions beyond Russia to other key nations, including members of the P5 as well as other possessing or aspiring states;

* ineffective dissuasion, through either soft or hard measures, of opponents' acquisition choices regarding nuclear weapons, fissile materials, design information, and parts, as well as critical delivery system technology;

* unacceptably slow progress in establishing a new norm (i.e. that nuclear weapons are horrific and viewed by all as undesirable – similar to biological weapons) as tested against other examples of our ability to execute crosscultural influence;

* inability to achieve effective inclusion of all nuclear weapons, specifically nonstrategic nuclear weapons as well as hedge/reserve weapons, in arms reduction agreements and associated monitoring and verification; and inability to execute multilateral agreements;

* insufficient security guarantees provided to countries to reduce their incentives for acquisition of nuclear weapons or other WMD; and

* ineffective assurance of our allies that we will maintain extended deterrence at every step of this process.

This particular ISAB study isn't the only one that has recently come to light, though.

Inside the Pentagon recently obtained a draft copy of an ISAB report on near-term options for implementing more nuclear force cuts. That report recommends the United States offer to reduce its nuclear arsenal significantly below current treaty requirements to no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads and 500 strategic delivery vehicles if Russia is willing to reciprocate.

The draft ISAB report also urges the United States and Russia to accelerate implementation of New START Treaty reductions and to lay the groundwork for future cuts to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The report was drafted in May based on a study led by Graham Allison of Harvard University and overseen by former Defense Secretary William Perry.

ITP further reports:

Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller briefly mentioned the study last week at U.S. Strategic Command's annual deterrence symposium, noting the board is "helping us with some big thinking," but she stopped short of revealing the board's recommendations.

The draft report calls for implementing a "mutual unilateral reduction" below New START, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons. "The United States could communicate to Russia that the United States is prepared to go to much lower levels of nuclear weapons as a matter of national policy, e.g. to no more than 500 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, if Russia is willing to reciprocate," the panel writes. "This could greatly reduce Russia's incentive to build a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile and allow the United States to reduce the scope and cost of its nuclear modernization plans."

Further the two sides could "define unilateral, cooperative steps for reduction of nonstrategic weapons, including appropriate verification measures," the report adds, noting any U.S. efforts to reduce to these levels or below for strategic nuclear forces and yet-to-be-defined levels for nonstrategic weapons would have to "address lingering concerns over asymmetries between U.S. and Russian stockpile composition, force structures and reconstitution capabilities."

That ITP story is available to all. Click here to view it.

By John Liang
August 20, 2012 at 8:39 PM

This morning's issue of Inside the Navy notes that the service has formally established the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Romania as part of the Obama administration's Phased Adaptive Approach to ballistic missile defense in Europe, according to an Aug. 14 memo from the office of the chief of naval operations.

The memo, which stems from the Romanian Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement signed last September, establishes a subject shore command effective Oct. 1, complete with a commanding officer. The Navy hopes to install an Aegis Ashore site in Romania by 2015 and a site in Poland by 2018.

The memo itself is now available on InsideDefense.com.

Some other recent Aegis Ashore news:

MDA Looking To Industry For Information On Future Aegis Ashore Site (Inside the Navy, July 16)

The Missile Defense Agency is looking to industry to determine interest and capability to deliver an Aegis Ashore site in Poland in 2018 as part of the third phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the Obama administration's plan for defending the continent from ballistic missiles, according to a Federal Business Opportunities notice.

The research will help MDA identify potential sources and experience to fulfill requirements, develop an acquisition strategy, identify barriers to competition and determine documentation needed to support the program and proposal preparations, according to a July 11 request for information.

Aegis Ashore builds upon the already-fielded Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System assets and adapts a sea-based weapon system for use on land. This will be accomplished by adapting the Aegis Weapons System and Vertical Launching System to the land-based concept.

By John Liang
August 20, 2012 at 3:34 PM

The Pentagon's Reserve Forces Policy Board plans to hold a meeting on Sept. 5, according to a notice published in this morning's Federal Register:

Purpose of the Meeting: The purpose of the meeting is obtain, review and evaluate information related to strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

Agenda: The Reserve Forces Policy Board will hold a meeting from 8 a.m. until 4:10 p.m. The portion of the meeting from 3:15 p.m. until 4:10 p.m. will be closed and is not open to the public. The open portion of the meeting will consist of administrative details, remarks from the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) on her role as the RFPB's sponsor and the future role of the Reserve Components (RC) within the Department of Defense (DoD); from the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation on today's fiscal challenges facing DoD and future implications for the out year Future Year Defense Program; from the Adjutant Generals of California and Wisconsin on their views of AC/RC mix considerations, and roles and missions; an update on the RFPB's Cost Methodology Project; and RFPB subcommittee briefs. The closed session of the meeting will consist of the Secretary of Defense discussing RC readiness, capability shortfalls, roles and missions and future composition of the Active and Reserve Component.

Today's Inside the Army has some related news:

State Guard Leaders Oppose Army Chief's Brigade-Design Proposal

The adjutants general of seven U.S. states have rejected an idea by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno to optimize four of the Army National Guard's 28 brigade combat teams for security assistance missions, according to a previously unreported letter.

"We understood you would like the Guard to consider converting four . . . [brigade combat teams] to some other structure, such as Advise and Assist Brigades," or AABs, the two-star guard leaders from Arkansas, Indiana, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas wrote in the June 28 missive to Odierno.

Such a plan "does not appear to be a realistic option" because it would create a mismatch between the unit designs of the active-duty Army and the reserves, they contend. "'Advise and assist' is a mission that is and has been conducted by BCTs, not a viable force structure," the adjutants general write.

We also have the letter the story is based on:

Adjutants General Letter To Odierno On National Guard Force Structure

By John Liang
August 17, 2012 at 6:33 PM

The White House is racing against time to implement the first elements of its export control reform initiative before the presidential election this year, which will require the administration to notify Congress of the intended changes, Inside U.S. Trade reports this morning. Further:

Standing in the way is the lack of an agreement with the committees of jurisdiction on how detailed the notifications should be and the considerable substantive work that remains to be done on the required regulations, which also need to be cleared interagency, according to informed sources.

The administration is targeting September for the first notification of changes to export control rules for aircraft and engines, but in light of the current obstacles, that could slip to the lame-duck session of Congress, sources said. This may raise additional obstacles for any notification, particularly if President Obama is not reelected, according to these sources. The administration has been working on the export control reform initiative for about two years after it was announced by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April 2010.

Under the best of circumstances, sources said the administration would be able to notify the transfer of items in the aircraft and engine categories from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) before the election.

Traditionally, such notifications under Section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act have been made while Congress is in session, though it is not required by law, sources said. That puts the administration on a tight schedule because there are eight legislative days in September and five in October.

Notification of the aircraft and engine category revisions would only represent a fraction of the technical work that has been done on the overall USML rewrite. A number of categories, such as Category VII covering military vehicles, have been published in proposed form. But seven of the 21 USML categories are still to be published as proposed rules and are still moving through the interagency review process, administration officials have said.

Given that it is unlikely the administration and Congress will reach agreement in the next few weeks on how to present the notifications, the administration will likely face a political decision on whether to force the issue by making them formally without such a consensus, sources said. At this point, the administration has not made any final decisions internally on how to proceed beyond working intensively on the final rules that need to be part of the notification, a senior administration official said this week.

Previously, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Eric Hirschhorn implied that the administration would proceed to formal notifications quickly instead of engaging in a long pre-notification dialogue.

But proceeding with a formal notification without at least congressional acquiescence will require the administration to weigh the potential political fallout from such a step. Congressional staff has hinted that this could involve legislation stopping the export control initiative, or denying the administration the funds in the appropriations process to implement the initiative.

At this point, the discussions have largely been with congressional staff, which has demanded more detail in the notifications than the administration has said it can practically provide. Some sources said the staff does not appear to have much political guidance from its principals, but others said the House staff stance reflects the skepticism that House members on both sides of the aisle have displayed to the export control reform initiative.

In response to congressional staff concerns, the administration has scaled back some of the reform provisions in subsequent proposed rules. For example, in a June 19 proposed rule further explaining how items will transition from the USML to the CCL, the administration placed congressional notification requirements on the export of items beyond a certain dollar threshold that are located in a special 600 series of export control classification numbers where former USML items will be placed on the CCL.

Sources said that the administration will ultimately have to develop a strategy for elevating this issue to members of Congress, but they said there has been no decision on such an end game. The administration official said it is premature to talk about how this will be handled "until we've actually come to a final opinion internally on all of this."

Private-sector sources said that legislation to block or hinder the reform effort is highly unlikely given that it would be hard to get an agreement between the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate committees of jurisdiction and secure a legislative vehicle to move it in the limited number of days left in the session.

One source noted that in the Senate, Republican critics of the export control initiative have so far failed to find a member willing to champion language in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would limit the administration's flexibility in how to notify the transfers from the USML to the CCL. Such language is included in the NDAA version approved by the House earlier this year but the Senate has not yet acted on its version of the bill. It is expected to do so before Congress leaves this year, and by that time, it is possible that export control reform critics will have found a member to offer this language as a floor amendment, one source speculated.

If that language passed before the first notification is submitted, it would further complicate the process, one source said. The House language is unacceptable to the administration because it obligates the administration to provide an "enumeration" of the transferred items to the extent practicable. But another source said the administration could simply claim it has met that requirement with what it has submitted.

In addition to spelling out the category changes, the first congressional notification under Section 38(f) will be accompanied by three final rules. One of them governs the transition of items from the USML to CCL, a second defines items that are "specially designed" for military applications and thereby subject to tighter controls than other items, and a third sets the framework rule that will create the categories for the transferred items on the CCL. All these rules spell out the elements of how these transferred items will be controlled once they leave the USML and are therefore required for the notification.

"We're working aggressively in August to do all that and we still hope, expect and plan to be able to sometime in late summer, early fall, to be able to have all of that ready [as final rules] because that is necessary . . . to attach to the [Section] 38(f) notice" made under the Arms Export Control Act, the official said.

"We are hoping to get all this done in August and September and sometime soon thereafter we'll start talking to Hill staff," the official said. The official implied that a draft final version of these rules will be the basis for initial congressional discussions.

The public comment periods for the "specially designed" rule and the transition rule ended in early August and the incoming comments still need to be considered in developing a final rule.

Some sources familiar with the process say it is impossible to develop the required a final rule and get it cleared interagency in the timetable laid out by the administration official, but others said it may still be possible.

The skeptics note that export control work at the State Department has been lagging since Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher left her job for health reasons. They said Tauscher had the export control knowledge and the political stature to advance export control reform issues within State and that the same combination does not exist in her successor, Acting Undersecretary Rose Gottemoeller, nor in the Assistant Secretary for Political and Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and his deputy Beth McCormick.

If the notification process slips into the lame-duck session and President Obama is not re-elected, it is likely that the new administration would take its time to review the work done up to that point and then decide how to proceed. This could take at least a year since export controls are not likely to be a priority issue for the new administration, a private-sector source speculated.