The Insider

By John Liang
March 14, 2011 at 3:33 PM

Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) is urging the White House to clarify the Environmental Protection Agency's and other agencies' roles -- including the Pentagon's -- in overseeing nuclear emergency response plans. His concern is a lack of adequate plans could leave the government agencies unable to respond to disasters similar to the plant meltdowns and radiation releases that took place in Japan following the March 11 earthquake and resulting tsunami, InsideEPA.com reports this morning:

Citing an Inside EPA article that shows EPA and other agencies have no plan to determine which agency would oversee off-site cleanup in the event of a large-scale nuclear accident, Markey urged President Obama in a March 13 letter to prioritize federal planning for nuclear disaster and require EPA and other agencies to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities in such a situation.

"In stark contrast to the scenarios contemplated for oil spills and hurricanes, there is no specificity for emergency coordination and command in place for a response to a nuclear disaster," Markey wrote, adding that "the tragic events in Japan highlight the need for more intensive and specific nuclear disaster response plans."

In Japan, several nuclear generating units located at least two plants suffered partial meltdowns after backup generators failed to provide cooling water when the plants were shut down following the massive 8.9 magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami. Thousands of nearby residents have been evacuated and are being monitored and treated for radiation exposure while several plant workers have suffered radiation poisoning.

Markey said that the nuclear emergencies in Japan are diverting emergency responders from rescuing victims of the natural disasters because they are "instead being compelled to flood nuclear reactors with water from the ocean to halt the imminent meltdown" of nuclear plants, "screen toddlers for radiation exposure and evacuate hundreds of thousands of citizens."

Markey, citing a review of the Inside EPA article and related documents, suggested the United States is unprepared to respond to a similar disaster because "it appears that no agency sees itself as clearly in command of emergency response in a nuclear disaster."

Markey's letter states:

In stark contrast to the scenarios contemplated for oil spills and hurricanes, there is no specificity for emergency coordination and command and control in place for a response to a nuclear disaster. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework says that "The Secretary [of Homeland Security] is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies." Yet the Annex also indicates that, depending on the type of incident, the Coordinating Agency may instead be the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, EPA, NRC, or U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). When my staff was briefed by staffs of the EPA and NRC, they were informed by both agencies that there is no clarity regarding which agency would be in charge of the various aspects of a response to a nuclear disaster, and that the identity of the lead Federal agency is dependent on many different factors. One Agency official essentially told my staff that if a nuclear incident occurred, they would all get on the phone really quickly and figure it out.

By
March 11, 2011 at 9:25 PM

Lockheed Martin just released a statement to InsideDefense.com confirming reports of a suspension in F-35 flight operations:

AF-4, one of 10 F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) aircraft currently in flight test, experienced a dual generator failure and oil leak during flight operations on Wednesday, March 9, at Edwards AFB, Calif. The jet returned safely to base. As a routine safety precaution, the Joint Program Office (JPO) has temporarily suspended F-35 flight operations until a team of JPO and LM technical experts determines the root cause of the generator failure and oil leak. Once the cause is known, the appropriate repairs and improvements will be made before flight operations resume.

By John Liang
March 11, 2011 at 8:43 PM

A new Government Accountability Office report released today finds that the Navy "did not sufficiently analyze alternative acquisition approaches" for the Next Generation Enterprise Network, the program that is supposed to replace the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.

GAO found that the Navy's "alternatives analysis contained key weaknesses, and none of the alternatives assessed match the current acquisition approach." Specifically:

[T]he cost estimates for the respective alternatives were not reliable because they were not substantially accurate, and they were neither comprehensive nor credible. Further, the operational effectiveness analysis, the other key aspect of an analysis of alternatives, did not establish and analyze sufficient measures for assessing each alternative's ability to achieve program goals and deliver program capabilities. Moreover, the acquisition approach that DON is actually pursuing was not one of the alternatives assessed in the analysis, and it is riskier and potentially costlier than the alternatives analyzed because it includes a higher number of contractual relationships.

GAO found that the Navy's analysis "reflects the most that could be done in the time that was available to complete it, and [service officials] do not view the alternative selected as materially different from the assessed alternatives, even though it is about $4.7 billion more costly."

Additionally, the report states that the Navy "does not have a reliable schedule for executing NGEN." Specifically:

Only two of the four subschedules that GAO reviewed, each of which help form the master schedule, adequately satisfied any of the nine practices that are associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. These weaknesses have contributed to delays in key program milestones. During the course of GAO's review, DON stated that action was taken to address some, but not all, of these weaknesses. According to program officials, schedule estimating was constrained by staffing limitations. NGEN acquisition decisions were not always performance- and risk-based. In particular, the program was approved in the face of known performance shortfalls and risks. For example, the program was approved at a key acquisition review despite the lack of defined requirements, which was recognized as a risk that would impact the completion of other key documents, such as the test plan. This risk was later realized as a critical issue. According to program officials, the decisions to proceed were based on their view that they had sufficiently mitigated known risks and issues. Collectively, these weaknesses mean that DON does not have a sufficient basis for knowing that it is pursuing the best approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities and the program's cost and schedule performance is unlikely to track to estimates. GAO is recommending that DOD limit further investment in NGEN until it conducts an interim review to reconsider the selected acquisition approach and addresses issues discussed in this report. In its comments, DOD stated that it did not concur with the recommendation to reconsider its acquisition approach; GAO maintains that without doing so, DOD cannot be sure it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach.

Consequently, GAO makes the following recommendations:

To ensure that NGEN capabilities are acquired in the most cost-effective manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an interim NGEN milestone review.

To ensure that NGEN capabilities are acquired in the most cost-effective manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to immediately limit further investment in NGEN until this review has been conducted and a decision on how best to proceed has been reported to the Secretary of Defense and congressional defense committees.

To facilitate implementation of the acquisition approach resulting from the review, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that the NGEN integrated master schedule substantially reflects the key schedule estimating practices.

To facilitate implementation of the acquisition approach resulting from the review, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that future NGEN gate reviews and decisions fully reflect the state of the program's performance and its exposure to risks.

Inside the Navy reported in October that the service had transitioned to a continuity-of-services contract with Hewlett-Packard to keep NMCI up and running into fiscal year 2014 as the Navy prepared to put out the first request for proposals for NGEN. Moreover:

The service had originally planned to replace the 10-year-old NMCI program with NGEN on Oct. 1, but in April 2009 officials told reporters the transition was more complex than they envisioned and the service would need 43 months to phase in NGEN, during which NMCI would need to remain operational. Capt. Scott Weller, NMCI program manager, and Capt. Timothy Holland, NGEN program manager, told reporters in an Oct. 13 teleconference call that there would be little recognizable change over the next three-and-a-half years for the end user, but the Navy will take a greater role in the operation of the network.

"Continuity of services is just that: It supports a continuation of NMCI services while we transition to NGEN," Weller said. "By roughly 2014, we'll have all of NGEN in place with multiple contracts and at least two vendors."

The original contract for NMCI called for the vendor to basically run the network and make all necessary procurements, but officials now want the Navy to have greater say in the operation of the network. The Navy has already acquired copyrights from HP and will buy infrastructure from the company on an as-needed basis as leadership figures out how many government workers the Navy should have in key positions operating the network as opposed to the contractor.

By John Liang
March 11, 2011 at 5:14 PM

Defense Secretary Robert Gates earlier today sought to buck up NATO member states under pressure by their citizens to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, warning alliance defense ministers in Brussels of his "very serious concern" that progress made in that country could be threatened by "ill-timed, precipitous, or uncoordinated national drawdowns." Further:

I am very concerned that if we do not maintain the unity and commitment to success we expressed at Lisbon, the progress we now see could be threatened. Unfortunately, some of the recent rhetoric that is coming from capitals on this continent is calling into question that resolve.  Frankly, there is too much talk about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done right. Too much discussion of exit and not enough discussion about continuing the fight. Too much concern about when and how many troops might redeploy, and not enough about what needs to be done before they leave.

Now, I say this while recognizing the intense pressure that many nations face to reduce their commitment. We have all made extraordinary contributions to this effort, in the face of fiscal austerity and political pressure. The U.S. has surged 30,000 new troops in the past year for a total of nearly 100,000, and we have tripled our civilian commitment. We are spending $120 billion a year to sustain this effort and are seeking $12.8 billion to build the Afghan Army and Police in 2012. We, like many of you, suffered more casualties in 2010 than in any previous year of the war. These are the tragic costs of success, but we bear them because it is in our shared security interests to do so. And in order to ensure that these sacrifices are not squandered, we need to keep our focus on succeeding in our missions, and not get pulled away prematurely.

When President Obama ordered the 30,000 U.S. surge forces, he said the United States would begin a responsible drawdown in July 2011. Thanks to the progress we have made, we are setting the right circumstances to begin to reduce some of those U.S. surge forces in July, but we will do that based on conditions on the ground and in coordination with NATO and our allies.  We will not sacrifice the significant gains made to date, or the lives lost, for a political gesture.

In return, we expect the same from your nations. Let me be clear – uncoordinated national drawdowns would risk the gains made to date. Considerations about any drawdown of forces must be driven by security conditions and the ISAF commander’s operational needs, and not by mathematical calculation shaped by political concern.

By Dan Dupont
March 10, 2011 at 10:21 PM

The Pentagon just announced that the president has nominated Army Lt. Gen. Robert Cone for a fourth star and the job of commander, Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA.

Cone is the commanding general of III Corps and Ft. Hood, TX.

Also announced: Army Maj. Gen. Donald Campbell has been nominated to succeed Cone at Ft. Hood (a three-star post). Campbell "most recently served as commanding general, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, KY," DOD said.

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 10, 2011 at 3:41 PM

Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Lynn told the Senate Budget Committee this morning there are three reasons sticking with the current continuing resolution for the rest of the year would harm the Defense Department.

Lynn's said this would cut DOD's funding by $23 billion compared with the request, leaving "inadequate funding to carry out our national security commitments properly."

Second, a yearlong CR would leave the funding DOD does get in the wrong places, he noted.

And third, a yearlong CR robs DOD of the flexibility to start new weapons programs and boost production rates, he said.

By John Liang
March 9, 2011 at 8:21 PM

The Senate Armed Services Committee has launched an investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department's supply chain, according to a statement just released by the panel. Further:

Counterfeit electronic parts pose a risk to our national security, the reliability of our weapons systems and the safety of our military men and women. The proliferation of counterfeit goods also damages our economy and costs American jobs. The presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department’s supply chain is a growing problem that government and industry share a common interest in solving. Over the course of our investigation, the Committee looks forward to the cooperation of the Department of Defense and the defense industry to help us determine the source and extent of this problem and identify possible remedies for it.

InsideDefense.com reported at the end of last year that lawmakers -- after objections from the Pentagon -- dropped a proposal that would have required the defense secretary to appoint a senior official as the executive agent for preventing counterfeit microelectronics from entering the defense supply chain. During 2010, the House passed a version of the fiscal year 2011 defense authorization bill that called for the executive agent. However, according to the Dec. 28 story:

Senate authorizers included no such proposal in their version. Following objections from the Defense Department, lawmakers omitted the provision from the final version of the bill passed this month by the House and Senate.

The proposal would have put the executive agent in charge of developing a strategy, implementation plan and fiscal blueprint to "identify, mitigate, prevent, and eliminate counterfeit microelectronics from the defense supply chain." The official also would have assessed trends in counterfeit microelectronics.

The nixed provision defined "counterfeit microelectronic" as "any type of integrated circuit or other microelectronic component that consists of a substitute or unauthorized copy of a valid product from an original manufacturer; a product in which the materials used or the performance of the product has been changed without notice other than the original manufacturer of the product; or a substandard component misrepresented by the supplier of such component."

But DOD distanced itself from that definition and objected to the provision, asking lawmakers to wait for the results of an ongoing Pentagon review.  In an appeal sent to Congress and reviewed by Inside the Pentagon, the department argued the ongoing review involving industry suppliers and DOD agencies and components would consider the need for an executive agent and write a definition for "counterfeit."

A joint effort between the Pentagon's procurement shop and the office of DOD's chief information officer -- the Countering Counterfeits Tiger Team (C2T2) -- would "address DOD's vulnerabilities associated with counterfeits in our supply chains and methods to mitigate risks caused by those counterfeits, to include but not limited to information, communications technology and electronics," the appeal stated. The effort would provide findings, a proposed strategy and a plan of action to senior DOD officials in "fall 2010," the Nov. 19 appeal added.

By John Liang
March 9, 2011 at 7:55 PM

Andrew Hunter, a staffer on the House Armed Services Committee, has been appointed to the Senior Executive Service and will work as the special assistant to the Pentagon acquisition chief, according to a Defense Department announcement.

Hunter's new assignment was one of several Senior Executive Service announcements the Pentagon put out today, including:

James B. Lackey has been appointed to the Senior Executive Service and is assigned as deputy director, air warfare, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Washington, D.C.  Lackey previously served as supervisory program manager with the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.

Philip A. Burdette is assigned as principal director, (wounded warrior care and transition policy), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.  Burdette previously served as deputy federal security director, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.

Darlene J. Costello is assigned as principal director, portfolio systems acquisition/director, acquisition and program management, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Washington, D.C.  Costello previously served as deputy director, naval warfare, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Washington, D.C.

Paul J. Hutter is assigned as principal deputy general counsel, Tricare Management Agency, Falls Church, Va.  Hutter previously served as chief of staff, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington D.C.

Virginia S. Penrod is assigned as deputy assistant secretary of defense (military personnel policy), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.  Penrod previously served as principal director, military personnel policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness),Washington, D.C.

Lynn C. Simpson is assigned as chief of staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.  Simpson previously served as director, human capital and resource management, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.

Pasquale Tamburrino is assigned as deputy assistant secretary of defense (civilian personnel policy), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.  Tamburrino previously served as assistant deputy chief of naval operations, fleet readiness and logistics, Department of Navy, Arlington, Va.

By John Liang
March 9, 2011 at 6:58 PM

House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee Chairman Roscoe Bartlett has some questions regarding the viability of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle program. According to his prepared opening statement at a hearing this afternoon:

The committee has and continues to support the Army’s goal of pursuing a modernized combat vehicle.  However, the committee needs to understand the rationale as to why the Ground Combat Vehicle should proceed as scheduled or if it should move to the right, in time?  How do we know that the GCV is the full spectrum vehicle that the Army needs?  Why did the Army not complete an analysis of alternatives before it issued the original requests for proposals as this committee had encouraged?  Can the Army afford to launch another program that could cost up to $30 billion to procure a vehicle that carries a squad of nine instead of the current six?  Why not consider as an alternative option, continuing to upgrade Abrams, Bradleys and Strykers; focus on the network and take part of the funds and apply it to lightening the load of the soldier?

Ten years ago we were told that the Paladin howitzer couldn’t be upgraded and that Crusader and then Non-Line of Sight-Cannon (N-LOWS-C) was the only solution.  And now that those programs have been terminated we are pursuing an upgraded Paladin howitzer, albeit with technologies from Crusader and N-LOWS-C.

To be clear, I am not saying that I don't support the GCV program. And to be fair, I believe the Army's requirements will become clearer to the committee once the results of the Analysis of Alternatives are submitted. However, as was the case with the FCS program, it is this committee's responsibility to ask the hard questions now, so that we don’t learn in five years that the Army can't afford the GCV or that it is based on 'exquisite' requirements.

By John Liang
March 9, 2011 at 4:34 PM

The Senate Armed Services Committee has just released its complete list of subcommittee members for the 112th Congress, which is reproduced in full below.

The lists:

Subcommittee on AirLand

Senator Lieberman, Chairman

 

Senator Brown, Ranking Member

Senator Ben Nelson

 

Senator Inhofe

Senator McCaskill

 

Senator Sessions

Senator Manchin

 

Senator Wicker

Senator Gillibrand

 

Senator Vitter

Senator Blumenthal

 

 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Senator Hagan, Chairman

 

Senator Portman, Ranking Member

Senator Reed

 

Senator Chambliss

Senator Mark Udall

 

Senator Brown

Senator Manchin

 

Senator Graham

Senator Shaheen

 

Senator  Cornyn

Senator Gillibrand

 

 

 

Subcommittee on Personnel

 

Senator Webb, Chairman

 

Senator Graham, Ranking Member

Senator Lieberman

 

Senator Chambliss

Senator Akaka

 

Senator Brown

Senator McCaskill

 

Senator Ayotte

Senator Hagan

 

Senator Collins

Senator Begich

 

Senator Vitter

Senator Blumenthal

 

 

 

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

 

Senator McCaskill, Chairman

 

Senator Ayotte, Ranking Member

Senator Akaka

 

Senator Inhofe

Senator Ben Nelson

 

Senator Chambliss

Senator Webb

 

Senator Portman

Senator Mark Udall

 

Senator Collins

Senator Begich

 

Senator Graham

Senator Manchin

 

Senator Cornyn

Senator Shaheen

 

 

 

Subcommittee on Seapower

 

Senator Reed, Chairman

 

Senator Wicker, Ranking Member

Senator Akaka

 

Senator Sessions

Senator Webb

 

Senator Ayotte

Senator Hagan

 

Senator Collins

Senator Blumenthal

 

 

 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

 

Senator Ben Nelson, Chairman

 

Senator Sessions, Ranking Member

Senator Lieberman

 

Senator Inhofe

Senator Reed

 

Senator Wicker

Senator Mark Udall

 

Senator Portman

Senator Begich

 

Senator Cornyn

Senator Shaheen

 

Senator Vitter

Senator Gillibrand

 

 

By John Liang
March 8, 2011 at 4:30 PM

A recent Government Accountability Office report on export controls has an interesting nugget on exactly which technologies foreign governments want to get their hands on:

According to intelligence reports and law enforcement sources, as well as congressional testimony and law enforcement officials, a small group of countries is responsible for most of the efforts to acquire controlled technologies for military purposes. The countries included in this small group are detailed in the December 2010 classified version of this report. According to congressional testimony presented in September 2005 by the Director of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) . . . and intelligence assessments, some countries use some of their foreign nationals as part of organized programs to obtain controlled technologies while working, studying in, or visiting the United States. In addition, the Director of ONCIX also testified that the U.S. government has limited insight into foreign intelligence operations in the United States. The Director of ONCIX also said that much of the intelligence collection against the U.S. technology base is carried out by those who are employing nontraditional collection means against the United States, rather than by known intelligence officers. As a result, the U.S. government has little knowledge of when individuals who ostensibly come to the United States for legitimate business purposes might have illegitimate objectives, according to this official.

According to the ONCIX and other assessments, the technologies most often targeted for theft since 2002 have included aeronautics, computers and information systems, electronics, lasers and optics, sensors and marine technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, according to ONCIX’s 2003 Annual Report, biotechnology has been of particular interest. Moreover, the ONCIX has expressed concern about emerging military technologies or commercial breakthrough technologies that have not yet been added to the CCL because these technologies are often hard to identify in their early phases and are more vulnerable to loss or compromise.

But just because potential enemies have been trying to get their hands on UAV technologies doesn't mean U.S. contractors don't want to sell UAVs to friendly nations -- and have had trouble doing so, as InsideDefense.com reported last October. Ill-defined and incoherent Pentagon policies governing foreign military sales have hindered exports of U.S. unmanned aircraft to partner nation forces, putting the United States and its allies in danger of losing its edge in a key area, according to a top industry executive. Further:

"It is a challenge to navigate through [that]  process . . . We are still struggling to sell unmanned aircraft, even to our allies," Northrop Grumman's President and Chief Executive Officer Wes Bush said during a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"To rely on technical superiority as a strategy, we have to maintain those things that truly make us superior," Bush added. But in the case of export controls, industry and government "for years have made the perfect the enemy of the good," remaining too focused on protecting U.S. technological advantages, he said.

In many cases, that focus has resulted in "severe and unnecessary damage" to the U.S. defense industrial base, Bush said. The potential damage being done to the UAV market via those overprotective export measures is akin to U.S. efforts to regulate exports of satellite technology in the late 1980s.

By John Liang
March 7, 2011 at 5:17 PM

U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate recently concluded a two-year project that improved the way the command manages its processes "for tasking, collecting and assessing Joint Integrated Persistent Surveillance (JIPS) capabilities," according to a JFCOM statement. Further:

"The project developed standardized training and doctrine to keep pace with current battlefield needs and accurate assessment of all information collection assets," said Army Lt. Col. Stan Murphy, USJFCOM JIPS project leader.

"Regular or irregular warfare makes no difference," Murphy said. "It is all about how we integrate, manage and synchronize all of our limited resources and capabilities to be the most effective possible."

Navy Capt. Terry Morris, J9 Battle Space Awareness division chief, oversees projects such as JIPS and said that aerial unmanned surveillance assets such as the Predator and human ground-based communications intelligence need to be integrated.

"Persistent surveillance is more than just video screens and cameras," he said. "It is blending the right information at the right time for the commander so that he can make real-time decisions on the best utilizations for assets to be able to support the warfighters on the ground."

Proper training and information disbursement across a joint force can have a huge impact on increasing JIPS information collection abilities.

"This increases commander's awareness of what's happening in his battlefield, allowing him to make decisions much quicker" Morris added.

The project identified gaps dealing with surveillance operations and processes used by the joint force not adequately reflected in joint training and doctrine.

Inside the Pentagon reported last month that the planned closures of U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Business Transformation Agency -- part of Defense Secretary Robert Gates' proposed overarching efficiencies initiative -- are expected to save $1.9 billion from fiscal year 2012 to 2016. Further:

Regarding JFCOM, the disestablishment plan was signed by Gates earlier this month, with the nearly 6,000-person command being disestablished by August 2011, and all personnel moves completed by next March.

"When the transition is complete, roughly 50 percent of JFCOM personnel and budget will remain along with core missions, such as joint training, joint force provider, joint concept and doctrine development and joint integration," according to a Feb. 9 JFCOM press release. "These functions will be aligned under the Joint Staff for leadership and direction."

During the budget briefing Monday, Hale also noted that the money savings will not start immediately.

"There will certainly be some cost," Hale said. "We will offer some buyout incentives in cases where we need people to leave." He said costs could also be incurred by terminating contracts.

"My rule of thumb, and it doesn't relate directly to JFCOM, but having done a lot of these drawdowns in the past, is that you don't save any money in the first year," Hale said. "You do well to break even, frankly."

By Gabe Starosta
March 4, 2011 at 5:56 PM

Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned military leaders not to revert back to a 20th-century philosophy of warfare after he leaves his post, and predicted difficult budgetary constraints near the end of this decade, in a speech at the Air Force Academy this morning.

Speaking to a crowd of young airmen, Gates addressed the current and future budget constraints all the military services can expect. In response to a question about future program cuts, Gates said that in 2009, he presented Congress with a list of 33 programs that should be canceled or curtailed. Of those only one is still ongoing: the second engine for the F-35 that House lawmakers voted to kill last week.

However, Gates warned that he expected leaner budget years near the end of the 2010s. As a result, the secretary has pushed to fund large projects, like the development of an Air Force next-generation bomber, in the present.

“The Air Force is going to face a big challenge" in the coming years, Gates said. “Whether we can fund a new tanker, F-35, a new bomber and all of these other capabilities simultaneously is going to be a tough question that people will have to confront.” If he didn't get those programs started now, future government officials and service leaders would be left with far fewer options, Gates added.

To that end, the secretary praised the joint operations performed by all the military services, but lamented that the services “do not procure jointly.” He cited the F-35 program, despite its many delays and cost overruns, as a model for cooperative procurement among the services.

Gates also urged future leaders to hold “a comprehensive and integrated” view of the service's future needs, which should include the continued development of unmanned capabilities and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tools. The Air Force now counts on a UAV fleet six times larger than was projected in 2000, he said.

“I'm concerned that the view still lingers in some corners that once I depart as secretary of defense and U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, things can get back to what some consider 'real Air Force normal,'” Gates said. “This must not happen.”

The speech marked Gates' third, and according to him, final visit to the Air Force Academy in his time as defense secretary.

By John Liang
March 4, 2011 at 4:44 PM

Northrop Grumman has submitted its final proposal revision for the Missile Defense Agency's Next Generation Aegis Missile (NGAM) concept definition and program planning procurement effort, according to a company statement:

The new interceptor is a key element of the layered intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) defense of the nation and will be designed to engage intercontinental, intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missile threats. MDA has said it plans to make multiple contract awards in early 2011 and plans to field the interceptor in the 2020 time frame.

"Northrop Grumman offers MDA an opportunity to put fresh, experienced eyes on the early ICBM intercept design challenge," said Duke Dufresne, sector vice president and general manager, Strike and Surveillance Systems Division for Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems. "We bring extensive design, development, testing and manufacturing experience from our ICBM and Kinetic Energy Interceptor programs. We're joined by a team of industry experts who have been at the forefront of every ballistic missile defense hit-to-kill interceptor program, including terminal high-altitude area defense, standard missile and ground-based mid-course defense systems. Together, we offer the unique combination of interceptor experience and innovation to develop the next generation of ballistic missile defense interceptors."

Inside Missile Defense reported last September that MDA had identified $1.4 billion in the Pentagon's six-year budget plan for the NGAM program:

In answers to questions submitted to MDA after a July 29 industry day with agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, which were recently posted on Federal Business Opportunities, MDA writes that the $1.4 billion "figure that LTG O'Reilly mentioned was referring to the funding within MDA's POM12 budget for the Product Development Phase (covering years FY12-16). The number is a requested amount. No funds for FY-12 have been appropriated yet."

MDA anticipates contract awards for the NGAM program "in the second quarter of FY-11," the document states. When asked about the "technology maturation contact awards time line vs. the concept definition time line," MDA responds: "We intend to award additional technology maturation contracts in FY-11."

According to MDA's fiscal year 2012 budget request submitted last month, the agency allocated $225.6 million in FY-10, nearly $94 million in FY-11 and is asking Congress for $565 million in FY-12 for its overall Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program.

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 4, 2011 at 3:25 PM

Losing KC-X tanker bidder EADS North America has scheduled a press conference at noon today with its CEO, Sean O’Keefe, and its chairman, Ralph Crosby, at the National Press Club to discuss the tanker competition. Reuters and Agence France-Presse reported today that EADS is expected not to appeal the Pentagon's decision to award the lucrative deal to Boeing. Last week, the department and Boeing inked a $3.5 billion engineering and manufacturing development contract for the tanker. The value of the program could ultimately exceed $30 billion.

Rep. Jo Bonner (R-AL) questioned Defense Secretary Robert Gates about the program Wednesday. For a detailed report on the Pentagon's KC-X acquisition decision memorandum, see this week's Inside the Pentagon.