The Insider

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 29, 2011 at 5:22 PM

U.S. military operations in Libya have cost roughly $550 million to date, Pentagon spokeswoman Cmdr. Kathleen Kesler said today.

"DOD has incurred added costs of about $550 million from the start of operations through March 28," she said. "About 60 percent of these added costs are for munitions; the remaining costs are for higher operating tempo of U.S. forces and deployment costs."

While the Pentagon anticipates future costs tied to the operation, the ultimate cost to the department remains unclear.

"Future costs are highly uncertain," Kesler said. "However, we expect to incur added costs of about $40 million over the next three weeks as U.S. forces are reduced and NATO assumes more responsibility. After that, if U.S. forces stay at the levels currently planned and the operation continues, we would incur added costs of about $40 million per month."

By John Liang
March 29, 2011 at 2:46 PM

The Missile Defense Agency has awarded Lockheed Martin's Space Systems division a contract worth nearly $695 million to build and deliver 48 interceptors and ground-support equipment for batteries 3 and 4 of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, according to a Federal Business Opportunities notice issued this morning. The contract -- a "fixed price incentive and cost-plus-fixed-fee modification" -- has a performance period through December 2013.

Last week, MDA announced via FedBizOpps that the agency would "negotiate on a sole source basis" with Lockheed "for the manufacturing of THAAD Production Lot 3." Specifically:

The contracting approach for this manufacturing effort will be to modify the existing Fire Unit Fielding (FUF) Contract HQ0147-07-C-0196. Contract HQ0147-07-C-0196 requires manufacturing, delivery and integration of the THAAD components for fire unit fielding and initial spares. The THAAD Fire Unit Fielding (FUF) components are comprised of the THAAD Launcher, THAAD Fire Control and Communications (TFCC), Interceptors, and Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE). Quantities for Production Lot 3 to be procured are a maximum of 18 launchers, 68 interceptors, 1 Fire Control Suite, and associated PSE. This action is expected to be awarded in 2nd quarter FY12.

The proposed acquisition is directed to LMSSC pursuant to the authority of 10 USC 2304(c)(1) as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii), (iii) and (b)(1)(ii). Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. LMSSC is the only source that currently possesses the in-depth technical knowledge of the THAAD system requirements to satisfactorily perform the work contemplated herein within the needed timeframe. No other source has access to the required technical data and resident expertise to perform the described effort. This expertise cannot be attained by any other contractor within the anticipated period of performance without incurring an unacceptable delay and risk to the overall program in fulfilling these agency requirements and mission and without incurring a substantial duplication of costs. LMSSC is the system prime contractor for three other THAAD system developmental efforts: Contract DASG60-92-C-0101 ($1.4B), DASG60-00-C-0072 ($6B) and THAAD Field Support Contract HQ0197-10-D-0001 ($435M). Contract DASG60-00-C-0072 will continue through FY11 and the work under this proposed contract action must be completely compatible and fully integrated with the work under the other THAAD development contracts. Only LMSSC is capable of manufacturing the identified THAAD components, combining them into fire units, and successfully integrating these tasks with prior and on-going development work on the THAAD System.

By John Liang
March 28, 2011 at 5:06 PM

The Pentagon last week issued a "directive-type memorandum" that seeks "to immediately enhance reliability in the acquisition process and . . . improve the efficiency of the Defense acquisition system." The memo "is designed to improve reliability analysis, planning, tracking, and reporting" and "[i]nstitutionalizes reliability planning methods and reporting requirements timed to key acquisition activities to monitor reliability growth."

The March 21 memo, signed by Frank Kendall from the Defense Department's acquisition shop and directed to the senior DOD leadership, establishes the following procedures:

1. Program Managers (PMs) shall formulate a comprehensive reliability and maintainability (R&M) program using an appropriate reliability growth strategy to improve R&M performance until R&M requirements are satisfied. The program will consist of engineering activities including: R&M allocations, block diagrams and predictions; failure definitions and scoring criteria; failure mode, effects and criticality analysis; maintainability and built-in test demonstrations; reliability growth testing at the system and subsystem level; and a failure reporting and corrective action system maintained through design, development, production, and sustainment. The R&M program is an integral part of the systems engineering process.

2. The lead DoD Component and the PM, or equivalent, shall prepare a preliminary Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Cost Rationale Report in accordance with Reference (c) in support of the Milestone (MS) A decision. This report provides a quantitative basis for reliability requirements and improves cost estimates and program planning. The report shall be attached to the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) at MS A and updated in support of MS B and C.

3. The Technology Development Strategy preceding MS A and the Acquisition Strategy preceding MS B and C shall specify how the sustainment characteristics of the materiel solution resulting from the analysis of alternatives and the Capability Development Document sustainment key performance parameter thresholds have been translated into R&M design requirements and contract specifications. The strategies shall also include the tasks and processes to be stated in the request for proposal that the contractor will be required to employ to demonstrate the achievement of reliability design requirements. The Test and Evaluation Strategy and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) shall specify how reliability will be tested and evaluated during the associated acquisition phase.

4. Reliability Growth Curves (RGC) shall reflect the reliability growth strategy and be employed to plan, illustrate, and report reliability growth. A RGC shall be included in the SEP at MS A, and updated in the TEMP beginning at MS B. RGC will be stated in a series of intermediate goals and tracked through fully integrated, system-level test and evaluation events until the reliability threshold is achieved. If a single curve is not adequate to describe overall system reliability, curves will be provided for critical subsystems with rationale for their selection.

5. PMs and operational test agencies shall assess the reliability growth required for the system to achieve its reliability threshold during initial operational test and evaluation and report the results of that assessment to the Milestone Decision Authority at MS C.

6. Reliability growth shall be monitored and reported throughout the acquisition process. PMs shall report the status of reliability objectives and/or thresholds as part of the formal design review process, during Program Support Reviews, and during systems engineering technical reviews. RGC shall be employed to report reliability growth status at Defense Acquisition Executive System reviews.

By Jason Sherman
March 28, 2011 at 2:05 PM

The F-35 joint program office late Friday night announced the Joint Strike Fighter test flight program -- suspended more than two weeks ago following the in-flight failure of a key component -- is resuming in full:

The three remaining F-35 test aircraft with the production alternate engine starter/generator (AES/G) configuration, as well as the first two production aircraft, will resume flight operations.

This action follows a thorough analysis of a March 9 in-flight dual generator failure on AF-4 during a test flight at Edwards AFB, Calif.  During the March 9 flight, the aircraft backup electrical generator came on line as designed and the test pilot was able to return the jet safely back to base.

Flight clearance was reinstated after an investigation and test data indicated a maintenance procedure resulted in excess oil remaining within the AES/G lubrication system. Previous maintenance procedures could allow a small amount of extra oil to remain within the generator following servicing.  Under some conditions, the extra oil that is churning inside a narrow air gap within the AES/G could cause internal temperatures to increase.  It was assessed that high temperatures led to the generator failures. Maintenance documents have been amended to provide improved engine starter/generator servicing procedures.

There are two primary generator configurations used on the F-35 - the ES/G (Engine Starter / Generator) which is used on AF-1/2/3, BF-1/2/3/4 and a newer production item known as AES/G (Alternate Engine Starter/Generator) which was installed in AF-4, BF-5, CF-1 and all Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft. Both generators provide the functions of engine start and primary electrical power generation in the overall architecture.

There was no significant impact to the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program or production operations. Flight test schedules are built with a margin for precautionary safety stand-downs. After it was determined the dual generator failure was unique to aircraft with the AES/G configuration, seven SDD jets (AF-1/2/3, BF-1/2/3/4) were cleared to return to flight on March 14. The F-35 test programs at Edwards AFB, Calif. and Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD remain ahead of their monthly flight test schedules.

By John Liang
March 25, 2011 at 8:32 PM

The Government Accountability Office released an annual report today evaluating the Missile Defense Agency's progress in improving the way the agency handles cost, schedule, testing and performance in developing the various components of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.

The 124-page report includes 10 recommendations for MDA "to strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts."

To make the baselines MDA reports to Congress clearer, more consistent and complete, GAO recommends the agency take the following actions:

1. For resource baselines:

a) Provide more detailed explanations and definitions of information included in resource baselines; particularly operations and support costs and unit cost calculations.

b) Label cost estimates to appropriately reflect the content reported and explain any exclusions.

c) Include all sunk costs in all of its cost estimates and baselines.

d) Obtain independent cost estimates for each baseline.

e) In meeting new statutory requirements to include a cost estimate in each acquisition baseline for a program element, take steps to ensure these cost estimates are high quality, reliable cost estimates that are documented to facilitate external review.

2. For schedule baselines:

a) In meeting new statutory requirements to report on an acquisition baseline including a comprehensive schedule, include a comprehensive list of actual versus planned quantities of assets that are or were to be delivered each fiscal year.

b) In meeting new requirements to report variances on acquisition baselines, report on variances of these quantities by fiscal year and the reasons for these differences.

3. For test baselines:

a) In meeting new statutory requirements to report variances between reported acquisition baselines, also report variances between the test plan as presented in the previous acquisition baseline and the test plan as executed that explain the reason for any changes.

b) Report the cost effects of those test changes in either the BAR or the budget justification documentation.

In order to stabilize the test plan and ensure the test baseline can absorb test failures and test delays and remains executable, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Missile Defense Agency:

4. Includes sufficient schedule and resource margin, including spare test assets and targets, based on recent test experience and forecasted testing demands.

The GAO report also notes the Pentagon's responses to the recommendations in an earlier draft of the report:

DOD fully concurred with 7 of our 10 recommendations, including our recommendations to take steps to ensure its cost estimates are high-quality, reliable cost estimates that are documented to facilitate external review. In response to this recommendation, DOD stated that MDA will follow the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide for each program reported in the [BMDS Accountability Report]. In doing so, MDA Cost Estimating and Analysis Directorate plans to form a cost assessment group to formally assess each cost estimate to ensure they are well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. DOD also fully concurred with our recommendation to report the cost effects of its test changes in either the BAR or budget justification documentation, stating that MDA will provide the cost effects as part of the individual program resource baselines starting in the 2012 BAR.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA to include all sunk costs in all of its cost estimates and baselines. DOD stated that MDA will continue to report sunk costs in most of its acquisition programs except targets, where it will continue to report unit costs in the same manner as the 2010 and 2011 BARs. According to DOD, because each target is inherently a test article and no two are identical, there are always variable non-recurring costs associated with each article. Also, due to the extensive reuse of previous strategic missile components in the targets program, including all sunk costs does not reflect MDA program costs accurately. Accordingly, MDA will use the costs incurred/planned during the future years defense plan to calculate unit costs. These unit costs will not include any sunk costs. We continue to believe that all costs, including all sunk costs incurred for individual target efforts, should be reported to the maximum extent possible, regardless of the agency or service that originally incurred those costs. To the extent that a sunk cost, such as the original cost of previous strategic missile components, can not be calculated, that fact should be explained when the costs are reported. Moreover, DOD’s method of reporting and baselining target unit costs will not reflect even MDA program costs accurately because it excludes MDA-incurred sunk costs. Excluding these costs, which can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, precludes understanding of the full investment required to develop and procure targets, as well as limiting insight into developmental progress. In addition, the incomplete costs reported will be changed every two years because, as DOD noted, MDA uses only the costs for the future years defense plan to calculate the target unit cost baselines. The future years defense plan covers a six year period of time, but changes every two years to a new six year period of time. Calculating unit costs this way provides neither the full cost nor the full quantities of targets as it removes any costs or quantities prior to fiscal year 2010. We therefore continue to believe that including these costs will aid departmental and congressional decision makers as they make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources.

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 25, 2011 at 3:49 PM

The Navy expects to issue the results of its VXX presidential helicopter analysis of alternatives (AOA) in the second quarter of 2011 and seems to be on track to capitalize on lessons learned from the previous VH-71 program, the Government Accountability Office writes in a report issued today.

"While we cannot assess its sufficiency until it is complete, statements by DOD officials on the nature of the AOA effort suggest the pursuit of an acquisition approach in line with best practices, the report states. "Plans are for the AOA to analyze in detail the estimated cost and effectiveness of a range of potential materiel solutions to support the need."

Program officials told GAO they understand the need to establish and maintain a solid business case laying out a balance between requirements, cost and schedule that results in an executable program with acceptable risk.

"To accomplish this, the program intends to use a rigorous four-phase systems engineering and technical review process constituting a more knowledge-based acquisition approach," the report states. "This process differs greatly from the process followed during the VH-71 program. According to VXX program officials, the VXX program’s systems engineering and technical review process will begin earlier during the technology development phase (pre-Milestone B). VXX program officials stated that they plan to enter the systems development phase with a preliminary technical design and possibly an early prototype of subsystems."

By John Liang
March 24, 2011 at 8:21 PM

No, that headline isn't about the 1970s doo-wop band that appeared in the movie musical "Grease." It refers to an Afghan concept of standing "shoulder-to-shoulder" with someone -- a term taught to reporters today by a U.S. military official in Afghanistan in response a question on whether Provincial Reconstruction Teams create a dependency on foreign coalition forces. During the teleconference, Air Force Lt. Col. John "Red" Walker, the commander of the Mehtar Lam Provincial Reconstruction Team in Regional Command-East, said:

One of the things that we've done or one of the -- one of the actions that we've been very cognizantly taking is, all of the PRT actions and all of our processes are nested "shana-ba-shana." I mean, we are really integrated very well with the governor and his staff, so we don't give any opportunity or any projects or development or really any actions without the knowledge and prioritization of that Afghan government entity, whether that's at the district or at the provincial level. And I think that's what President Karzai is getting at, is that the PRTs need to be very well nested with the provincial governor and his staff.

As cooperative as coalition forces have been with their Afghan counterparts, however, senior U.S. military officials have grown increasingly worried about having to continue to operate under a continuing resolution instead of a fiscal year 2011 appropriations bill. As Inside the Pentagon reports today:

Continuing to restrict Defense Department funding under stopgap legislation could complicate the war in Afghanistan by blocking the acquisition of urgently needed military equipment, according to Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander there.

If Congress does not pass a fiscal year 2011 defense appropriations bill, the restrictions tied to operating under a continuing resolution could prevent the armed services from buying systems such as MQ-9 Reaper drones needed to support troops in Afghanistan, he said March 18 at the Newseum in Washington.

"The CR is not yet complicating our efforts, but there is a point at which it will," he said. "To give you an example, the U.S. Air Force won't be able to buy the additional Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle [combat air patrols] that we have requested on an urgent joint operational needs statement. And then there are similar examples of that."

Inside the Air Force reported March 18 that the Air Force had exhausted its prior-year reprogramming funding, meaning that the planned purchase of 24 more Reaper drones and other equipment would have to wait for further relief from Congress or until a full appropriations bill is passed.

Petraeus noted a multibillion-dollar fund used to plan, program and implement structural, institutional and management changes in Afghan forces could also be impacted. "At a certain point, the Afghan Security Forces Fund," for which the administration is seeking a budget increase, "would be capped at a much lower level," he said.

On March 17, the Senate passed a three-week continuing resolution to fund government operations through April 8. The House previously passed the bill. President Obama signed the legislation March 18.

Petraeus also reiterated his "grave concerns about the inadequate levels of funding" for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, stressing both organizations have vital work to do in Afghanistan. He recently made the same point in congressional testimony.

"These are national security issues," he said at the March 18 event, sponsored by National Journal. The expertise of, and funding for, the State Department and USAID are needed to "cement the gains on the ground" in Afghanistan, he said.

By Jason Sherman
March 24, 2011 at 4:33 PM

The Pentagon today announced plans to stop funding the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine program, drawing a strong challenge from a key congressional committee and a pledge from F136 builder General Electric to fight the move.

The Defense Department's announcement:

The Department of Defense today issued a stop work order in connection with the Joint Strike Fighter extra engine program.

The administration and the DoD strongly oppose the extra engine program, as reflected in the President’s fiscal 2012 budget proposal that was recently submitted to Congress, which does not include funding for the program.  In our view it is a waste of taxpayer money that can be used to fund higher Departmental priorities, and should be ended now.

The House of Representatives has recently expressed its own opposition to the extra engine in its passage of H.R. 1 including the adoption of the Rooney Amendment which removed all fiscal 2011 funding for this program.  In addition, funding for the extra engine was not authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2011, enacted in January.  In light of these recent events, Congressional prerogatives, and the administration’s view of the program, we have concluded that a stop work order is now the correct course.  The stop work order will remain in place pending final resolution of the program’s future, for a period not to exceed 90 days, unless extended by agreement of the government and the contractor.

Rep. Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, responded with the following:

Yesterday, my staff director at the House Armed Services Committee received a call from Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter informing the committee of the Department’s decision to discontinue funding for the Joint Strike Fighter’s competitive engine program.

The views of the President and Secretary Gates are well known on this topic, but those opinions—however strong—are not the law.  The Joint Strike Fighter F136 engine program is funded under the current Continuing Resolution.  The Secretary should follow current law and not pre-empt the Congressional deliberation process by yanking funding after a single amendment vote.

Regardless of the convenient arguments utilized by the Department of Defense and others, canceling the engine competition and awarding a sole-source, never-competed contract constitutes the largest earmark in the history of the Department of Defense.  In the case of the Littoral Combat Ship, our industry partners did not voluntarily lower their price—competition forced a lower price per ship.  In this era of fiscal responsibility, I am stunned that the Administration and the Congress would accept the argument that it is good policy to save a dollar today only to spend a thousand dollars tomorrow.

The Department’s decision is especially troubling when you consider their preferred engine has experienced development delays and a cost to complete increase of 445 percent over the last three years.

Going forward, we will explore all legislative options available to us to maintain engine competition in the largest acquisition program in U.S. history.

The F136 industry team has also weighed in with a statement:

The GE/Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team received a "Stop Work" order from the Department of Defense instructing the team to stop efforts on the F136 for 2011 once the current funding runs out at the end of March.

While the F136 development contract contains a "stop work" clause, we are disappointed that DoD took this unilateral action before Congress has completed its work on the fiscal year 2011 budget.

However, we are not deterred by this decision. We feel so strongly about this issue, as do our Congressional supporters, that we will, consistent with the stop work directive, self-fund the F136 program through this 90-day stop work period.

We are fully committed to delivering a better engine for the F-35 program, and have no intention of abandoning the warfighter and taxpayers.

Everyone knows competition saves money. Our supporters in Congress are more determined than ever, and are encouraging us to press the merits of our case. We will not walk away from a $3 billion taxpayer investment and your hard work to deliver what the Senate has called a "near model program."

The F136 engine is meeting or exceeding performance expectations, is demonstrating significant advantages over the Pratt & Whitney engine, and is nearly complete.

The F135 has racked up $3.4 billion in cost overruns with continued delays and technical issues.  Just last week, House hearings confirmed that the P&W engine has not met required testing for the JSF flight envelope after four years.

These issues won't fix themselves.  Only competition creates performance based rewards and delivers better and better capability ... it's just that simple. Mischaracterizing the F136 as "redundant" does not support our founding principles of competition and excellence which are at the core of the US military.

We are gratified that several House and Senate leaders, who will convene in early April to complete the FY2011 budget process, are determined supporters of competing JSF engines for a myriad of financial and security reasons.

By John Liang
March 24, 2011 at 3:46 PM

Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, spoke yesterday during a briefing on board Air Force One about whether U.S. military actions in Libya constituted war or something else:

I think what we are doing is enforcing a resolution that has a very clear set of goals, which is protecting the Libyan people, averting a humanitarian crisis, and setting up a no-fly zone. Obviously that involves kinetic military action, particularly on the front end.  But again, the nature of our commitment is that we are not getting into an open-ended war, a land invasion in Libya.  What we are doing is offering a unique set of capabilities over a period of days that can shape the environment for a no-fly zone.

Expect Congress to take a hard look at the administration's policy on Libya in the coming weeks, as Inside the Pentagon reports this morning:

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) said Wednesday he expects the ongoing U.S. and allied airstrikes in Libya will take center-stage March 29 when the panel holds a fiscal year 2012 budget hearing with U.S. European Command chief Adm. James Stavridis and U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. Robert Kehler. "There will be a hearing in effect which will focus on this, because Adm. Stavridis will be coming in front of us Tuesday. So I'm sure this will be the main focus of that hearing," Levin said.

By Cid Standifer
March 23, 2011 at 8:24 PM

The Navy has plenty of Tomahawk missiles to burn in Libya, according to the service's top officer, who said today that replacing the rounds that have been used up establishing a no-flight zone would not be a problem.

“The Tomahawks that were shot, that's part of our current inventory,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said at a Defense Writers Group breakfast this morning. “There are ample replacements for those in the inventory -- more than ample replacements for them -- and in the budget, the funding line continues for Tomahawks to replace those that were shot.”

Roughead agreed with the Navy's top budget officer, Rear Adm. Joseph Mulloy, who told Inside the Navy on March 21 that the cost of the no-fly zone operation for the service is small, given that most of the assets being used were already in the area.

“Did we incur some additional flying hours? Yes,” Roughead said. “But, for example, the [EA-18G] Growlers that we brought in were flying in Iraq anyway, so those flying hours were being burned. . . . Moving to Japan, for example, on the [aircraft carrier] Ronald Reagan [CVN-76], which is heavily involved in the relief operation there, we're flying a lot of helicopters, but we're also not flying the air wing as much as we would have, so quite frankly it's probably costing me less money in that regard.”

The admiral noted that the service is keeping track of all Libya-related expenditures, though he said there is no sign yet of whether or not a supplemental budget would be requested to cover the cost of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

Roughead suggested that the Navy could keep up operations off Libya more or less indefinitely.

“For the Navy, because we are deployed and we are in constant rotation, the forces that are there will continue to provide support that the tactical commander needs,” he said, “but we have other forces that are getting ready to float, so the forces that are there will be relieved by others and that flow continues.”

By Thomas Duffy
March 23, 2011 at 6:32 PM

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) today said he has asked his staff to work with Pentagon officials to come up with a good estimate for the cost of the U.S. military's participation in Operation Odyssey Dawn which has established a no flight zone in the skies above Libya.

During a conference call with reporters, Levin said he thinks the U.S. portion of the bill for Odyssey Dawn "will cost a lot less because we are going to be the junior partner in a multilateral effort."

Levin added that he thinks there will be some support in terms of costs that will be coming from other countries. "That may be in terms of equipment or fuel but we need to sort that out as well," he said.

The key to holding down the costs of U.S. participation is when leadership of the operation is handed off to a coalition of other countries, Levin said.

Next Tuesday, Adm. James Stavridis, head of U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, will appear before Levin's committee. Libya will certainly be discussed, the senator said.

Sens. Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Jack Reed (D-RI) joined Levin on the conference call.

By John Liang
March 23, 2011 at 4:03 PM

U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) has deployed personnel to support international humanitarian efforts in response to the crisis in Libya, according to a JFCOM statement. Further:

Thirty-seven members from the JECC's Joint Deployable Team, the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and the Joint Public Affairs Support Element are providing planning, operational, knowledge management, logistics, public affairs and communication expertise, to support U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) efforts as part of the international community's response to civil unrest in Libya.

Additionally, the JECC coordinated support of additional USJFCOM capabilities from the Operations, Plans, Logistics and Engineering Directorate (J3/4), the Joint Deployment Training Center, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to meet the requirements of this mission.

The JECC's assistance is part of the U.S. military's support to a larger U.S. government emergency response which includes close coordination with the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development and other international organizations.

The JECC also will support the joint information bureau (JIB) in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece, a satellite JIB in Sigonella, Italy, and assist in the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) - Odyssey Dawn, led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa.

By Thomas Duffy
March 22, 2011 at 5:40 PM

Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), who has opposed the U.S. involvement in Libya from the start, wants to cut off funding for the operation. Today Kucinich sent out the following letter to other House members:

Dear Colleague:

A few days ago, the United States and our allies began conducting United Nations-sanctioned, U.S.-led military operations against Libya. The establishment of a no-fly zone by the U.S. and our allies, billed as an act to protect civilians in Libya, is an act of war. Yet the President committed the U.S. to military intervention without consulting Congress, in clear subversion of Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives only Congress the power to declare war.

According to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the initial costs of a no-fly zone could cost the U.S. between $400 and $800 million, or $30 to $100 million per week. We have already spent trillions of dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which descended into unwinnable quagmires. Now, the President is plunging the United States into yet another war we cannot afford. While the Administration assures us that that the U.S. will hand-off its lead role to coalition partners within days, we have not been notified of long-term plans or goals following initial air strikes in the country. The timeline the President gave to Congress was summarized with one word: “limited.”

I intend to offer an amendment to the forthcoming Continuing Resolution or Omnibus Appropriations bill that would prohibit funding for U.S. involvement in military operations in Libya. I urge you to support this amendment.

By Thomas Duffy
March 21, 2011 at 8:00 PM

A senior Pentagon group will receive a briefing this week on the results of a recently completed study of the force requirements needed for the Obama administration's missile defense plan.

Rear Adm. Archer Macy, the director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, said at a missile defense conference in Washington today that the results of the Joint Capabilities Mix Study III will be briefed to the deputy secretary of defense's advisory working group -- affectionately known as the 'DAWG" -- sometime this week.

Testifying last December before the House Armed Service strategic forces subcommittee, Macy explained what the study would cover:

JCM III is examining our missile defense strategy in the PAA to inform decisions on the number and types of sensors, launchers, and interceptors we require. In order to determine force needs at this level of granularity we have to take into account how the Combatant Commands intend to employ them, what the threats are, and generally how the threat will be expected to be employed. Historically, a lot of these types of studies make assumptions about all these factors based on what other studies have used. We chose not to do this. Instead, we went to the experts. For operational employment information, like asset laydowns and shot doctrine we went to each of the Combatant Commands. We are using how they will conduct BMD operations within their Area Of Responsibility (AOR). For system performance, we went to the experts at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In order to keep it all in perspective we set up a joint analysis and review process.

"While this could appear to be a rather laborious structure, in reality it worked quite smoothly, and we found it was very effective in getting the combatant commands, the services and system developers" together, Macy said today. "It helped keep our efforts coherent and complete as we worked through the factors."

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 21, 2011 at 6:38 PM

The possibility that Libyan ruler Col. Moammar Gadhafi might use surrogates to launch terrorist attacks in the United States or elsewhere in retribution for U.S. and allied airstrikes against his military is a "very, very legitimate concern," Gen. Carter Ham, the head of U.S. Africa Command, told Pentagon reporters today via satellite from AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

Ham said he has not seen anything specific to indicate Gadhafi plans to launch terrorist attacks, but he added, "We must operate under the assumption that he would like to see that happen. And so we must necessarily keep our guard and our vigilance very high." Officials must also ensure al Qaeda and its affiliates do not capitalize on the situation in Libya by gaining a foothold there, he said.

"There is no higher priority for this command than the protection of America, Americans and American interests from terrorist attack, and we watch that very closely," Ham said.

Gadhafi might remain in power, the general said. "I do see a situation where that could be the case," Ham said. "It's perhaps easier for me to address that than it is for others, because I have a very discrete military mission. And so I could see accomplishing the military mission . . . which has been assigned to me and the current leader would remain the current leader. Is that ideal? I don't think anyone would say that is ideal, but I could envision that as a -- as a possible situation at least for the current mission that I have."

Ham reiterated he has no mission to attack Gadhafi. "And we are not doing so," he said. "We are not seeking his whereabouts or anything like that. We think we have been very effective in degrading his ability to control his regime forces. And we think we are seeing that play out at various parts of the country." Asked about an attack on a facility in Gadhafi's compound, Ham noted the compound is a "pretty big place" and that the building attacked with "tremendous precision" was a command-and-control facility. The strike was conducted to "degrade the regime's ability to control its military forces . . . in the attack of civilians," he said. "So we think there is a very, very direct relationship in the attack on that target and the mission that we have."

U.S. and allied forces are expanding the no-fly zone in Libya. "Our actions today are focused on extending the no-fly zone southward, then westward from Benghazi," he said. "With the growing capabilities of the coalition, I anticipate the no-fly zone will soon extend to Brega, Misurata and then to Tripoli. That's about 1,000 kilometers, so it's a pretty wide area."

But Ham said he is not concerned about mission creep. "The military mission here is pretty clear -- it is very clear, frankly, and what is expected of us to do: to establish this no-fly zone; to protect civilians; to . . . get the withdrawal of regime ground forces out of Benghazi. And so I don't -- I don't have a sense at all that there is mission creep."

To date, the forces involved are generally achieving the intended objective, he said. The mission is not intended to destroy all of Libya's military, he added. "We do not provide close air support for the opposition forces," Ham noted. "We protect civilians." Distinguishing between opposition and regime forces can be very difficult, particularly when they are in very close contact, he noted.

Ham said he has seen no evidence to suggest other governments are now providing support to Gadhafi.