The Insider

The Obama administration is putting on a full-court press to prevent the unauthorized release of classified information following another WikiLeaks document dump this weekend.

In a memo issued yesterday, the new director of the Office of Management and Budget Jacob Lew laid the responsibility for controlling classified information at the feet of every government worker who has been granted access to that info.

The recent irresponsible disclosure by WikiLeaks has resulted in significant damage to our national security. Any failure by agencies to safeguard classified information pursuant to relevant laws, including but not limited to Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information (December 29, 2009), is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

Lew then laid down two new, specific instructions:

Each department or agency that handles classified information shall establish a security assessment team consisting of counterintelligence, security, and information assurance experts to review the agency’s implementation of procedures for safeguarding classified information against improper disclosures. Such review should include (without limitation) evaluation of the agency’s configuration of classified government systems to ensure that users do not have broader access than is necessary to do their jobs effectively, as well as implementation of restrictions on usage of, and removable media capabilities from, classified government computer networks.

The Office of Management and Budget, the Information Security Oversight Office, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will stand up processes to evaluate, and to assist agencies in their review of, security practices with respect to the protection of classified information.

Navy Adm. James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) and head of U.S. European Command, participated in a question-and-answer session earlier today at the State Department's Foreign Press Center, where he fielded numerous questions about the recent Lisbon Summit and missile defense in particular. Below are the missile defense-related excerpts:

Q: I wanted to ask you some detail about the missile defense agreement. First of all, how important, you know, in your position, do you feel this is going to be to protect NATO member countries? And also, you know, what countries are seen as a threat? I mean, it was -- it was often said that it's 30 plus countries that are seen as the threat. However, Iran was previously always highlighted. I know Turkey had some objection to this. If you could just elaborate a little bit on that meeting.

STAVRIDIS: Well, the second part is the easiest one to address, which is the 30-plus countries. And frankly, I think that's the right way to think about this, rather than trying to identify any particular nation as a threat to NATO, because the world changes.

So we're developing a capability, just like we do with cyber, to create a (missile) defense. I think that as the United States moves forward with the European Command-led phased adaptive approach, it will initially be sea-based. It will come into the Eastern Mediterranean. We'll have a U.S. command and control backbone that will run from the president to the secretary of Defense to me, as the combatant commander, and then down to my Air Force subordinates in an air defense center in Germany, thence down to the ships, initially.

Over time, as we decide how to integrate with a NATO air command and control system, we will plug in -- we will plug in the NATO part of that architecture. And it will be roughly parallel to the U.S. one. Fortunately, I am dual-hatted as the U.S. European commander and the Supreme Allied Commander. So that same structure, which will run operationally from the nations, the 28 nations, secretary-general to me and down through the NATO parallel chain of command, will then go down to the shooting asset.

So it'll be parallel to the structure the United States employs. The details will be worked out. The European -- or I should say the NATO system that will be the backbone is called the ALT -- A-L-T -- BMD system. And I'm quite confident we'll be able to surmount the technical challenges as we go forward. . . .

Q: I just wanted quick follow-up on that actually. Last time I ask Ambassador Daalder, he said, very similar to what you just said, that -- about the command and control system of the missile defense system, will be very similar to the one that -- integrated air missile defense system that I believe under your command.

Could you please elaborate on that, because there is a huge discussion in Turkey, as you are aware, who is going to push the button if threat emerges.

STAVRIDIS: Well, all of that, as I mentioned, will be part of that discussion as we move forward. So there's no definitive answer at this moment for how the NATO side will plug into the U.S. side. But the point I made with the reporter here in the back is that we have a -- an idea based on the U.S. structure, and I think we'll do something somewhat similar. But all of that will be a proposal that I will develop over the next six months or so and then will be presented to the nations via the North Atlantic Council. And all these decisions will be taken in consensus. But there is no detail to add to it beyond what I've offered thus far. . . .

Q: How certain we are that this radar part of the installment will be placed in Turkey? Is this still detail question that will be work out in the future, or it's for sure that Turkey's decided and -- what's next step? Thank you.

STAVRIDIS: There are no concrete decisions on the emplacement of the NATO side of the installation as yet. All that will be a matter of discussion. It will be eventually proposed and then, again, decided by consensus.

And I must say, coming out of the Lisbon summit, when I looked at the decisions that were taken on the Strategic Concept, on the NATO- Russia Council, on Afghanistan, I felt a great deal of consensus among all 28 of the nations. So therefore, I'm confident we can work through the technical part of this to come to a structure that is acceptable to all of the nations. . . .

Q: The secretary-general of NATO after the Lisbon meeting sounded quite positive about the possibility that Russia may cooperate to the missile deployment plan in Eastern Europe. How realistically do you assess this development?

And second, NATO, since the operations in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, has expanded its out-of-area operations. With the Korean crisis developing, do you see any role for the alliance?

STAVRIDIS: Let me take the Korean question first. The alliance, I believe, speaking through our spokesman in Brussels, has condemned the attacks of North Korea on South Korea, and we are monitoring the situation very closely.

In terms of the missile defense and how realistic it is to have -- envision Russian participation, I think it's very realistic. As I look at it, the technical capabilities that both the alliance and Russia possess are compatible. We could combine them.

In terms of the political will, I was present at the meeting where President Medvedev said the Russians are very willing to listen to serious technical proposals. We're committed to going forward in providing those, and then we'll have a dialogue as the new year unfolds.

And as a personal viewpoint, as the Supreme Allied Commander and the operations officer, if you will, of the alliance, I think it's very realistic from technical perspective, and we'll see how this all develops from a political perspective. . . .

Q: A high-ranking White House official briefed that in the final stage of missile defense, that system will protect not only Europe but also the United States. And I'm a little bit confused. If so, what kind of difference we can see from the new MD and Bush-era missile defense? If at the end, if it is same, doesn't it, I mean, make (not a ?) problem with Russia?

STAVRIDIS: The two systems are extremely different, and let me quickly articulate it. The current system is called the "phased adaptive approach." It is phased in that it will move in over time. It will not be a sudden emplacement, a very large in-ground, very heavy, permanent radars.

It's phased because the system is going to come off of ships. It's going to come of the Aegis ships, which are employed by the United States, by Japan, by Spain, by Korea, several other nations. That system will come off the ships. It's light, and it can be phased in ashore.

It's adaptive in that, because it is light, it can be moved around.

And thirdly, the capabilities of this system would not pose a strategic threat to any strategic system. It is designed to work against the ballistic missile threat.

So you will find that what the system is designed to do is to be very phased, very adaptive. It's very different than the previous systems.

And I'm convinced that as we get into technical talks with Russia, we will be able to ameliorate their concerns in a way that -- that we are not posing that system against any of their systems but rather we want to cooperate with them to create a commonly shared defensive zone.

And yes, over time, as we expand the number of radars -- back to the question from the gentleman of the Times here -- you will see that the coverage also expands. And eventually it will provide coverage not only to Europe but also to the United States, but it will do so in a way that does not -- does not interfere with the Russian capability. . . .

Q: My question is, what is the estimation of the total -- this whole missile system? How much? I mean, end of the phase is -- I believe is 2018. That will be whole system; it will be finished.

Do you have any kind of estimation how much this is going to cost? And second, do you also have any kind of estimation or plan that -- which manufacturers will be producing this whole system? Because (I believe ?) it is a marginal topic here, but it's very important. And a lot of discussion is going on. Countries like Turkey that -- you know, which sector will be the most beneficial (out of whole ?) billions of dollars? . . .

STAVRIDIS: Well, first of all, the good news for NATO is that the United States has already borne a great deal of the cost of the research and development of the systems. For example, as I mentioned, the Aegis defense system was developed here. That will be adapted and moved ashore. So a great deal of the costs have already been -- have already been spent in the development of the R&D portion of this thing.

In terms of the European side of this thing, the cost is actually relatively low, because it's a command and control system that plugs into hardware that is being offered up by the United States at this point. So the command and control side of this thing will be in the low hundreds of millions of dollars. The actual infrastructure is, indeed, in the billions of dollars, but much of those costs will be borne by the United States.

In terms of other entities that will be involved, there are other parts of this system that eventually will plug into it: point defense systems, mid-range systems. Some of those will be developed, some are already developed. It's a complicated question. But there's a variety of actors that will plug into this over time. But those are the kind of technical questions we'll need to resolve over the next couple of years, frankly.

And you're correct. The overall end game for this is 2018 to 2020.

So we've got time to develop this. I think it's the right system. I'm going to have to leave it right there.

Army Brig. Gen. Jeff Colt, the head of the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence (JUAS COE), recently led a UAS demonstration called "Blue Knight 2010" that tested U.S. manned and unmanned joint force capabilities against airborne unmanned systems. The U.S. Joint Forces Command website has a Q&A with Colt on the exercise. Here's an excerpt:

Q: What is the next step in the continuing evolution of counter UAS?

Colt: As technology evolves, threat capabilities will, too.  In UAS that may be even smaller and faster platforms—or it may include swarm (multiple) adversary UAS.

The next steps in counter UAS include going to a more comprehensive modeling and simulation.  I think we will see this more widely introduced into operational level exercises and at the combat training centers to expand baseline awareness for the tactical to operational decision makers.

I feel closer integration of exercise objectives between what has been done here and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization's Black Dart exercises are necessary -- the Black Dart exercises focus more on future technologies -- we don't need a whole series of systems, but examining some emerging technologies may allow us to deal with the evolution of future UAS threats more effectively.  But the long-term solution lies in a balance between procedures and technology.

More than 50 nations now are employing UAS.  As the technology continues to proliferate, I think the sophistication in how those applications are employed is going to increase in the future.  I think it would be naïve not to believe that an intelligent and learning threat will try to use these systems to gain some local advantage or make a wider statement.

With that said, we really don't have either the time or financial resources to go out and develop a single perfect solution or capability to deal with all the potential threats.  As a result of that, we must adapt the systems that already exist and array them in a manner combined with validated procedures so we can detect, track, identify and then take action. We need to educate the joint force about what is available.

I am confident, given fundamental joint procedures and a better understanding of our existing joint capabilities, our joint warfighters are capable of taking the output of this exercise, and exercises similar to it, to devise even more relevant applications.

Ever read through a government report or memo -- especially one coming out of the Pentagon -- and felt you needed a road map just to find your way to the end? The Obama administration is trying to do something about that by issuing preliminary rules yesterday for the Plain Writing Act of 2010.

President Obama signed the legislation into law back in mid-October with an eye toward promoting "clear government communication that the public can understand and use," according to an Office of Management and Budget memo released yesterday. The law requires OMB to "develop and issue guidance on implementing the requirements" of the act by April 13, 2011. In the memo, OMB says that final guidance will be developed by the deadline but until then the preliminary rules will give federal agencies some much needed direction.

OMB explains the purpose behind the law this way:

Plain writing is concise, simple, meaningful, and well-organized. It avoids jargon, redundancy, ambiguity, and obscurity. It does not contain unnecessary complexity.

This is not the first time a sitting administration has tried to untangle government syntax and retire certain jargon. OMB provides several examples of how plain writing can save the taxpayer a few dollars:

• reduce questions from the public to agency staff;
• improve compliance with regulations;
• reduce resources spent on enforcement;
• reduce errors on forms and applications; and
• reduce time spent addressing errors.

NATO leaders agreed over the weekend in Lisbon, Portugal, to a new strategic concept -- designed in part to guide the alliance over the next decade -- that makes missile defense a mission for the 28-member states.

The new concept commits the alliance to:

develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.

The gathering was also hailed by participants as an opportunity for NATO and Russia to reset relations. The alliance, in the strategic concept, committed to:

enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security; use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

With the Marine Corps' variant of the Joint Strike Fighter set next Monday to face the judgement of Pentagon leaders, we hear from a reader -- a seasoned Washington hand and retired Marine -- who believes the outcome of the Nov. 22 JSF milestone review carries implications far beyond the F-35 program.

Senior Pentagon leaders, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have questioned the fundamental need for the F-35B to the nation in recent weeks following a technical review that determined the Marine Corps' variant will require another substantial infusion of cash in the fiscal year 2012 budget and additional time to develop in order to address new technical challenges. Could this line of questioning be prelude to dramatic changes to Marine Corps, which potentially are now in play?

Our reader opines:

I think I understand why Bob Gates picked Jim Amos as Commandant and it makes me an even greater admirer of Gates. Only by having a Marine Aviator as Commandant, and a fixed-wing jet pilot at that, could Gates have the Marines start down a path towards doing away with their fixed-wing jet assets. When Amos says, after the new year, that “middleweight forces” do not need to possess organic fixed-wing assets no one in Marine Aviation will argue with him. Only Gates would have thought of using that sort of velvet knife to surgically remove “another Air Force” from DoD’s balance sheet.  Once Amos shows he has the “mettle” to give up on fixed-wing aviation, the concept of ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) via EFVs will be next package to be unceremoniously heaved overboard.