CRS On LCS

Inside the Navy reports this week that a service official is countering reports that the Littoral Combat Ship is failing to meet requirements as it nears its deployment date. Here's an excerpt from the story:

Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander of Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, told reporters in an Aug. 7 phone conference that LCS had been pushed hard in recent tests and studies, but the ship and its mission packages were still meeting all the goals for the program and for Freedom's (LCS-1) spring deployment to Singapore.

War games, exercises and more have been conducted throughout the year "to make sure that we have all things associated with LCS correct, including, do we have the right number of people? Do they have the right skill set? Does the shore training infrastructure support our concept of how we're going to man them and operate them in the future?" Copeman said.

Reports that the ship was not performing up to standards are misleading, he said. "If the ship and the mission packages and the people that are assigned to the mission packages are in the same port at the same time and the port's able to support the movement of them, then we can meet the requirement of shipping a mission package out in 96 hours," he said.

But a war game earlier this year "took some excursions from that" and, for example, looked at what might happen if the ship needed to switch mission packages at a port other than the one to which it is forward-deployed, Copeman said. Not having the new mission module pieces waiting in their shipping containers on land meant that that mission package swap took longer than the 96-hour limit.

"We've been fairly critical because this is an important program for us," he added.

There are also ongoing questions about the size of the ship's core crew, but Copeman said the Navy was sticking with its original plan for now and would monitor performance during the Singapore deployment.

A Congressional Research Service report issued last Friday and obtained by Secrecy News quotes from an Aug. 2 Navy information paper submitted to CRS that provides further details on LCS's deployment readiness:

1. ASSERTION: The Mission Package quick-swap concept is dead.

RESPONSE: Each LCS will deploy with the Mission Package (MP) required to accomplish the Combatant Commander (COCOM)-directed missions. As expected, if COCOMs direct a MP swap, materiel staging and personnel movement will need to be planned and coordinated in advance. The physical swap of MP equipment can occur in less than 96 hours, as the requirement dictates.

2. ASSERTION: Planners originally envisaged LCS as a replacement for Frigates, Minesweepers, and Patrol Boats, but new assessments conclude that the ships are not equal to the legacy ships.

RESPONSE: While LCS will provide the capabilities and conduct the missions currently performed by the FFG, MCM and PC type ships, LCS is not a direct class replacement for any of these. It is a new ship type with distinct capabilities. LCS with its mission packages will provide equal or greater capability than the legacy platforms whose missions it is assuming.

3. ASSERTION: LCS vessels cannot successfully perform three other core missions envisioned for them-forward presence, sea control or power projection.

RESPONSE: LCS will be able to perform all of the missions for which she was built. As the ships transition from research and development assets to operational Fleet units, the ongoing efforts to determine the infrastructure requirements and sustainment processes will be implemented and provide the requisite support to enable the successful execution of these missions.

4. ASSERTION: Key failure is inability to effectively defend against ASCMs.

RESPONSE: LCS, with its 3-D air search radar and highly effective Rolling Airframe Missile, is at least as capable against the cruise missile threat as the CIWS-equipped FFG 7 and significantly more capable that the Avenger class MCM and Cyclone Class PC, which have no self-defense anti-cruise missile capability. LCS capability against ASCMs has been demonstrated with two live firings of RAM from LCS against cruise missile targets, as well as multiple tracking exercises and simulated ASCM engagements within the developmental test window.

5. ASSERTION: CONOPS dictates ships operate at sea for 21 days but ship can only store food for 14 days.

RESPONSE: The LCS CDD gives a 14-day threshold and a 30-day objective for replenishment, which supports the expected 21-day underway cycles referenced in the CONOPS. The CDD, not the CONOPS, is the governing document for all LCS requirements. And as noted earlier, when operating within its normal speed range profile (<15 knots), LCS has comparable endurance to an FFG 7.

6. ASSERTION: Navy is looking at ways to increase ship’s weaponry and lethality.

RESPONSE: Every Navy weapon, sensor, ship and aircraft system is continually being reviewed and evaluated against current and future operations and threats to determine the best mix of total combat power that can be brought to the fight. LCS is no exception to this ongoing process.

7. ASSERTION: Major gap is the replacement of the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS).

RESPONSE: While the cancellation of NLOS was indeed a setback in bringing the surface-to-surface missile to LCS, the modular design of LCS allows the Navy to select another missile, without costly redesign. As an interim solution, the Griffin missile has already been selected for incorporation until an extended range missile can be competitively awarded.

Based on that, CRS raises these potential issues for lawmakers:

* The Navy initiated LCS program in November 2001 because the Navy concluded that a ship like the LCS would be the most cost-effective way to fill Navy capability gaps for countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters. In light of subsequent growth in the cost of the LCS sea frame, the Navy's reported intention to increase the LCS crew size (which will increase LCS life cycle operation and support [O&S] costs), and the Navy's assessments of the LCS in recent exercises and war games, is the Navy still confident that the LCS program represents the most cost-effective way for the Navy to counter mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters?

* When does the Navy believe the LCS will be fully capable of performing its originally stated primary missions of countering mines, small boats, and diesel electric submarines in littoral waters?

* How, if at all, will LCS procurement and life-cycle O&S costs be affected by Navy actions to address issues identified in recent Navy assessments of the LCS program?

* What missions other than countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters does the Navy now envisage as being significant missions for the LCS?

* Taking various factors into account -- including but not limited to LCS sea frame procurement costs as they are now understood, LCS life-cycle O&S costs with an enlarged crew, the LCS's originally stated primary missions, other potentially significant missions for the LCS, recent Navy assessments of the LCS program, and the costs (if any) of addressing issues identified in those assessments -- is the Navy still confident that the LCS program is more cost-effective than potential alternative courses of action?

View the full, 98-page CRS report.