Disarming Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller, the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, is in Geneva this week attending the Conference on Disarmament. Here are some highlights from the speech she gave this morning:

. . . On the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty:

Mr. President, an FMCT long has been one of the key goals of multilateral arms control. A cutoff will provide a firm foundation for future disarmament efforts, and help to consolidate the arms control gains made since the end of the Cold War. It is one of the key steps called for in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference. An FMCT's verifiable controls on fissile material will play an important role by strengthening confidence among the relevant states and help to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, no other world body of sovereign states is better suited to negotiate an FMCT. We readily acknowledge that an FMCT would have profound security implications for countries that have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including the United States of America. Under the CD's rules of procedure and consensus principle, every State assembled in this room will have an equal opportunity to defend its interests and ensure that an FMCT does not harm its vital interests.

The entire point of seeking to pursue an FMCT here, in the CD, is precisely because of the consensus principle undergirding this body's substantive work. No country need fear the outcome of FMCT negotiations. And no country should feel it necessary to abuse the consensus principle and frustrate everyone else's desire to resume serious disarmament efforts and negotiations.

. . . On the follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty:

Mr. President, the Administration is pleased that the United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty on December 22 of last year. When he called to offer his condolences for the tragedy at Domodedovo Airport, President Obama congratulated President Medvedev on the successful vote in the Russian State Duma. Yesterday, there was a positive vote in the Federation Council, which is excellent news. The legislative process will be followed by an exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will bring the Treaty into force.

When the Treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and the Russian Federation since the 1950s.

The New START Treaty sets the stage for further limits on and reductions in nuclear arms. As President Obama stated when he signed the New START Treaty in Prague on April 8, 2010, once the Treaty enters into force, the United States intends to pursue with Russia further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including on non-deployed nuclear weapons.

The U.S. Senate made clear its strong interest in addressing the numerical disparity in non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification calls for the United States to seek to initiate negotiations with Russia to limit and reduce tactical nuclear weapons within a year of entry into force of the New START Treaty.

Work is already underway in Washington to prepare for such dialogue with Russia on future talks.

The United States will continue its long tradition of transparency about nuclear weapons, as exemplified by the stockpile numbers that we released during the NPT Review Conference, as well as the many briefings and documents which we made available in the run-up to and at the RevCon, and subsequently.

As a follow-up to the September 2009 P-5 conference on verification, transparency and confidence building, the five will meet later this year to take up these issues again, as part of our effort to implement the Review Conference's final Document.

. . . On preventing an outer space arms race:

Mr. President, the U.S. National Space Policy was released on June 28, 2010, and reflects the principles and goals to be used in shaping the conduct of U.S. space programs and activities. One provision of the policy states that the United States will pursue pragmatic and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures - or TCBMs - to strengthen stability in space by mitigating the risk of mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

To implement this part of the policy, the United States is continuing to consult with the European Union on its initiative to develop a comprehensive set of multilateral TCBMs, also known as the "Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities." We plan to make a decision in the coming weeks as to whether the United States can sign on to this Code, including what, if any, modifications would be necessary.

Additionally, we look forward to working with our colleagues in the international community in the Group of Government Experts (GGE), which was established by Resolution 65/68 during the 65th session of the UN General Assembly. It is our hope that this GGE will serve as a constructive mechanism to examine voluntary and pragmatic TCBMs in space that address real problems.

Within a short time, the United States will be announcing its National Security Space Strategy. Like the Space Policy, the National Space Strategy will be based on the notion of shared interest: It is in the shared interest of all space-faring nations to ensure the responsible, peaceful and safe use of space.

With regard to arms control, the National Space Policy states that the United States will consider space-related arms control concepts and proposals that meet the criteria of equitability and effective verification and which enhance the national security of the United States and its allies. The United States continues to support the inclusion of a non-negotiating, or discussion, mandate in any CD program of work under the agenda item, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space," which is known as PAROS.

. . . On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

The Obama Administration will continue to lay the groundwork for positive U.S. Senate consideration of the CTBT, working closely with the Senate, and to bolster international support for the Treaty.

While the Administration prepares for U.S. Senate consideration of the Treaty, the United States has increased its level of participation in all of the activities of the CTBTO's Preparatory Commission in preparing for the entry into force of the CTBT, especially with respect to the Treaty's verification regime.

U.S. technical experts are working closely with their counterparts from the Provisional Technical Secretariat to explore joint efforts to improve the capabilities of the various networks of the global International Monitoring System and the functions of the International Data Centre in Vienna.

After an absence of eight years, U.S. experts are fully engaged in advancing the effectiveness of the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, both from policy and technical perspectives.

The United States has also assumed full responsibility for the costs of operating, maintaining, and sustaining the 31 stations of the International Monitoring System assigned by the Treaty to the United States.