DOT&E On THAAD

The Pentagon's operational test and evaluation office still has doubts over the reliability and maintainability of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system.

"THAAD reliability and maintainability measures are still fluctuating greatly between test events, indicating system immaturity with respect to consistent reliability and maintainability growth," states the office's latest annual report, released this week. The report recommends that THAAD program officials "reassess their reliability and maintainability growth planning curve."

DOT&E compared reliability and maintainability data from several intercept tests between October 2011 and October 2012. That comparison "indicates that the THAAD system may not be mature enough to exhibit consistent reliability growth,” the report states. Additional data from a September 2013 intercept test "will help determine any emerging trends," it adds.

In February 2012, the Pentagon's testing office issued a classified evaluation of the THAAD system and its accompanying AN/TPY-2 radar. That analysis included seven recommendations, according to the new report, which calls on the Missile Defense Agency to "continue to address the three classified recommendations (Effectiveness #2, Effectiveness #5, and Survivability #4)" and addresses the other four in more detail:

1. The MDA and the Army should reassess the required spares and tools (including their quantities) that should be onsite with the battery based on all available reliability and maintainability data (Suitability #5). An assessment of the proper number of spares is ongoing and is scheduled to complete in FY-14.

2. The MDA and the Army should define duties related to THAAD at the brigade level. Until a battalion is established for THAAD, it should also define duties and training for THAAD battery personnel on any required battalion-level duties (Suitability #10). This recommendation has been addressed, although DOT&E does not concur with the response. The Army has assigned the two fielded THAAD batteries to an existing Army battalion. This battalion currently lacks a comprehensive understanding of THAAD requirements, which significantly reduces the THAAD batteries' effectiveness by forcing them to assume typical higher headquarters responsibilities for personnel, logistics, plans, and operations.

3. The MDA and the Army should implement equipment redesigns and modifications identified during natural environment testing to prevent problems seen in testing (Suitability #11). During FTO-01, a total radar power failure was observed to be caused by a connector that was missing a gasket, which allowed water to enter a sealed area. Periodic inspection of all gaskets was a recommendation from the natural environment testing.

4. The MDA and the Army should conduct electronic warfare testing and analysis (Survivability #3). This recommendation remains open. Some preliminary testing was conducted during FY13, but additional testing is required.