Gates To Navy: Change

Defense Secretary Robert Gates today raised fundamental questions about the affordability of the Navy's modernization plans and called for the sea service “to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new missions.”

In an address to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo at the Gaylord Convention Center in National Harbor, MD, Gates issued a raft of challenges to Navy and Marine Corps leaders. We'll have a full story up on the speech, which is sure to get lots of attention. For now, here are some key quotes -- not necessarily in order of delivery -- from the prepared text:

• I do not foresee any significant topline increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 ((billion)) to 6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.

• Our Navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new missions -- because another one of history’s hard lessons is that, when it comes to military capabilities, those who fail to adapt often fail to survive.

• … ((T))he virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding -- especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially $15 to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk. The U.S. will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems -- including numbers of stealthy subs -- all of which could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades.

• But we must also rethink what and how we buy -- to shift investments towards systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict. This means, among other things: extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike, with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. New sea-based missile defenses; a submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. We will also have to increase submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned underwater platforms.

• ((T))he Department must continually adjust its future plans as the strategic environment evolves. Two major examples come to mind.
  
  • First, what kind of new platform is needed to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore under fire -- in other words, the capability provided by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt, it was a real strategic asset during the first Gulf War to have a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City -- forcing Saddam’s army to keep one eye on the Saudi border, and one eye on the coast. But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again -- especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore. On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?

Second -- aircraft carriers. Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040. To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the massive over-match the U.S. already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing anti-ship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one? Any future plans must address these realities.