New ISAB Report

The State Department's International Security Advisory Board recently released a study on "strategic deterrence and the path to a world of mutual assured stability." In the report (viewable here), ISAB lists 10 "key de-stabilizing factors" that need to be periodically looked at as nuclear weapon stockpiles are gradually reduced:

* inadequate intelligence, monitoring, and verification, and unacceptable delay in detection of breakout actions and early indicators of threatening action, as well as discernment of destabilizing motives, influences, and drivers, in leadership, societies and sub-national groups;

* ineffective defense against various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery mechanism threats for ourselves and our allies;

* ineffectiveness of non-nuclear, advanced conventional forces to provide all aspects of the desired deterrence, including their survivability in the face of a surprise or shocking turn of events;

* nuclear forces, albeit progressively smaller in size, but not adequately sized and maintained, and with a force structure and posture not appropriately tailored for circumstances and uncertainty;

* inability to move strategic stability discussions beyond Russia to other key nations, including members of the P5 as well as other possessing or aspiring states;

* ineffective dissuasion, through either soft or hard measures, of opponents' acquisition choices regarding nuclear weapons, fissile materials, design information, and parts, as well as critical delivery system technology;

* unacceptably slow progress in establishing a new norm (i.e. that nuclear weapons are horrific and viewed by all as undesirable – similar to biological weapons) as tested against other examples of our ability to execute crosscultural influence;

* inability to achieve effective inclusion of all nuclear weapons, specifically nonstrategic nuclear weapons as well as hedge/reserve weapons, in arms reduction agreements and associated monitoring and verification; and inability to execute multilateral agreements;

* insufficient security guarantees provided to countries to reduce their incentives for acquisition of nuclear weapons or other WMD; and

* ineffective assurance of our allies that we will maintain extended deterrence at every step of this process.

This particular ISAB study isn't the only one that has recently come to light, though.

Inside the Pentagon recently obtained a draft copy of an ISAB report on near-term options for implementing more nuclear force cuts. That report recommends the United States offer to reduce its nuclear arsenal significantly below current treaty requirements to no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads and 500 strategic delivery vehicles if Russia is willing to reciprocate.

The draft ISAB report also urges the United States and Russia to accelerate implementation of New START Treaty reductions and to lay the groundwork for future cuts to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The report was drafted in May based on a study led by Graham Allison of Harvard University and overseen by former Defense Secretary William Perry.

ITP further reports:

Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller briefly mentioned the study last week at U.S. Strategic Command's annual deterrence symposium, noting the board is "helping us with some big thinking," but she stopped short of revealing the board's recommendations.

The draft report calls for implementing a "mutual unilateral reduction" below New START, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons. "The United States could communicate to Russia that the United States is prepared to go to much lower levels of nuclear weapons as a matter of national policy, e.g. to no more than 500 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, if Russia is willing to reciprocate," the panel writes. "This could greatly reduce Russia's incentive to build a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile and allow the United States to reduce the scope and cost of its nuclear modernization plans."

Further the two sides could "define unilateral, cooperative steps for reduction of nonstrategic weapons, including appropriate verification measures," the report adds, noting any U.S. efforts to reduce to these levels or below for strategic nuclear forces and yet-to-be-defined levels for nonstrategic weapons would have to "address lingering concerns over asymmetries between U.S. and Russian stockpile composition, force structures and reconstitution capabilities."

That ITP story is available to all. Click here to view it.