A group of House Armed Services Committee members will develop legislative proposals in the coming months to address critical foreign dependencies in the U.S. defense supply chain.
The committee's "Defense Critical Supply Chain Task Force" aims to develop a 20-page report identifying "the levers we have available to pull in the executive branch," according to task force co-chair Rep. Elissa Slotkin (D-MI). The task force has a three-month term and will seek to include its proposals in this year's defense policy bill.
“We are taking a really hard look at the defense supply chain and whether we have a good handle on what is being produced, what are critical supplies, where are they being produced and how do we ensure that we don’t have interrupted access to those supply chains,” Slotkin told reporters today.
The medical supply shortfalls the United States confronted in the early months of the pandemic last year was “a pretty searing experience,” Slotkin said. Both she and co-chair Mike Gallagher (R-WI) referenced how it became more difficult to obtain supplies from China during tense political moments between Beijing and Washington last year.
“That made me think that they could just as easily weaponize key supply chain dependencies in the event of an escalation or crisis, thereby putting our national defense at an unacceptable risk,” Gallagher said.
The Biden administration last month launched a comprehensive review of U.S. supply chains, including semiconductors and the defense industrial base. Slotkin said the task force will aim to complement the administration’s efforts where possible.
While previous industrial base assessments have included a consideration of domestic risks, such as sole-source suppliers, lawmakers said the task force will mostly focus on foreign dependencies.
“I’ve been more focused on the searing experience we had in COVID, which is that foreign countries are producing stuff that we’re desperate for,” Slotkin said.
Both Slotkin and Gallagher pointed to semiconductors as the archetype of a major risk area where legislation is needed. Most U.S. firms outsource leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing to Taiwan and South Korea. Meanwhile, China is also working toward becoming a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing.
“There is in my mind a real place for legislation on the issue of critical supply chains and semiconductors is a perfect example,” Slotkin said. “Sometimes the marketplace just doesn’t get it right and we, without intending to, create real national security vulnerabilities for ourselves by allowing the free market to just decide where they want to build these things.”
A key deliverable for the task force will be a forthcoming Pentagon report on “strategic and critical materials, including the gaps and vulnerabilities in supply chains of such materials,” required under the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.
Slotkin said the list will help guide the task force’s efforts in identifying critical materials and key choke points.
“I’m particularly interested in bringing some of that manufacturing, where appropriate, back to the United States,” she said.
Gallagher also said he wants to focus on the role of allied and partner countries in the defense supply chain.
“The trick is finding the right balance between what capabilities we absolutely must be able to make in the USA, what we can buy from close allies and what we can afford to source from broader networks of partners,” Gallagher said. “I hope the administration keeps that in mind.”
Slotkin also said the task force will consider the funding necessary to carry out its recommendations and make sure appropriators make money available “where possible.”
“I think this is going to be part of a much bigger conversation and debate about what to do about the topline of the budget and how to spend our money, how to make tradeoffs, how to address legacy systems that maybe need to be off-ramped,” Slotkin said.
"I’m certainly not going to shy away from making recommendations that assume appropriations,” she added.