The Joint Staff is in the preliminary stages of ironing out its doctrine for security force assistance.
On April 29, the Joint Staff released a "pre-doctrinal publication that presents generally agreed to fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA. It is considered a part of the initiation stage of the joint doctrine development process. Once extant and validated best practices and procedures are common across the operating forces, appropriate principles and guidance are incorporated into existing joint doctrine hierarchy or, if required, a new joint publication (JP)."
The "Joint Doctrine Note" further states:
Despite the importance of its national mission, SFA does not have a dedicated JP and existing joint doctrine makes only occasional references to it. To address this joint doctrinal gap, J-7 developed the following JDN for the joint force's consideration. Although this JDN has not been through the joint doctrine development system as described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine Development System, it draws on both contemporary and historical experiences to describe the documented best practices currently in use across the joint force. It also connects SFA to United States national strategy and policy guidance, discusses organization and planning for SFA, and provides considerations for conducting SFA activities.
The document notes that the guidance contained in it "is not authoritative. If conflicts arise between the contents of this JDN and the contents of a [Joint Publication], the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance."
Inside the Pentagon earlier this year obtained a report to Congress that found more permanent and aligned authorities would better enable special operations forces to establish long-term relationships with foreign partners and prevent management challenges. As ITP reported in March:
In the Jan. 30 report, Michael Sheehan, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict, states more permanent authorities would allow for long-term planning and commitment to foreign partners for counterterrorism assistance, unconventional warfare and irregular warfare missions. These relationships could help the United States shift the mission lead to partners and obtain more force flexibility.
Partner trust and consistency in training could degrade without this, Sheehan writes in the report, obtained by Inside the Pentagon. The temporary nature of many of the authorities also prevents the development of mature administrative processes, Sheehan notes.
"In order to encourage our foreign partners to share the burden of global responsibility, as is called for in the 2012 defense guidance, SOF [special operations forces] will seek to develop lasting relationships with foreign SOF and to build their special operations capabilities that are developed and sustained best through persistent engagement," Sheehan writes. "However, many of the existing authorities that could support such relationship building are temporary."
Additionally:
Looking forward, special operations forces need to increasingly focus on security force assistance, strengthening partnerships and "enabling foreign internal defense capabilities in order to identify, deter and defeat national security threats," Sheehan writes.
The fiscal year 2012 Defense Authorization Act called for this report to lay out details on the future authorities special operations forces would need to conduct counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and irregular warfare missions.
No legislative changes are called for in the report. "As optimal legislative changes are identified through careful analysis at a later date, the department will work through proper processes to request those authorities," the report states.
This report comes on the heels of special operations forces spending the past decade heavily engaged in counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regions in hopes of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates. This demand for special operations forces in Afghanistan is supposed to decline over the next decade, Sheehan writes, noting that these units will enhance focus on security assistance activities to help deny safe haven to terrorists and other insurgent groups.