The Insider

By John Liang
March 16, 2011 at 7:25 PM

A new Aerospace Industries Association report is warning that the volume of counterfeit parts in the supply chain is climbing, and mitigation plans need to be developed and implemented.

"The use of counterfeit parts in the aerospace industry may have life or death consequences," AIA President and CEO Marion Blakey said in a statement. "Reducing their proliferation and potentially harmful effects requires increased diligence and active control measures from both industry and government." The statement further reads:

While the prevalence of counterfeit parts in the supply chain is difficult to quantify, in fiscal 2009, the Customs and Border Protection Service seized nearly $4 million in counterfeit critical technology components, including networking equipment and semiconductor devices that the aerospace industry uses. Counterfeit Parts: Increasing Awareness and Developing Countermeasures, seeks to raise awareness of the issues associated with counterfeit parts.

"Regardless of how counterfeit parts enter the aerospace and defense supply chain, the ramifications can be significant," said Blakey. "They can jeopardize the performance, reliability and safety of our products."

While profit is the primary incentive for counterfeiting, the long lifecycle of aerospace products also contributes to conditions that make aerospace and defense equipment susceptible to counterfeiting. Aircraft developed in the 1950s, such as the B-52, are still in active inventory while parts from original equipment, component manufacturers or authorized aftermarket manufacturers or distributors may no longer be available.

The report has more than 20 recommendations for industry and government that encourage further discussion among stakeholders on how to most effectively reduce counterfeit parts in the supply chain. The recommendations were prepared by AIA’s Counterfeit Parts-Integrated Project Team and include:

* Scrutinize the purchasing process to limit the use of automated systems, which increases the risk of counterfeit products.

* Develop an Approved Suppliers list for use by government and industry.

* Conduct training for employees in the areas of procurement, detection, reporting and disposition of counterfeit parts.

* Create standards in the area of mechanical parts and materials.

"Our industry makes the best aerospace products available and has an unsurpassed safety record," said Blakey. "We feel the recommendations will allow industry and government to address the issue before it threatens that record."

Read the full report here.

The Senate Armed Services Committee last week launched an investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department's supply chain. Further, according to a committee statement:

Counterfeit electronic parts pose a risk to our national security, the reliability of our weapons systems and the safety of our military men and women. The proliferation of counterfeit goods also damages our economy and costs American jobs. The presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department’s supply chain is a growing problem that government and industry share a common interest in solving. Over the course of our investigation, the Committee looks forward to the cooperation of the Department of Defense and the defense industry to help us determine the source and extent of this problem and identify possible remedies for it.

InsideDefense.com reported at the end of last year that lawmakers -- after objections from the Pentagon -- dropped a proposal that would have required the defense secretary to appoint a senior official as the executive agent for preventing counterfeit microelectronics from entering the defense supply chain. During 2010, the House passed a version of the fiscal year 2011 defense authorization bill that called for the executive agent. However, according to the Dec. 28 story:

Senate authorizers included no such proposal in their version. Following objections from the Defense Department, lawmakers omitted the provision from the final version of the bill passed this month by the House and Senate.

The proposal would have put the executive agent in charge of developing a strategy, implementation plan and fiscal blueprint to "identify, mitigate, prevent, and eliminate counterfeit microelectronics from the defense supply chain." The official also would have assessed trends in counterfeit microelectronics.

By John Liang
March 15, 2011 at 8:04 PM

Defense Environment Alert is reporting today that a recent change in federal law has prompted the Defense Department to launch an aggressive push to tackle the backlog of wind and solar projects across the country that have are seen as potentially in conflict with military activities, according to a DOD energy official. Specifically:

The effort to review the military's potential conflicts with more than 290 renewable energy projects proposed by wind and solar energy developers responds to amendments passed in the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Authorization Act that require DOD to preliminarily review within 180 days renewable-energy project applications sent to the Transportation Department, in order to assess potential adverse impacts on the military.

The legislation, signed into law by President Obama Jan. 7, sets out new tools for the department to use to identify potential conflicts early on with renewable-energy projects and quickly remedy them. The tools include developing an integrated review process with other agencies to ensure timely notification and consideration of renewable-energy projects, developing procedures for early outreach to parties carrying out projects, and developing a comprehensive strategy to address military impacts of renewable-energy projects filed with the Transportation Department.

The law also states that only certain senior Pentagon officials can file objections with the DOT over a renewable-energy project, and can do so only after fully considering mitigation actions and determining that the project nonetheless poses unacceptable risk to national security.

In response, DOD is undertaking efforts to narrow the backlog of potentially conflicting projects.

The military launched the effort two weeks ago with a two-day conference at Hill Air Force Base, UT, where subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the services, along with the Bureau of Land Management, convened to review the backlogged projects -- those in which the military had raised an objection to a project with BLM or the Federal Aviation Administration within the past few years, according to the director of DOD's energy siting clearinghouse, David Belote, in a March 9 interview. Belote and a North American Aerospace Defense Command official co-hosted the conference.

The analysis entailed reviews by three groups of subject matter experts. One panel examined impacts of each project to military test and evaluation capabilities, a second group looked at impacts to readiness and training capabilities, and a third considered impacts to long-range radar and border surveillance, according to Belote. The groups reviewed about 170 of the approximately 291 projects, he said.

The groups applied the coordinates of proposed wind and solar projects against military areas such as military training routes, bases and special use airspace, according to Belote.

Within 30 days, DOD expects to publish a list, following further review, of those projects where DOD has no objections so the FAA, BLM and developers will know which ones are free of military hazards. At this point, Belote said, of the 170 reviewed, roughly 80 may not warrant an objection. More study is needed for some, while four of the reviewed projects would likely cause a significant impact to military capabilities, he added.

The changes passed into the FY-11 defense authorization law "made it very clear that the burden of proof is on us" to do a significant amount of work looking at the potential conflicts, Belote said. While the new law recognizes the serious issues that might arise with a project, it calls on DOD to be aggressive about doing its "homework" before blocking any renewable energy projects, he said.

Congress also is requiring DOD to report by March 15 of every year through 2015 on actions it has taken the previous year to implement the provisions of the amendments. This includes reporting on the results of its reviews of any renewable-energy projects filed with the Transportation Department that DOD determines pose a national security risk and should be flagged as a hazard.

The amendments address a growing issue for the military, as the construction of renewable-energy projects in the private and public sector rise. While DOD has been a strong proponent of alternative and renewable-energy development, including for its own needs, it has faced significant conflicts over some civilian projects involving wind and solar energy due to feared interference with military activities, such as radar interference. In response, DOD established the central clearinghouse headed by Belote within OSD to evaluate whether proposed renewable-energy siting projects will interfere with mission capabilities across the department.

By John Liang
March 15, 2011 at 3:22 PM

Before beginning its hearing on the situation in Afghanistan this morning, the Senate Armed Services Committee via voice vote approved the nominations of Michael Vickers to become the top Pentagon intelligence official and Army Gen. Martin Dempsey to become his service's next chief of staff.

By John Liang
March 15, 2011 at 2:53 PM

NASA is looking for information on whether interested contractors could design and develop a prototype command and control communications system for unmanned aircraft.

According to a request for information posted on Federal Business Opportunities last week, "[t]his command C2 system prototype will be designed to operate in the 5,030 5,091MHz and/or 976 MHz bands, while following draft industry performance requirements currently under consideration in RTCA SC-203 and ASTMF 38. Even though both terrestrial and satellite based solutions are under consideration in the standards bodies, the focus of this effort is on a terrestrial system.

"This prototype radio hardware is being designed and developed in order to validate and verify draft performance requirements by collecting performance data in relevant laboratory and flight environments," the notice continues. "The results of this testing may necessitate the modification of the prototype radio(s) and/or proposing modifications to the draft performance requirements. The prototype design and development process will be one which follows a proven path to certification."

The possible effort between NASA and one or more industry partners would jointly "develop the design(s) to meet the requirements, develop prototype radio hardware, perform laboratory testing, and execute flight testing of the prototype radio system in a relevant environment," according to the notice. "This prototype radio system is targeted for use in all UAS classes, from those weighing less than 55 lbs flying below 3,000 ft. up to and including those weighing greater than 1,320 lbs flying above 18,000 ft. The primary focus is operations within the U.S. National Airspace System, but these systems should be capable of operations outside the U.S."

NASA wants the proposed system "to support control and non-payload communications (CNPC) between the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) and the UA control station. This could include the following types of information/traffic types: telecommands; non-payload telemetry; navaid data; ATC voice relay; ATS data relay; sense and avoid data relay; airborne weather radar data; and non-payload situational awareness video."

Comments or questions are due no later than March 30, according to the notice.

Inside the Pentagon reported last November that federal agencies that use unmanned drones have been instructed to complete detailed studies laying out and prioritizing their operational needs to fly the aircraft in U.S. skies:

A joint plan released by a committee led by the Defense Department and the Federal Aviation Administration called for DOD, the Department of Homeland Security and NASA to each conduct "a detailed shortfall analysis that identifies, defines and prioritizes their operational needs" to fly unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the national airspace.

These defined needs would help shape the committee's recommendations to develop procedures, standards and policy to integrate drones into the national airspace.

"This evaluation will establish a basis for estimating program costs and benefits during later steps in the process and will be considered during decision-making processes when establishing solutions to meet mission needs," states the October plan, which was obtained by ITP.

The plan was penned by the National Airspace System Access Working Group, which was created by and reports to an executive committee comprised of representatives from DOD, FAA, DHS and NASA. Titled "National Airspace System Access Plan for Federal Public Unmanned Aircraft Systems," the congressionally mandated plan was recently submitted to Capitol Hill as an attachment to DOD's final report on national airspace access.

The plan comes as there is an increased demand to fly drones at home to complete missions ranging from training and testing and evaluation to surveillance and homeland security. The number of requests to fly drones in the national airspace has increased 900 percent since 2004, the plan notes.

The plan instructs the executive committee members to conduct their reviews in a manner that allows the panel to make comparisons across the different agencies and to easily group similar characteristics and needs. The evaluations should examine requirements and resources necessary to fulfill the needs, challenges that could crop up, and "realistic and economic alternative solutions" to address them.

"Identifying common needs will provide for broader consideration across organizations and enable the development of joint solutions and activities that meet the needs of multiple agencies," the plan states.

By Dan Dupont
March 15, 2011 at 2:30 PM

The Joint Strike Fighter program office just out the following update on F-35 flight testing:

AF-4, a F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) aircraft, experienced a dual generator failure and oil leak while conducting flight test operations March 9 at Edwards AFB, CA. The test pilot was able to return the jet safely back to Edwards AFB. As a safety precaution, a Suspension to Operations (STOP) was issued on March 10 until the root cause of this occurrence was determined.

Since the incident, the F-35 Joint Program Office, Air Force and Navy System Commands and Lockheed Martin have collaborated to determine the root cause. The failed generators from AF-4 were inspected over the weekend. On the basis of that effort, and in combination with flight test data from the incident, it was determined that the dual generator failure was the result of a design artifact unique to a newer configuration of the generator.

The current F-35 fleet has two generator configurations. The newer generator had production initiated on AF-4, BF-5, and CF-1. As a result of our understanding of what system failed and the contributing factors, the Joint Program Office has rescinded the STOP today for aircraft flying the older generator configuration (AF-1/2/3, BF-1/2/3/4). The Suspension to Operations continues for the balance of the SDD fleet and all Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft in flight ops configured with the newer generator.

Determination of root cause and potential mitigating actions has the highest priority on the F-35 Team. Impact to SDD execution and production ops is being assessed.

By John Liang
March 14, 2011 at 8:40 PM

Naval Air Systems Command recently made official its decision to award Northrop Grumman a single-source contract for a common controller for Global Hawk and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles. Northrop is the primary contractor for Global Hawk.

In a March 11 Federal Business Opportunities notice, NAVSEA states it is awarding Northrop a 20-month contract worth nearly $25.6 million for the "Global Hawk and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) common, autonomous airborne sense and avoid initial design efforts."

According to the purchase justification document appended to the notice:

The ABSAA system must be designed and developed as a subsystem for integration into the Global Hawk and BAMS UAVs. As the sole weapon system designer, developer, and integrator for both the BAMS and Global Hawk systems, only Northrop Grumman has the necessary technical information, tooling, facilities and personnel to successfully design a common system at the requisite TRL. Additionally, the BAMS UAS is still in the SDD phase and has not completed CDR. As such, the overall design configuration of the BAMS UAS is not stable enough to procure technical data. Therefore, it is not feasible to procure accurate technical data to provide a contractor other than Northrop Grumman to complete this ABSAA design task.

Inside the Navy reported last month that it may be some time before the Navy can create a common controller for unmanned vehicles that covers the aerial and underwater domains. Rear Adm. Matthew Klunder, the service's director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, at an industry conference on Feb. 3 described the UXV control station as a platform that would treat control programs for new vehicles like applications on an iPhone. Further:

Klunder said he expects the controller to take on systems like Fire Scout, as well as vehicles like the Medium-Range Unmanned Aerial System and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Aerial Surveillance System.

"Right now we are building into the requirements and the specifications to ensure that those control stations should be able to service all of those platforms," he said.

He acknowledged that legacy systems will likely need patches to become compatible with the controller.

However, he noted, "That domain exchange between undersea and air is tough. I don't want to oversell."

He said the Navy is working on creating a system that can bridge the gap between the domains, adding, "I don't want to tell you right today at this hour that I'm as confident on branching through that yet. We're striving for it."

By Cid Standifer
March 14, 2011 at 8:09 PM

The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System re-entered full System Functional Demonstration testing today, almost three months after the program's first live aircraft launches uncovered a glitch, according to a Naval Air Systems Command spokesman.

Rob Koon told Inside the Navy today that the “control software issue” was discovered during testing in the run-up to the initial aircraft launches on Dec. 20. Since then, the program has spent two months fiddling with EMALS' software and conducting no-load and dead-load testing to fix the problem.

Koon said the software upgrades will help the catapult manage force transitions between linear motor sections as it shuttles the aircraft down the rail.

Sean Stackley, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, mentioned the issue at a congressional hearing last week.

“We did take a pause because . . . while we were working on these changes or corrections coming out of the live aircraft testing, we did not want to have a standing Army on the test side that was performing inefficiently,” Stackley told lawmakers on March 9. “We're coming back with corrections.”

By John Liang
March 14, 2011 at 7:39 PM

Australia wants to buy a C-17A Globemaster cargo aircraft, according to a recent Defense Security Cooperation Agency statement. The aircraft, along with "associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support," has an estimated value of $300 million, the DSCA statement reads. Further:

Australia is one of our most important allies in the Western Pacific. The strategic location of this political and economic power contributes significantly to ensuring peace and economic stability in the region. Australia’s efforts in operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations have made a significant impact on regional, political, and economic stability and have served U.S. national security interests. This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives and facilitates burden sharing with our allies.

Australia currently has a heavy airlift capability comprised of four C-17As. This additional C-17 will further improve Australia’s capability to rapidly deploy in support of global coalition operations and will also greatly enhance its ability to lead regional humanitarian/peacekeeping operations such as its current response to the Queensland flooding, cyclone aftermath and the New Zealand Earthquake.

Australia has the ability to absorb and employ the additional C-17. The C-17 fleet is based at Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Amberley. RAAF Base Amberley is the primary base for airlift and tanker aircraft and is currently undergoing the infrastructure upgrades required to support the C-17 and other large aircraft Australia already received or is under contract to purchase.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the Boeing Company in Long Beach, California. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Australia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Last month, the Defense Department asked Congress for permission to sell a decade's worth of maintenance services to Australia to sustain 24 MH-60R helicopters, a deal that could be worth up to $1.6 billion. As InsideDefense.com reported at the time:

According to a Feb. 2 Defense Security Cooperation Agency statement, the 10-year, "Through-Life-Support" (TLS) sustainment contract would "include spare and repair parts provisioning, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support." . . .

Because Australia already has S-70B helicopters in its inventory, the country "will have no difficulty performing the actions necessary to properly sustain these additional helicopters," according to DSCA.

Stratford, CT-based Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Owego, NY-based Lockheed Martin, Lynn, MA-based General Electric and Raytheon's Portsmouth, RI, facility will be the prime contractors, the statement reads, adding: "There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale."

By John Liang
March 14, 2011 at 3:33 PM

Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) is urging the White House to clarify the Environmental Protection Agency's and other agencies' roles -- including the Pentagon's -- in overseeing nuclear emergency response plans. His concern is a lack of adequate plans could leave the government agencies unable to respond to disasters similar to the plant meltdowns and radiation releases that took place in Japan following the March 11 earthquake and resulting tsunami, InsideEPA.com reports this morning:

Citing an Inside EPA article that shows EPA and other agencies have no plan to determine which agency would oversee off-site cleanup in the event of a large-scale nuclear accident, Markey urged President Obama in a March 13 letter to prioritize federal planning for nuclear disaster and require EPA and other agencies to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities in such a situation.

"In stark contrast to the scenarios contemplated for oil spills and hurricanes, there is no specificity for emergency coordination and command in place for a response to a nuclear disaster," Markey wrote, adding that "the tragic events in Japan highlight the need for more intensive and specific nuclear disaster response plans."

In Japan, several nuclear generating units located at least two plants suffered partial meltdowns after backup generators failed to provide cooling water when the plants were shut down following the massive 8.9 magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami. Thousands of nearby residents have been evacuated and are being monitored and treated for radiation exposure while several plant workers have suffered radiation poisoning.

Markey said that the nuclear emergencies in Japan are diverting emergency responders from rescuing victims of the natural disasters because they are "instead being compelled to flood nuclear reactors with water from the ocean to halt the imminent meltdown" of nuclear plants, "screen toddlers for radiation exposure and evacuate hundreds of thousands of citizens."

Markey, citing a review of the Inside EPA article and related documents, suggested the United States is unprepared to respond to a similar disaster because "it appears that no agency sees itself as clearly in command of emergency response in a nuclear disaster."

Markey's letter states:

In stark contrast to the scenarios contemplated for oil spills and hurricanes, there is no specificity for emergency coordination and command and control in place for a response to a nuclear disaster. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework says that "The Secretary [of Homeland Security] is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies." Yet the Annex also indicates that, depending on the type of incident, the Coordinating Agency may instead be the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, EPA, NRC, or U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). When my staff was briefed by staffs of the EPA and NRC, they were informed by both agencies that there is no clarity regarding which agency would be in charge of the various aspects of a response to a nuclear disaster, and that the identity of the lead Federal agency is dependent on many different factors. One Agency official essentially told my staff that if a nuclear incident occurred, they would all get on the phone really quickly and figure it out.

By
March 11, 2011 at 9:25 PM

Lockheed Martin just released a statement to InsideDefense.com confirming reports of a suspension in F-35 flight operations:

AF-4, one of 10 F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) aircraft currently in flight test, experienced a dual generator failure and oil leak during flight operations on Wednesday, March 9, at Edwards AFB, Calif. The jet returned safely to base. As a routine safety precaution, the Joint Program Office (JPO) has temporarily suspended F-35 flight operations until a team of JPO and LM technical experts determines the root cause of the generator failure and oil leak. Once the cause is known, the appropriate repairs and improvements will be made before flight operations resume.

By John Liang
March 11, 2011 at 8:43 PM

A new Government Accountability Office report released today finds that the Navy "did not sufficiently analyze alternative acquisition approaches" for the Next Generation Enterprise Network, the program that is supposed to replace the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.

GAO found that the Navy's "alternatives analysis contained key weaknesses, and none of the alternatives assessed match the current acquisition approach." Specifically:

[T]he cost estimates for the respective alternatives were not reliable because they were not substantially accurate, and they were neither comprehensive nor credible. Further, the operational effectiveness analysis, the other key aspect of an analysis of alternatives, did not establish and analyze sufficient measures for assessing each alternative's ability to achieve program goals and deliver program capabilities. Moreover, the acquisition approach that DON is actually pursuing was not one of the alternatives assessed in the analysis, and it is riskier and potentially costlier than the alternatives analyzed because it includes a higher number of contractual relationships.

GAO found that the Navy's analysis "reflects the most that could be done in the time that was available to complete it, and [service officials] do not view the alternative selected as materially different from the assessed alternatives, even though it is about $4.7 billion more costly."

Additionally, the report states that the Navy "does not have a reliable schedule for executing NGEN." Specifically:

Only two of the four subschedules that GAO reviewed, each of which help form the master schedule, adequately satisfied any of the nine practices that are associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. These weaknesses have contributed to delays in key program milestones. During the course of GAO's review, DON stated that action was taken to address some, but not all, of these weaknesses. According to program officials, schedule estimating was constrained by staffing limitations. NGEN acquisition decisions were not always performance- and risk-based. In particular, the program was approved in the face of known performance shortfalls and risks. For example, the program was approved at a key acquisition review despite the lack of defined requirements, which was recognized as a risk that would impact the completion of other key documents, such as the test plan. This risk was later realized as a critical issue. According to program officials, the decisions to proceed were based on their view that they had sufficiently mitigated known risks and issues. Collectively, these weaknesses mean that DON does not have a sufficient basis for knowing that it is pursuing the best approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities and the program's cost and schedule performance is unlikely to track to estimates. GAO is recommending that DOD limit further investment in NGEN until it conducts an interim review to reconsider the selected acquisition approach and addresses issues discussed in this report. In its comments, DOD stated that it did not concur with the recommendation to reconsider its acquisition approach; GAO maintains that without doing so, DOD cannot be sure it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach.

Consequently, GAO makes the following recommendations:

To ensure that NGEN capabilities are acquired in the most cost-effective manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an interim NGEN milestone review.

To ensure that NGEN capabilities are acquired in the most cost-effective manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to immediately limit further investment in NGEN until this review has been conducted and a decision on how best to proceed has been reported to the Secretary of Defense and congressional defense committees.

To facilitate implementation of the acquisition approach resulting from the review, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that the NGEN integrated master schedule substantially reflects the key schedule estimating practices.

To facilitate implementation of the acquisition approach resulting from the review, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that future NGEN gate reviews and decisions fully reflect the state of the program's performance and its exposure to risks.

Inside the Navy reported in October that the service had transitioned to a continuity-of-services contract with Hewlett-Packard to keep NMCI up and running into fiscal year 2014 as the Navy prepared to put out the first request for proposals for NGEN. Moreover:

The service had originally planned to replace the 10-year-old NMCI program with NGEN on Oct. 1, but in April 2009 officials told reporters the transition was more complex than they envisioned and the service would need 43 months to phase in NGEN, during which NMCI would need to remain operational. Capt. Scott Weller, NMCI program manager, and Capt. Timothy Holland, NGEN program manager, told reporters in an Oct. 13 teleconference call that there would be little recognizable change over the next three-and-a-half years for the end user, but the Navy will take a greater role in the operation of the network.

"Continuity of services is just that: It supports a continuation of NMCI services while we transition to NGEN," Weller said. "By roughly 2014, we'll have all of NGEN in place with multiple contracts and at least two vendors."

The original contract for NMCI called for the vendor to basically run the network and make all necessary procurements, but officials now want the Navy to have greater say in the operation of the network. The Navy has already acquired copyrights from HP and will buy infrastructure from the company on an as-needed basis as leadership figures out how many government workers the Navy should have in key positions operating the network as opposed to the contractor.

By John Liang
March 11, 2011 at 5:14 PM

Defense Secretary Robert Gates earlier today sought to buck up NATO member states under pressure by their citizens to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, warning alliance defense ministers in Brussels of his "very serious concern" that progress made in that country could be threatened by "ill-timed, precipitous, or uncoordinated national drawdowns." Further:

I am very concerned that if we do not maintain the unity and commitment to success we expressed at Lisbon, the progress we now see could be threatened. Unfortunately, some of the recent rhetoric that is coming from capitals on this continent is calling into question that resolve.  Frankly, there is too much talk about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done right. Too much discussion of exit and not enough discussion about continuing the fight. Too much concern about when and how many troops might redeploy, and not enough about what needs to be done before they leave.

Now, I say this while recognizing the intense pressure that many nations face to reduce their commitment. We have all made extraordinary contributions to this effort, in the face of fiscal austerity and political pressure. The U.S. has surged 30,000 new troops in the past year for a total of nearly 100,000, and we have tripled our civilian commitment. We are spending $120 billion a year to sustain this effort and are seeking $12.8 billion to build the Afghan Army and Police in 2012. We, like many of you, suffered more casualties in 2010 than in any previous year of the war. These are the tragic costs of success, but we bear them because it is in our shared security interests to do so. And in order to ensure that these sacrifices are not squandered, we need to keep our focus on succeeding in our missions, and not get pulled away prematurely.

When President Obama ordered the 30,000 U.S. surge forces, he said the United States would begin a responsible drawdown in July 2011. Thanks to the progress we have made, we are setting the right circumstances to begin to reduce some of those U.S. surge forces in July, but we will do that based on conditions on the ground and in coordination with NATO and our allies.  We will not sacrifice the significant gains made to date, or the lives lost, for a political gesture.

In return, we expect the same from your nations. Let me be clear – uncoordinated national drawdowns would risk the gains made to date. Considerations about any drawdown of forces must be driven by security conditions and the ISAF commander’s operational needs, and not by mathematical calculation shaped by political concern.

By Dan Dupont
March 10, 2011 at 10:21 PM

The Pentagon just announced that the president has nominated Army Lt. Gen. Robert Cone for a fourth star and the job of commander, Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA.

Cone is the commanding general of III Corps and Ft. Hood, TX.

Also announced: Army Maj. Gen. Donald Campbell has been nominated to succeed Cone at Ft. Hood (a three-star post). Campbell "most recently served as commanding general, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, KY," DOD said.

By Christopher J. Castelli
March 10, 2011 at 3:41 PM

Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Lynn told the Senate Budget Committee this morning there are three reasons sticking with the current continuing resolution for the rest of the year would harm the Defense Department.

Lynn's said this would cut DOD's funding by $23 billion compared with the request, leaving "inadequate funding to carry out our national security commitments properly."

Second, a yearlong CR would leave the funding DOD does get in the wrong places, he noted.

And third, a yearlong CR robs DOD of the flexibility to start new weapons programs and boost production rates, he said.

By John Liang
March 9, 2011 at 8:21 PM

The Senate Armed Services Committee has launched an investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department's supply chain, according to a statement just released by the panel. Further:

Counterfeit electronic parts pose a risk to our national security, the reliability of our weapons systems and the safety of our military men and women. The proliferation of counterfeit goods also damages our economy and costs American jobs. The presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the Defense Department’s supply chain is a growing problem that government and industry share a common interest in solving. Over the course of our investigation, the Committee looks forward to the cooperation of the Department of Defense and the defense industry to help us determine the source and extent of this problem and identify possible remedies for it.

InsideDefense.com reported at the end of last year that lawmakers -- after objections from the Pentagon -- dropped a proposal that would have required the defense secretary to appoint a senior official as the executive agent for preventing counterfeit microelectronics from entering the defense supply chain. During 2010, the House passed a version of the fiscal year 2011 defense authorization bill that called for the executive agent. However, according to the Dec. 28 story:

Senate authorizers included no such proposal in their version. Following objections from the Defense Department, lawmakers omitted the provision from the final version of the bill passed this month by the House and Senate.

The proposal would have put the executive agent in charge of developing a strategy, implementation plan and fiscal blueprint to "identify, mitigate, prevent, and eliminate counterfeit microelectronics from the defense supply chain." The official also would have assessed trends in counterfeit microelectronics.

The nixed provision defined "counterfeit microelectronic" as "any type of integrated circuit or other microelectronic component that consists of a substitute or unauthorized copy of a valid product from an original manufacturer; a product in which the materials used or the performance of the product has been changed without notice other than the original manufacturer of the product; or a substandard component misrepresented by the supplier of such component."

But DOD distanced itself from that definition and objected to the provision, asking lawmakers to wait for the results of an ongoing Pentagon review.  In an appeal sent to Congress and reviewed by Inside the Pentagon, the department argued the ongoing review involving industry suppliers and DOD agencies and components would consider the need for an executive agent and write a definition for "counterfeit."

A joint effort between the Pentagon's procurement shop and the office of DOD's chief information officer -- the Countering Counterfeits Tiger Team (C2T2) -- would "address DOD's vulnerabilities associated with counterfeits in our supply chains and methods to mitigate risks caused by those counterfeits, to include but not limited to information, communications technology and electronics," the appeal stated. The effort would provide findings, a proposed strategy and a plan of action to senior DOD officials in "fall 2010," the Nov. 19 appeal added.