The Insider

As InsideDefense.com's Jason Sherman reported yesterday in a must-read piece, the defense secretary -- and not the White House, as others have suggested -- has told everyone involved in the process of retooling the FY-10 defense budget they must sign a nondisclosure agreement that says they won't talk to anyone about it.

Gates, according to defense officials, signed the first such pledge on Feb. 13 at a high-level meeting with the top brass and newly appointed Obama administration Pentagon officials. Following his lead, everyone from four-star generals to office managers involved in the budget review must commit in writing to discuss budget deliberations only with those immediately involved in the process.

“We're dealing with highly sensitive matters involving programs costing tens of billions of dollars,” Geoff Morrell, Gates' spokesman, told InsideDefense.com on Feb. 23.

There are, of course, billions of dollars at stake here as the Pentagon tries to bring the defense budget in line with the Obama administration's priorities in a very short time frame. (Topline figures on the budget come out tomorrow, but the details won't be available until late next month.) But the nondisclosure agreements are, to say the least, unusual -- despite what Morrell, the spokesman, said today in a briefing to reporters. From the transcript, which we'll have for you shortly:

Q Did this directive come from the White House . . . or was this a Gates (decision ?)?

MR. MORRELL: It was the secretary's idea. And it's not terribly unusual. . . .

Q It's highly unusual.

MR. MORRELL: Well, but it was used during the BRAC process, I understand.

Q It wasn't used in any budget process I've been covering, even under Rumsfeld, "Mr. Disclosure" himself.

MR. MORRELL: This is -- this is a big deal to the secretary. . . .

Q Is the concern in the entirety the budget process, or is there also a concern that there could be some manipulation or problems on Wall Street at a very volatile time?

MR. MORRELL: I think it's a number of things. I think -- well, our primary -- the secretary's primary concern is the budget process. But we're not naive, either. We understand these involve huge corporations that have a lot riding on the outcome of these discussions. . . .

Q If the information is classified, there's criminal penalties for disclosing it. So that is clearly something people are not supposed to do anyhow. Are we talking -- are you talking about nondisclosure of certain unclassified information? Is that what we're talking about here?

MR. MORRELL: I think most of the information that's probably being discussed is classified. But there's a process that the secretary wants to keep as collegial and confidence-building as possible. So you know, it doesn't have to be germane, necessarily, to speaking to a classified briefing paper that they are working with.

The whole process the secretary wants to keep out of the limelight. He wants to keep it secret, because ultimately it needs to be judged on the whole and not bits and pieces which may leak out. And he wants people to participate in this with the confidence of knowing that what they are saying is not being leaked, it's not being disseminated, and therefore we can work together perhaps in a more collegial and honest way and come up with a better product.

Q What does it say, Geoff, about the secretary's own confidence in his most senior military and civilian advisers that he requires them to sign a piece of paper rather than just say, "I expect you not to talk," and believe that they won't talk? What does it say --

MR. MORRELL: The secretary signed the agreement himself. He's subjecting himself to the same standard that he's asked of those who are working for him.

. . . He wants to create . . . an environment in which the best possible budget can be built. And he believes the only way to do that is to make sure that we are doing this in a utter and complete secrecy until that budget is rolled out.

Q But if it's secret, Geoff . . . if information is secret and therefore classified, there are criminal penalties for disclosing it, why --

MR. MORRELL: Barbara, you've been around here long enough to know that classified information with potential criminal consequences gets leaked all the time. This is to reinforce the message that indeed this is classified material, these are highly secret discussions, and we should remember that, be mindful of it and honor it.

Q Did he require the Joint Chiefs -- if he signed it, did he require --

MR. MORRELL: Everybody who is participating signed it. There is no one -- and if you didn't sign it, you aren't participating. So if you want to be a part of the budget process, you had to sign it.

Q Can you just for the record tell us, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff sign this?

MR. MORRELL: Every -- everyone is -- yes, all the chiefs signed it.

Q Did you sign one?

MR. MORRELL: I am not participating in the process, which allows me to speak to you with total honesty and a clean -- clear conscience, and so no, I'm not participating in the process.

Q So he doesn't think the issue of classification of sufficient.

MR. MORRELL: I think I've answered the question several times. . . .

Q How does that level of secrecy and control at the beginning square with the new administration's stated goal of maximum transparency throughout all -- the whole process?

MR. MORRELL: I don't think the administration has been advocating a -- transparency in national security matters. I think that at the end of this it will be apparent to everyone where the secretary is and the process -- what the process has yielded. But I do not believe that the president's call for greater transparency means that we should get rid of classification of materials that are highly sensitive. . . .

Q You're leaving the impression with the viewers and listeners that a lot of the material -- the budget material is, like, stamped "Top Secret" and sensitive, compartmented and all that, when, in fact, most of this is for official use only, or unclassified. I mean, do you need to bound this a little bit so that you -- people don't think the Pentagon Papers are being floated around here -- the budget season?

MR. MORRELL: . . . . If, indeed, not all the materials that this gang is working with are marked "secret" or are classified and therefore for official use only, all the more reason for a nondisclosure agreement so that those matters could not be discussed as well.

The bottom line is, the process is one, the secretary wishes to keep close hold while it is under way. When it's appropriate, when decisions have been made, when he has a budget to present, he will do so, I am confident, in a very open and transparent fashion so everybody knows what the end result is and likely how we got there. Okay?

Ever since the Australian government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2006 to become a partner nation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, an “independent” think tank calling itself Air Power Australia has been all over the fifth-generation jet's capabilities. Suffice to say whoever's behind the JSF campaign isn't a fan.

But JSF Program Executive Officer Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Davis told Inside the Air Force last week that he has not paid much attention to this “small faction” in the land down under. In fact, the general said, “We've wasted more time on this group than we needed to.”

His reason?

It's a fairly small faction in Australia that has a fairly clear agenda of trying to extend the life of the F-111 and try to force the Australian government to demand the release of the F-22 to Australia. That's their overriding objective. If you read their all their articles, you will see articles that spend an incredible amount of time and detail trying to discredit everything on the F-35 while never comparing or questioning or, if you will, describe anything about the F-22, so it's pretty clear their whole idea is to do everything they can to change the Australian government's ((mind)) to buy the F-22. Their whole . . . premise is that, one day, all by itself, an F-35 will meet a Sikhoi MKI somewhere, all by itself, over the Pacific Ocean, and who will come out ahead? They have no concept of the modern warfare and systems of operations and airborne battle systems and coalition ops -- they just have no concept of that; it's all one-v-one airplane and who can turn the fastest quickest. That's a very 1950s-type of mindset. Keep in mind that one of the individuals that does this a member of the Parliament with a degree in physics, but he's enlisted some of the folks who have further degrees to do a rudimentary analysis of the structure of the F-35, and the most telling that they seem to focus on is because the F-22's bottom fuselage is smooth and the F-35's bottom fuselage has some curvatures, we hence have no (low-observable) capability when you look at us from the side. Their rudimentary understanding of stealth completely discounts the fact that there are a variety of different technologies including materials and different aspects that go well beyond the shape of the airplane to be able to . . . enhance radar cross-section. They're doing it from strictly a wire-frame analysis of the shape of the fuselage compared to something else.

Davis added that the JSF program office, rather than spurring an open debate with this group, “kind of just let them go and have their own little party down there.”

However, these articles have been “concerning for other partner nations" because “they read all this and it comes across quite authoritative and detailed, and so they are concerned about that,” Davis said. “Because of that, and because this comes across as appearing to be a very deep analysis when there is a very clear agenda behind it, is a difficult thing to dispute with partners.”

The “good news,” according to the two-star, is that the 13 services from the nine countries participating in the JSF effort have participated in live simulator events using data at the top secret and "special access required" level, which has the “most true representation of the airplane as we know it.” With simulations of airborne scenarios against Defense Intelligence Agency-certified models of surface-to-air missile threats, air-to-air threats and others, the partners are convinced that “this airplane can do basically what we're saying it can do, which basically discounts the articles we're dealing with in Australia,” according to Davis, who added Air Power Australia has not been briefed on the aircraft at this level of fidelity.

More from Davis:

When (the Norwegians) finally made their down-select, and all the dust and fur had settled from the battle with Gripen, and the cost of maintaining it and the cost of the industrial participation aspects, the Norwegians were very clear: they may someday, because of their geographic location, face a very highly advanced threat to their east, and it may run over them from the North Sea, or something else might happen, and some of those folks that (will) not necessarily always be friendly to their aspirations -- they may have to engage with an F-35. They basically said, 'We picked the F-35 because of that potential scenario, and we want the best airplane with the most stealth, the most sensors, the most networking capability, and the most coalition, if you will, capabilities to meet that threat if it should ever come.' They understand, in a very uncertain world, when you're going to have some friends and some enemies, you're going to want to fully operate with your friends and you want to overwhelm the enemy. It's not a one-v-one over the North Sea that they will necessarily see.

Make sure to read this week's issue of ITAF to hear more from Davis on JSF international partner news.

In the weeks since President Barack Obama took the oath of office, his administration has been almost solely focused on rescuing the U.S. economy. But putting together a federal budget for fiscal year 2010 is near the top of the priority list, too.

On Feb. 26 the White House will release a 2010 budget overview, with the full budget request slated for release in April.

According to a memo sent out yesterday by Peter Orszag, the head of the White House budget office, we'll have to wait until April for real details on what the Defense Department's spending plans will look like in 2010 -- no one in the administration will be allowed to go any further than what's handed out next week. Orszag told the government's department and agency heads:

In the coming weeks, you and your representatives will be testifying before Congressional committees in support of the Administration's FY 2010 Budget and participating in public events focused on budget initiatives. For the period between the February 26 release of the Administration's FY 2010 Budget Overview and the April release of the full FY 2010 President's Budget, your testimony and public disclosures should be limited to the information contained in the Budget Overview. The agency summaries in the Overview provide highlights of the agency budget; the Overview also describes certain Administration initiatives and other proposals. You should not make commitments about specific programs not specifically mentioned in the Overview or address account level details until the release of the full Budget in April.

Stay tuned right here, though, because we will do our best to get you the details the White House is hanging on to until April.

Admittedly, there are probably a few obstacles standing in the way of some kind of U.S.-Russian ballistic missile defense cooperation. But the thought of long-range nuclear-tipped missiles flying out of Iran one day has leaders in Moscow and Washington worried enough that the idea has gained some appeal while the Bush-era plans for a Poland- and Czech Republic-based system are under review.

Dean Wilkening, a Stanford University professor researching the technical feasibility of various European missile defense configurations, now throws a hypothetical, suitable Russian site into the mix that could come out of such an unprecedented pact.

In an updated briefing he sent us this week, Wilkening argues the combination of a tracking radar and interceptors located in Armavir, Russia, would cover most of Europe plus a good chunk of Russia against ballistic missiles from Iran.

According to his slides, the joint U.S.-Russian site would ...

"-- Protect western Russia, Europe and the US from non-stressing threats; -- protect Europe (except Turkey) and western Russia (except southern Russia) from depressed trajectories and low-((radar cross section)) threats; ((and)) -- protect the United States from low-RCS threats."

No word on whether an Armavir site will be featured in an upcoming Congressional Budget Office report about European missile defense options.

Inside the Army's Joe Gould this week has a piece on the Army and the QDR that sums up the official line and taps some outside experts for their thoughts on what it's all going to mean for the service once it's all said and done.

A taste:

The Army expects to tackle big questions in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, from how big the Army should be to whether China is a friend or foe, but the service has yet to receive any direct guidance, according to the director of the Army’s QDR office.

“We’re waiting to know when we can cross the starting line to see what issues we will be working on,” Brig. Gen. Francis Mahon, director of QDR for the office of the deputy chief of staff, G-8, said last week. “As we look forward to the QDR, the game hasn’t started; we haven’t been given, really, a focus.”

That guidance may come soon. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hosted a Defense Senior Leaders Conference Feb. 13 to discuss the budget with the Pentagon’s highest-level military and civilian leaders, including the combatant commanders and recently confirmed administration appointees (see related story).

Gates had said earlier this month that he planned to launch the review by the end of February.

Meanwhile, the service is looking for clues where they can find them from Gates’ previous speeches, articles and testimony to Congress.

“We’re probably going to launch using the June 2008 National Defense Strategy as our starting point, and all the things the secretary has been saying,” said Mahon in a presentation to retired officers and defense contractors on Feb. 13. “He may give us a narrow focus in this QDR. In his testimony, he’s said we’re going to make some ‘hard choices.’”

Mahon’s slides quoted from Gates’ recent speech at the National Defense University, a much discussed article Gates wrote for Foreign Affairs magazine, and comments he made recently to reporters that touched on stability operations, Russia and China, among other big issues.

“Is China an adversary or a competitor?” asked Mahon, referencing a Gates quotation. “He thinks they’re more of a competitor. If you read some of President Obama’s writings, or his staff’s writings, he thinks we ought to embrace China.”

Quoted in the piece are several outside experts, including John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security and a retired Army officer; and Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, director of the military history program at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Both had lots to say on the Future Combat Systems program, among other issues.

If you're interested in more of what both had to say, you can read the transcripts of Joe's interviews.

And to keep tabs on the QDR, see our QDR Watch page and sign up for our QDR Alert.

The Air Force is quietly resuscitating its long-dormant human-based intelligence corps, according to Maj. Gen. Paul Dettmer, the service's assistant deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

In the early 1990s the air service cut its human intelligence (HUMINT) division to focus on high tech spy satellites, planes, radars and other signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms after the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, in the wake of 9/11, the Defense Department was directed to reinvigorate or even build “from scratch” human-based intelligence teams, according to Dettmer.

Over the last three years, the service has formed a much smaller cadre of HUMINT professionals focusing on getting the scoop on the latest technology being developed by air forces around the globe, said Dettmer during a Feb. 17 speech at an Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association luncheon in Arlington, VA.

“We have a nascent program started with a small detachment at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base” in Ohio, said Dettmer. “Our intent is not to regrow the old Air Force Special Activities Center that did covert, clandestine interrogation and a bunch of other things that would duplicate HUMINT efforts that are done elsewhere in DOD.”

Instead, the service's HUMINT professionals will focus on the newest, most secret tools being used by foreign air forces.

The Air Force's new spies “will focus on niche requirements of Air Force warfighting -- in particular, where we are lacking is HUMINT-resourced intelligence focused in the scientific and technical realm,” said Dettmer.

This plan to focus Air Force spies on technology was prompted after the service's F-15 fighter pilots were given a serious run for their money by Indian pilots -- who were in some cases flying modified MiG-21s -- during the Cope India exercise in 2004, according to the two-star. (Click here for Inside the Air Force's superb coverage of that event, from June 2004.)

“The Indians had some capabilities we were just not aware of, and it kind of blew our socks off in the air-to-air domain,” said Dettmer.

Mark Bowden recently wrote an analysis piece about the future of American air power in The Atlantic that discusses among other things how the Indian air force modified its fleet of soviet and French designed fighters to successfully compete against Air Force F-15s during the Cope India exercise.

A small country can buy a MiG 21 on the world weapons market for about $100,000, put in a better engine, add more-sophisticated radar and jamming systems, improve the cockpit design, and outfit it with “launch and leave” missiles comparable to the AMRAAM. These hybrid threats are more dangerous than any rival fighters America has seen in generations, and they cost much less than building a competitive fourth-generation fighter from scratch. The lower expense enables rival air forces to put more of them in the air, and because the F 15 can carry only so many munitions, American pilots found themselves overwhelmed by both technology and sheer numbers during the exercises over India.